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Law’s Haze, Police Ways, and Tech’s Maze
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Meghan B. Peterson, PhD
University of Connecticut, 2017
In this dissertation, I explore the role of law in policing operations targeting cyber sex offenders
in the United States. Specifically, I examine enforcement in this crime arena as part of an
ongoing expansion within the carceral, surveillance, risk-based state. I argue that imprecision
and lack of clarity within American law – particularly in the evolving world of online
interactions – generate hazy, arbitrary applications in law enforcement. On this point, I submit
that absence of legal clarity undermines law enforcement efforts to address crimes – both within
and beyond the cyber world. Distinctive spaces of online and tech-based socialization, paired
with the rapid evolution of technology, produce complex conditions for law enforcement. These
components are further nourished – indeed, created – by a pervasive lack of clarity within the
law. In short, law is unable to keep pace with the evolving nature of crime, the technologies of
crime, and finally, the technologies of crime response, deterrence, and prevention. In chronicling
the history of American sex crimes law enforcement broadly and cyber sex crimes specifically, I
trace the role of unclear law in the ongoing project of carceral state development. Through my
work on a State-mandated taskforce reviewing the Connecticut Sex Offender Registry, I also
document impetuses of carceral state construction in the criminal justice apparatus for
cataloging, monitoring, tracking, and surveilling of offenders. Moreover, I detect within the shift
toward risk-assessment criminal justice sanctions the move to predict and identify not-yetoffenders among the civilian population – a premise of the carceral state drive to subsume the
legal into those rendered illegal; the nonpunitive into the punitive; the civil into the penal.
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Prologue

1

In preparation for dissertation work, I had the opportunity to take Dr. Andrew Deener’s
Sociology Qualitative Methods I Seminar during the Fall of 2013 at the University of
Connecticut. For the course, I conducted semi-structured interviews with a primary contact,
“Trooper A,” who at the time was a state police detective and twenty-one-year veteran on the
force. We held weekly meetings and conversations in public spaces usually lasting upwards of
two to two and a half hours. Trooper A put me into touch with another state Trooper B, with
whom I was able to speak on several occasions via phone and on occasion in-person. The
following exchange comes from one of those conversations with Trooper A.
“So you still focusing on computer crimes?”
“Well, I think that the focus will remain on technology-assisted, technology-based crimes, but
that I am more flexible to shifting the focus to major crimes policing as well.”
“Yeah, good choice. I mean, most of the crimes today do revolve around some sort of
technological device: phone, IPad, laptop. You name it. Besides, the computer crimes lab doesn’t
even work with phones. They don’t have the equipment or training really to do so. We usually
send our guys up there to process the evidence on some of the equipment there. But again, it’s
our own guys. It’s not the computer crimes people doing it. I mean, look around and think about
it. Would you say you spend time on the phone more than your laptop?”
“Oh, yeah, I would say it’s probably more in favor of the phone actually in terms of the
breakdown. Maybe only when I am writing do I rely on my laptop more.”
“Exactly, so there you go. Same with people who commit crimes. They are going to use the
convenience of the phone. It’s like the alpaca case. I’ll never forget the kid in that one. I sat him
down for questioning and all he was doing was texting, thinking that I couldn’t see his thumbs
moving on the phone keypad. Trying to be covert. I shut him down right away.”
“The alpaca case? Oh, the one from a couple of years ago when the two kids allegedly murdered
all those alpacas on that farm in No-Name-Town?”1
“Yep, that’s the one. And so anyway, here this kid is sitting before me for questioning and he’s
trying to be all like ‘oh, you can’t see me texting my partner in crime, ha!” Well, after I question
him, I tell him that I am seizing his phone. He gets all arrogant and says, ‘You can’t take my
phone, you need a warrant for that!’ I tell the punk, actually, I don’t need a warrant for this
item. So you’re going to hand it over.”
“And what did he do?” I ask with bursting curiosity.
“He did. He did it reluctantly, but he handed it over. And boy, did I have to quickly make sure I
got that to the lab for processing. Didn’t want to give him and his buddy time to disconnect the
1

Pseudonym used to protect anonymity of law enforcement source.
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phone and erase information. You know, you can do that with an IPhone. Erase any information,
data, remotely. It’s horrible for us as police. I mean, it’s a privacy thing for the phone’s owner.
But it really makes it hard for us police to make sure we get the evidence we need right then and
there before it disappears. And you know, here he is trying to tell me how to do my job. Can’t
stand that, I wanted to tell him not to tell me how to do m job. Little did he know that there are
seven exceptions to the search warrant mandate. Seven exceptions that we can apply – like, for
example, in exigent circumstances – situations where we have strong reason to believe that if we
don’t get the item now, important evidence may be lost forever. But even then, I could only take
his phone. I could only seize it for processing. It’s not like I could go through it and start
scrolling for information. I had to then write up a search warrant for the contents of the phone
after his questioning.”
This manuscript is about law, police, sex, crime, and technology. It is about how
American law enforcement – and American society – is positioned in the crosshairs of
Information Age law and order. It is about how law – along with its enforcers and breakers –
operates in the wending rabbit-hole that is the online world. It is about how law, police, sex
crimes, and technology come together to fuel the fire and fan the flames of the expanding
carceral, surveillance-obsessed, risk-based state. And maybe, just maybe, it is about how citizens
can do something about it.

3

Chapter One

4

Law’s Haze, Police Ways, and Tech’s Maze
Relationships between American law, crime, and technology
Sex offenders are our modern-day monsters, producing tidal waves of public demand.2
As the Internet filled with people, people filled the Internet with everything that was the worst
and best about humanity…[i]n response, all police became the Internet police.3

Simon, Jonathan. 1998. “Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology.”
Psychology, Public Policy and Law 4(1-2): 452-467.
3
Anderson, Nate. The Internet Police: How Crime Went Online, And The Cops Followed. NY:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2013: 29.
2
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Introduction
The policing of cyber sex offenders marks a continued expansion of the carceral,
surveillance, risk-based state.4 This expansion of the carceral state seeps into society, producing
what I here call the “carceral-civil society.” This expansion and seepage come as direct results of
increasingly blurred lines – whether deliberately crafted or not – between penal institutions,
criminal justice practices and civil society. In this dissertation, I argue that imprecision and lack
of clarity within American law generate hazy, arbitrary applications in law enforcement.
Given the rapid evolution, escalation, and ubiquity of communicative technologies,
policing becomes especially challenging when rules of the game within social media websites or
cell phone apps change from day to day. Indeed, cyber policing provides a useful example of
shifts in contemporary law enforcement concepts and practices. More, these shifts are no
accident, for they are tethered to the unclear role of law in policing on this emergent front of
human socialization and engagement. That is, absence of legal clarity undermines law
enforcement efforts to address crimes – both within and beyond the cyber world. My argument

Following Foucault’s distillation of the carceral system as one that covers all manner of
punitive and disciplinary mechanisms (from the school classroom to the military formation), has
been a rich scholarly tradition focusing on the discipline-obsessed, surveillance-based,
penological-oriented state. For example, see Foucault’s “The Carceral” in Discipline and Punish;
Gottschalk, Marie. 2008. “Hiding in Plain Sight: American Politics and the Carceral State.”
Annual Review of Political Science 11: 235-260; Hinton, Elizabeth. 2016. From the War on
Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America. MA: Harvard
University Press; Simon, Jonathan. 2014. Mass Incarceration on Trial: A Remarkable Court
Decision and the Future of Prisons in America. NY: The New Press; Alexander, Michelle. 2010.
The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness. NY: The New Press;
Wacquant, Loic. 2009. Prisons of Poverty. MN: University of Minnesota Press; Wacquant, Loic.
2009. Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. VA: Duke
University Press; Beckett, Katherine, and Steve Herbert. 2009. Banished: The New Social
Control in Urban America. UK: Oxford University Press.
4
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proceeds along three points corresponding to shifts in concepts and practices of American law,
crime, and policing.
First, contemporary cyber policing replaces physical proximity with online ubiquity.
Officers exchange spatial closeness for virtual closeness. Second, criminal justice measures such
as public sex offender registries or GPS-tracking devices intersect online sex crimes with offline
repercussions. Illicit virtual identities and behaviors – which complicate constitutional First
Amendment doctrines on thought versus expression – exact criminal, social, and political
penalties. Third, online dynamics of police-cyber sex offender interactions reveal heightened
norms of self-surveillance and self-discipline despite tenuous mechanisms for compliance (e.g.,
problematic enforcement of sex offender registration). On the one hand, police aim to uphold the
law in the increasingly volatile social realm of online communications. On the other hand, cyber
sex offenders aim to hide from, subvert, and defy law. In both instances, abilities of law
enforcement agent and cyber sex offender to succeed are provisional. Success in either case is
contingent on technological prowess, cyber world know-how, and a new facility with selfdiscipline. For the agent, this skill takes form through “the how” – namely, speaking in ways
understandable to a cyber sex offender in order to conduct sustainable online sting operations.
For the cyber sex offender, however, self-discipline takes form through a discernment of the
“who” – a determination of whether the individual at the other end of the dialogue box is an
actual child or instead a police officer masquerading as one. Both scenarios, I contend, require a
unique combination of restraint and engagement in ways not replicated or sustained in offline sex
crimes policing operations.
In all, these dimensions (which are not altogether unique to cyber policing), resonate with
broader components of the contemporary American carceral, disciplinary, surveillance state.

7

Distinctive spaces of online and tech-based socialization, paired with the rapid evolution of
technology, produce complex conditions for law enforcement. More, these components are
further nourished – indeed, created – by a pervasive lack of clarity within the law. In short, law is
unable to keep pace with the evolving nature of crime, the technologies of crime, and finally, the
technologies of crime response, deterrence, and prevention.
I examine the policing of sex offenders broadly, with a particular eye toward offenders
who employ technology in the commission of their crimes in the United States. Since the
internet’s advent in the 1970s and 1980s, the topic of online sexual offenses against minors has
gained increasing attention to the United States.5 One in five minors receives sexual solicitations
from individuals they meet in online chat rooms or instant messaging forums (Mitchell, Wolak
and Finkelhor 2005).6 A 2008 NCMEC survey reports that one in seven U.S. children and teens
receive online sexual solicitations (McGhee et al. 2011). Between 1996 and 2002, online child
pornography increased by approximately 2,000% (Federal Sentencing Reporter 2011). Between
2005 and 2009, the United States housed the largest share of commercial child pornography web
sites, accounting for nearly half of global volume (Federal Sentencing Reporter 2011). In 2016,
NCMEC’s CyberTipline, which the organization touts as a “national mechanism for the public
and electronic service providers to report instances of suspected child sexual exploitation,”

5

The internet as we know it today has gone through multiple iterations, the first of which was the
primitive yet impressive ARPAnet, developed by a scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. During the late 1970s, computer scientist Vinton Cerf developed the transmission
control protocol and the internet protocol, which enabled computers from any part of the world
to communicate with one another – no matter the distance. See “The Invention of the Internet.”
http://www.history.com/topic/inventions/invention-of-the-internet. Accessed 24 April 2017.
6 Mitchell, Kimberly J., Janis Wolak and David Finkelhor. 2005. “Police Posing as Juveniles
Online to Catch Sex Offenders: Is it Working?” Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and
Treatment 17(3): 241-67.
8

received 8.2 million reports pertaining to complaints involving online enticement, child sex
trafficking, child sexual molestation, and evidence of child sexual abuse images.7
In 1990, Congress passed the first law banning child pornography possession (SpearIt
2011).8 In the midst of rising usage of, and concern about, the internet, the Office of Juvenile
Justice (under U.S. Department of Justice authority) created the Internet Crimes Against
Children task forces (ICAC) in 1998. According to its website, ICAC helps state and local law
enforcement agencies tackle technology-assisted, internet-facilitated crimes against children.9 In
a survey of U.S. police departments serving cities with populations of 50,000 or above, Marcum,
Higgins and Freiburger (2010) document an increase in police taskforces specializing in and
conducting, child pornography investigations.10 Writing for the Journal of Sexual Aggression,
Hackett, Oelrich and Krapohl (2011) note that child pornography offenders are increasingly
becoming a major concern for criminal justice authorities and psychological treatment
providers.11 Describing public perception of the internet and cybercrime, Lincoln and Coyle
(2012) note how Americans fear the “capacity for deception” and anonymity that cyberspace
fosters.12 Likewise, Belvins, Holt and Burkert (2009) explain how the “ubiquity” of computers

“Key Facts about the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.” April 24 2017.
http://www.missingkids.com/KeyFacts.
8
SpearIt. 2011. “Child Pornography Sentencing and Demographic Data: Reforming Through
Research.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 24(2): 102-107.
9 “ICAC Task Force Program.” April 24 2017. https://www.icactaskforce.org.
10
Marcum, Catherine D., George E. Higgins and Tina L. Freiburger. 2010. “Policing possession
of child pornography online: investigating the training and resources dedicated to the
investigation of cyber crime.” International Journal of Police Science & Management 12(4):
516-525.
11 Hackett, Simon, Marty Oelrich and Donald Krapohl. 2010. “Cybersex offender risk
assessment. An explorative study.” Journal of Sexual Aggression 16(2): 197-209.
12 Lincoln, Robyn and Ian R. Coyle. 2012. “No One knows you’re a dog on the internet:
implications for proactive police investigation of sexual offenders.” Psychiatry, Psychology and
Law 20(2): 294-300.
7
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and the internet have generated online-based criminal “subcultures” or communities.13
Researchers make clear that cyber sex crimes against minors is an issue warranting public
scrutiny, law enforcement response, and academic study (Simon 1998; Farkas and Stichman
2002; Harrison 2006; Hebenton and Seddon 2009; Quayle and Taylor 2011; Roos 2014).14
A plethora of research exists on policing, cybercrime, technology, and sex offenders.
While there is considerable attention given to the “new penology,” on the one hand, and
cybercrime, on the other, scholars have yet to pursue questions about the ways that policing
cyber sex offenders expands the contemporary carceral, surveillance, risk-based state. At the
same time, there is little research by scholars exploring the ways that policing cyber sex
offenders carries significant implications for – perhaps even shifts in – the politics of criminal
justice in the United States.
Psychologists and sociologists have done extensive work investigating differences
between sex offenders and cyber sex offenders (Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson 2000; Bensimon
2007; Babchishin, Hanson and Hermann 2011; Elliott, Beech and Mandeville-Norden 2013;
Babchishin et al. 2015). Legal and constitutional scholars have examined sex offender defense
issues pertaining to First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and entrapment issues (moore and
McGrain 2010; Urbas 2010; Wynton 2011; Eagan 2013). Several law and society scholars also
discuss how trends in criminalization and punishment of sex offenders highlight a “new
Thomas, J. Holt, Kristie R. Blevins and Natasha Burkett. 2009. “Examining the Virtual
Subculture of Johns. Annals of Sex Research 22(1): 3-24.
14
See Farkas, Mary Ann and Amy Stichman. 2002. “Sex Offender Laws: Can Treatment,
Punishment, Incapacitation, and Public Safety be Reconciled.” Criminal Justice Review 27(2):
256-283. Hebenton, B. and T. Seddon. 2009. “From dangerousness to precaution: managing
sexual and violent offenders in an insecure and uncertain age.” British Journal of Criminology
49(3): 343-362; Quayle, Ethel and Max Taylor. 2011. “Social Networking as a nexus for
engagement and exploitation of young people.” Information Security Technical Report 16(2): 4450; Roos, Hanna. 2014. “Trading the sexual child: child pornography and the commodification
of children in society.” Texas Journal of Women and the Law 23(2): 131-156.
13

10

penology” as well as a politics of crime (Feeley and Simon 1992; Simon 1998; Scheingold
2011). According to this new penology, American criminal justice shifted from the rehabilitative
model of disciplining and later integrating criminals into society with management practices of
contemporary neoliberal economics. Under the new penology model, criminal, deviant
populations are identified as risks to society and are managed through governmental mechanisms
of tracking, surveillance, and monitoring.15
Nonetheless, these scholars have not yet applied these insights to the increasingly urgent
pressing matter of cyber sex crimes. Nor do they discuss – as I do – the ways in which
cyberpolicing reveals tenuous relationships between law, enforcement, and technology. I contend
that policing cyber sex offenders discloses an expanded model of the managerial, actuarial
approach to deviant, risk-bearing, crime-enacting individuals – but in ways that amplify how the
unclear, imprecise role of law gets translated in enforcement concepts and practices. It is at this
juncture that a productive merger of insights about neoliberal managerial, actuarial practices on
the one hand and insights about the ever-expanding, intrusive compulsions of the carceral state
into civil society vis-à-vis the hazy roles and implementations of law on the other, is necessary
for a comprehensive understanding – particularly in the context of ambiguity inherent to online
worlds of law-breaking and law enforcement.
When I talk about the carceral state, I signify two things: the continuing arc of
development within the mass imprisoned population on a quantitative level (the sheer number of
Americans in jail) and the outgrowth of all manner of criminal sanctions which follow offenders
beyond time served. For example, the work of Marie Gottschalk is useful on this front. In her
As David H. Bayley and Clifford D. Shearing pointed out in 1996, “[p]olicing is now being
widely offered by institutions other than the state, most importantly by private companies on a
commercial basis and by communities on a volunteer basis.” See their prescient article: “The
Future of Policing.” Law Society Review 30(3): 585-606.
15
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recent text, Caught, Gottschalk traces the development of the burgeoning American prison or
carceral state in tandem with the “growing range of penal punishments and controls that lies in
the never-never land between the prison gate and full citizenship.”16 The carceral state describes
more than the fact that the United States has an estimated 2.2 million individuals in prison.17
Indeed, the state is carceral in nature, as its reach subsumes more than 8 million individuals
under some kind of state control – whether that be in the form of parole, probation, community
supervision, detention and the like.18 As Gottschalk points out, one in 23 adult Americans are
under the carceral state’s watch in some format of surveillance, detention, or ostracization.19
Unlike Michelle Alexander, whose work is likewise prescient in its observations on racial
impetuses of the carceral state, Gottschalk seeks to identify and articulate the wider cadre of
sociopolitical and socioeconomic forces – not just the racial factors - driving growth of the
carceral state. Here, Gottschalk correctly points out that:
[t]he intense focus on the racial dimension of the carceral state sometimes
obscures the importance of other factors in determining who is punished and for
what. In particular, it obscures how certain shifts in the wider political economy
pose major impediments to the emergence of a successful broad-based political
movement to dismantle the carceral state.20
As we see in the context of sex offenders and cyber sex offenders, race is not necessarily an
explanatory factor in the carceral state’s efforts targeting this population. Racial, ethnic, and
socioeconomic diversity among sex offenders is pronounced. In fact, a majority of sex offenders
and cyber sex offenders are white males. To be clear, racial dimensions are certainly present
within the carceral state. That said, neoliberal socioeconomic and political practices, flowing
16

Gottschalk. Marie. Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics.
Princeton University Press, 2015.
17 Ibid., 1.
18
1.
19 1.
20
7.
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from fiscal policies emphasizing efficiency and managerial expediency, are significantly
instrumental to the tenacity of carceral state development in the United States. As a consequence,
these policies impact Americans of all races and ethnicities.
Thus, I seek to link work on the carceral state and new penology with work on
technology, law and society in order to understand better the broader intersections and trends
constituting and constituted by, law, crime, technology, and society. All in all, scholarship
combining concepts from the carceral state and new penology with concepts drawn from
scholarship on law and technology to form fruitful inquiries is relatively new and
underdeveloped. Policing in an era of cyber space also presents puzzles in terms of anonymity
behavioral versus speech parameters, and boundaries between legality and illegality.
I, therefore, aim to contribute to a growing field of study about intersections of law,
cyberspace, crime, and politics. Specifically, I offer an initial contribution to the understudied
topic of the practices and politics surrounding policing, sex crimes, and cyberspace. Furthermore,
I mean to offer a better understanding of how unclear, imprecise inflections of the law refract
onto the daily practices of policing and carry ambiguous, even adverse, ramifications for
members of society.
************
Methods
I focus the dissertation research on policing cyber sex offenders in the state of
Connecticut. The state is a founding member of the national Internet Crimes Against Children
task forces (ICAC).21 As such, Connecticut has been at the forefront of cutting edge cyber
policing efforts and forensics expertise and is “a national leader in the fight against online child
“Division of Scientific Services, Computer Crimes and Electronic Evidence Laboratory.”
April 25 2017. http://www.ct.gov/despp/cwp/view.asp?a=4154&q=487836.
21
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sexual exploitation.”22 In addition, the Meriden-based Connecticut Computer Crimes and
Evidence Laboratory frequently assists local, state, and federal agencies with computer crimes
investigations. Before I discuss methods further, I address reasons why I ground the research in
Connecticut. There are two major reasons. One, Connecticut is a founding member of the ICAC
task forces. As a result, it has been a long-time participant in local, state, and national cyber sex
crimes policing operations. Two, Connecticut residents play a key role in child pornography
distribution and child sex trafficking (through online and offline groups).
Originally, my plan was to conduct field work consisting of semi-structured interviews
and hours-long sessions spent following individuals at Connecticut State Police Sex Offender
Registry Units, Connecticut State Police Computer Crimes Lab, Connecticut Department of
Corrections, and the Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services. Based on
preliminary research, I identified these agencies and/or units as integral to the day-to-day
criminal justice apparatuses and processes to which sex offenders become subject.
In this project, I pose an overarching inquiry: how does the policing of sex offenders
function as a microcosm for understanding broader trends in the politics of American law and
order. What do we learn about the relationships between law, crime, sex, and technology that
help generate evolving trends in this mode of law enforcement? What can this slice within the
law and order pie reveal about the status of the “carceral state,” the new penology, and law in the
Information Age?23 I craft a tripartite argument. First, technological methods of cyber policing

Ibid.
Manuel Castells has written extensively on the Information Age and what this era of rapid
globalization and technological advancement heralds for sociopolitical processes and society.
See Castells, Manuel. 2010. End of Millenium: The Information Age: Economy, Society, And
Culture Volume III. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. Also, in Network Culture: Politics for the
Information Age (2004), Tiziana Terranova deploys the moniker to describe the network-linked,
social media-centric world in which we live and engage politics. She examines questions of
22

23
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have replaced physical proximity with online ubiquity. Second, criminal justice mechanisms
such as public sex offender registries deliver physical repercussions and penalties for virtual,
cyber behavior. Third, online interactions between police and sex offenders (e.g., chatroom
dialogue, instant messaging) indicate intensified levels of self-discipline due to anonymity at the
core of the cyber universe. For example, online pseudonyms permit cover for law enforcement
agents; whereas, that same kind of anonymity can make it difficult to identify sexual offenders.
For their part, online criminals can exploit the anonymity cyberspace provides – or better yet, an
agent’s lack of perpetrator know-how (for example, an offender may be able to detect something
is amiss if a police officer uses chat room speech clumsily or with exaggerated affect (e.g.,
emojis - ☺, ) as to elicit suspicion. Each of these considerations entails a distinctive question.
Each question triggers a different method for addressing it. Consequently, I have chosen methods
that are suitable for each inquiry.
Understanding the substitution of online ubiquity for physical proximity requires an
historical account as well as an empirical examination of the ways cyber policing sex offenders
is changing U.S. law enforcement. Here, I turn both to theory-rich sources of data and empiricalrich sources of data. My plan is two-fold. First, I detail the history of U.S. policing practices – in
particular those targeting sex offenders. Second, I identify implications of the changes that cyber
policing brings to U.S. law enforcement. My fieldwork, which offers the perspectives of actual
police officers, contributes to this understanding of broader changes and implications in law
enforcement efforts.
Accordingly, I had envisioned semi-structured interviews with Connecticut State Police
forming a vital component of the project. I had imagined that interviews with Connecticut
power and subjectivity in the context of the internet, e-newspapers, and a landscape in which
anyone can send out a Tweet or write a blog.
15

Department of Corrections workers would be similarly valuable. In addition, I had expected
interviews with employees of the Connecticut Department of Mental Health and Addiction
Services to yield crucial data about the ways that cyber sex criminality and virtual behavior carry
distinctive tasks for conventional law enforcement and agents of rehabilitation. I had thus
presented the following plan for interviewing individuals with the following agencies:
➢ Connecticut State Police Computer Crimes Lab in Meriden (detectives and forensic analysis
involved in cyber sex crimes against minors investigations)
➢ Connecticut State Police Sex Offender Registry Unit in Middletown (troopers involved with
registering, monitoring, and tracking sex offenders)
➢ Connecticut State Police Major Crimes Squad (Central District troopers whose caseloads involve
sex crimes against minors, technology-facilitated sex crimes against minors)
➢ Connecticut Department of Corrections (DOC workers and sex offender prisoners)24
➢ Connecticut Department of Mental Health & Addiction Services (DMAS workers who work
with sex offenders, cyber sex offenders)
Other methodologies like surveys are highly useful and informative in specific contexts. My
dissertation project is not one of those contexts. The kinds of data I seek are sensory-based,
experientially-located among the actors engaged in the practices, processes, lived experiences of
law enforcement and law breaking (McCann 1994; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Gilliom 2001; Engel
and Munger 2003). I pursue the “how” and “constitutive” questions – the processes of meaningmaking, identity-shaping, norm-developing within American law and order narratives and
practices (Becker 1998; McCann 1996). I seek to know the ground-level perspectives,
24

In consultation with my dissertation committee, I made the decision early into the dissertation
project that interviewing sex offenders was more appropriate for a separate, later project when
temporal considerations and financial resources would be more conducive. The focus for the
dissertation is therefore on the law enforcement side of this topic.
16

conversations, and actions of individuals intertwined in licit and illicit lives – and the politics
which attach to those. More fundamentally, is the cognizance of the researcher’s position in
relation to the subject-matter and interviewees. I aim to build the theoretical framework on two
symbiotic foundations: interpretative and discursive moorings (McCann 1996, 1998).
Researchers come to projects with unconscious and conscious biases, prejudices, and
assumptions (Ewick and Silbey 1998; Engel and Munger 2003; Pine 2012). Bearing this mind, I
pursue the project through an interpretative lens (Rabinow and Sullivan 1979). An interpretavist
researcher seeks to become attuned to the cultural, contextual, social specificities of people’s
thoughts and lives.
According to this framework, the researcher takes interviewee data at a level rooted in the
individual’s lived perspectives and experiences – without judgment (Geertz 1972; Gilliom 2001;
Pine 2012). Abiding by an interpretative method means recognizing that those lived perspectives
and experiences are the data (Geertz 1972; Ewick and Silbey 1998; McCann 1998; Gilliom
2001; Engel and Munger 2003). In turn, the project takes seriously the idea that ways of speaking
matter for people, politics and society. Discourse is powerful and valuable in ways that prepare
conditions for identity-making and action-taking (Foucault 1971; Lyotard 1979).
In September 2015, I received approval from the University of Connecticut’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB) to begin contacting personnel with the Connecticut State Police (CSP),
Department of Corrections (DOC), and the Department of Mental Health & Addiction Services
personnel (DMHAS), I began my reach-out efforts. The DOC promptly responded by e-mail, but
in the negative. I decided against reaching out to DMHAS, as I would no longer be interviewing
sex offenders for this dissertation. The CSP was delayed and variegated in its response. This was
a bit surprising, because I anticipated that having previously conducted two internships for the
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agency would have expedited the process.25 I did receive positive responses from several
individuals that they would like to move forward, and I received one response that was positive
pending approval from the State Police Legal Affairs unit. At this point, the fieldwork had in
effect stalled. I continued solicitation, but as I would soon find out, this too, was in vain.
I renewed the IRB application September 2016 in order to continue solicitation of
individuals associated with the State Police. Then, as I continued receiving positive responses to
begin interviews with state police personnel, I received a letter and e-mail October 2016
notifying me that I would not be permitted to utilize the data I had obtained during the two
internships I held with the State Police.26 Moreover, my request to conduct doctoral level
research at the agency was denied. I was, however, encouraged to file Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) requests for information and was wished the best in my career.
Following two urgent phone meetings with my dissertation advisor and UConn IRB staff,
it was determined that I had to dispense with the interviews and pursue an alternate route to
obtain data on policing efforts targeting sex offenders, including offenders who utilize
technology in the commission of their crimes.
Auspiciously, however, another opportunity arose several weeks after receiving the
DESPP letter. Over the summer of 2016, I had been recruited by an adjunct faculty member at
Central Connecticut State University’s Institute of Municipal and Regional Policy to assist on a
Connecticut General Assembly-mandated taskforce authorized to re-evaluate the state’s sex
offender registry. The independent panel, the Connecticut Sentencing Commission’s special
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I conducted one internship with the Middletown-based State Police Sex Offender Registry unit
during the Fall of 2014 and one with the Meriden-based Computer Crimes Lab, in the Division
of Scientific Services during the Spring of 2015. Both units are housed within the Department of
Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP).
26 A copy of the letter/e-mail in its entirety is in the Appendix.
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committee on sex offenders, was established by the legislature in 2015. Its final report will be
due to state legislators December 2017. According to an August 4, 2015 Hartford Courant
article, one of the committee’s “chief objectives” is to “assess the effectiveness of the state’s sex
offender registry.”27 Since December 2016, I have been officially interning with, and providing
assistance for, the sex offender committee. As of May 2017, I was placed on the Institute’s
payroll as an adjunct faculty member and researcher.
In order to evaluate the registry’s utility and efficacy, as well as to provide the state
legislature with recommendations, the committee has requested data from the CSP, CSSD (Court
Support Services Division), and DOC. These data, which have been de-identified by an
independent party at CCSU prior to analysis, pertain to all of the sex offenders currently on the
state registry. Data include: information on the sex-based offenses for which the individual was
placed on the registry; race/ethnicity of the offender; gender of the offender; age of the offender
at time of conviction; the date of appearance on the registry; and the expected exit from the
registry. Certainly, these data are not the kind of personalized information that qualitative
interviews with police would yield. Nevertheless, they provide a factual basis for understanding
sex crimes law enforcement in Connecticut broadly and, in particular, a bird’s-eye view of a
ubiquitous tool (one which is present in all fifty states) for that enforcement: the public sex
offender registry.
After all, my over-arching goal in this dissertation is to understand better and analyze
more precisely the kinds of disciplinary, surveillance-based, carceral-civil society patterns we
detect in this microcosm of policing. What does the sex offender registry illustrate in terms of
law, policing, technology, and society? Does the registry continue the ongoing project of a polis
Daniela Altimari, “State set to review policies, laws relating to sex offenders,” The Hartford
Courant, 4 August, 2015.
27
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in which penological concepts, practices, and institutions bleed into civil society? Does the
registry service the expansion of the carceral-civil society, a sociopolitical terrain in which law
and order, criminal and civilian, prison and society, state surveillance and private monitoring
become entangled? In short, does the registry support the expansion of the carceral state in the
Information Age? How does the lack of clarity within the law – as seen in the registry’s
operations – foster and amplify the carceral state? If the expansion of the carceral state relies on
the continuous seepage of the punitive into the civil, how do imprecise and arbitrary legal
mechanisms facilitate this structure? How does the registry exacerbate the blurring of lines
between jail and community, discipline and freedom, surveillance and privacy? I pursue these
higher-level inquiries by engaging with data from the state of Connecticut sex offender registry.
While I ultimately had to switch gears with the method of acquiring data, I am able to
retain content from several semi-structured interviews I conducted with two state troopers during
the Fall of 2013. At that time, I had taken a qualitative methods seminar; the interviews and
conversations were covered under the group IRB protocol. In consultation with IRB staff and in
accordance with this IRB coverage, I am permitted to include the relevant components of these
dialogues within the dissertation.28 The dissertation combines theoretical discussion,
historical/genealogical accounts, and empirical data.
************
Engaging the Scholarship
I engage with a number of literatures. I draw primarily from the theoretically rich law and
society scholarship on the constitutive character of law, law as social control, and the new
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The subject matter of the interviews was more wide-ranging and pertained to myriad
dimensions of law enforcement, but did include an emphasis on technology, sex crimes, and
policing.
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penology, found in the works of Malcolm Feeley and Jonathan Simon. In addition, I draw from
the scholarship of David Garland, Marie Gottschalk, Jonathan Simon, and Loic Wacquant on the
carceral state. I also look to sociolegal and constitutional analyses of technology-society
connections pertaining to questions about the meaning of virtual behavior and the role of law in
this emergent communicative terrain.
Constitutive Theory of Law
The complex character, functions, agents, relationships and processes of law undergird
conceptual as well as empirical orientations of this dissertation. The term “law” maps onto a
variety of epistemological understandings. Clarity surrounding the use of “law” conceptually,
theoretically, and empirically is an ongoing effort in the project. For purposes of clarity and
coherence, I place my project within the theoretically and empirically rich law and society
scholarship.
Following the tradition of law and society scholarship, I take seriously the idea that law is
not an abstract a priori. Law is neither external to society nor separate from it. Rather, law
becomes through societal relations; law develops in and because of, society. In turn, society
becomes through law; society emerges from within the meaning-making and identity-shaping
processes of law. In this dissertation, I grapple with the topic of policing cybersex offenders.
Understanding the interrelations of law and society is paramount to analyzing the talk
(discourses) and walk (practices) that emerge in U.S. law enforcement efforts to address cyber
sex crimes.
Law and society scholars have written extensively about “law’s variable and complex
character” (Ewick and Silbey 1998, 18). In contrast to earlier conceptions of law as a priori and
outside society, law and society researchers demonstrate myriad ways law is both shaped by and
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shapes, society. Law and society scholars tend to advance the view that law does not exist
separately from the social and political lives and relations that influence, mold, or challenge it
(Ewick and Silbey 1998). Society makes and places political, social, and cultural stampings on
law. And law makes society. Thus, law and society intersect, interact, and engage in ways that
are “mutually constitutive” (Yngevsson 1993). Law is not simply a byproduct of society. Nor is
society simply a byproduct of law. To assume law produces society or vice versa is to accept a
static, unidimensional perspective. Rather, law and society researchers focus on the fluid,
mobile, malleable dynamics through which law and society emerge. The two are intertwined in
sociopolitical processes of identity-making and norm-making. As Ewick and Silbey explain, law
and society work seeks to ground its epistemological understandings in a “social construction of
law.”29 In basic terms, law is a social construct. In turn, its production furthers processes for the
construction and evolution of identities, norms, values, and institutions in society. Law is of,
works within, engages with, and develops through, society. Hence, “law is both an embedded
and an emergent feature of social.”30
An important distinction to make is that many law and society scholars do not perceive
law-society dynamics as solely interactional or intersectional. In many instances, law and society
work supports the notion that law and society are neither easily separable nor isolable. Processes
of law and society are woven together in mutually developing, reifying or opposing ways. They
are intertwined. Delineating his epistemological differences with Rosenberg’s scholarship on
legal impact and social change, McCann explains well the alternative conceptual terrain of law
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30 Ibid., 22.
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and society. Distinguishing his Rights at Work from positive, linear, causal accounts of law’s
impact on society, McCann states:
I instead work within a very different interpretative tradition that is skeptical
about the value of this causal frame (positivism for making sense of human
interaction. This tradition emphasizes at the outset that causal explanations are
partial, imperfect, problematic intellectual contrivances to help us to make sense
of ourselves and the world in which we live but cannot fully ‘know’ (461).31
From a particular law and society vantage point, it is not the simple case that law impacts y or z.
Rather, law and society engage with one another – reinforcing, supporting, or challenging
symbols, ideas, norms and practices of the ideational yet ever-actualizing “other.” Law and
society scholarship treats “contexts as complex webs of multiple dynamically interactive,
contingent ‘social’ relations that both constrain and facilitate the reflexive actions of research
subjects.32 Indeed:
no contextual factor alone is determinative or autonomous. Human relations are
viewed as ongoing, dialectical processes rather than as aggregations of isolated
causal collisions.33
Simply put, law is not a variable to isolate as one factor among many in explanatory accounts of
politics and society. On the contrary, law constitutes an integral facet, dimension, practices of the
“dialectical, contingent, pluralistic, multidimensional” ways individuals live.34 Admittedly,
interpretative orientations of law and society research make for a complex analysis. That which
interpretative scholars gain in the capacity to understand and delve deeply into undergirding
sociopolitical processes of law and society, they lose in explanatory elegance. Accepting the
trade-offs and costs, I choose this approach because it best fosters a more holistic picture of ways
McCann, Michael. 1996. “Causal versus Constitutive Explanations (or, On the Difficulty of
Being so Positive…).” Law & Social Inquiry 21(2): 457-482.
32 Ibid., 462.
33
461.
34 465.
31

23

by which policing cyber sex criminals reveals the political values and practices that inform
American citizenship.
Law and society are created, constituted, and developed together along a countless array
of societal domains. Law and society relationships, for example, find expression through arenas
in the United States like its constitutional, political, and criminal justice systems. Canvassing law
and society dynamics in more holistic terms, Engel and Munger’s work stands as an exemplar.
Rights of Inclusion (2003) interrogates “whether – and how – legislative enactments of
[disability protections] actually intersect with the ‘day-to-day’ experiences of persons with
disabilities.”35 As with Ewick and Silbey, this in-depth, interview-filled piece of research finds
that disability rights-claims “and social and cultural settings ‘mutually shape’ one another.”36
Those with disabilities who view the American Disabilities (ADA) as efficacious in recognizing
and protecting their rights may do so due to particular experiences in home, work, and leisure.
Engel and Munger observe that “the relationship between law and actual life experiences is
extraordinarily complex.”37 During interviews of individuals with disabilities, Engel & Munger
find that people’s specific life experiences shape perceptions of the ADA as well as decisions to
use it (or not). Those who are disenchanted with the failed promises of the ADA may not view it
in the same positive light as those who have found it helpful or who have not yet mobilized its
provisions.
Taken together, examining how law interacts, intersects, and relates to those who break it
rests on an understanding of law’s mutually constitutive dynamics in society. The mutually
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constitutive dynamics operating in Americans’ constitutional faiths, rights-claiming, and
identity-shaping are operative as well in the police-offender dynamics within cyberspace.
Law as Social Control: New Penology and the Carceral State
I have discussed some of the multiple ways law and society scholars conceptualize law.
Thus far, I have sketched the constitutive theory of law – one of many approaches to
understanding law. Another strand of this constitutive theory is when scholars frame law as
social control. This literature helps inform my understanding of how law functions specifically in
the criminal justice system.
Influential law and society scholars argue that law is a mechanism for social control
(Scheingold 1974, 1984, 2004; Garland 2001, 2011, 2016; Feeley and Simon 1998; Simon 1983,
2004). They form a distinctive stream of law and society scholarship which argues that law
enforcement and the judiciary are institutions of social control. Law has controlling and
disciplining effects. To a great degree, this idea makes sense. On its face, law is designed to
install order, organization, and boundaries. We are familiar with law’s modalities of control –
whether we consciously absorb them or not: the criminal code, education, code, and the tax code.
Insights that law and society scholars contribute are ones that point out ways law functions to
control, coerce, discipline, and punish in subtle as well as systemic ways. Mandatory K-12
education is one example of law’s role in social control. In this instance, education is a
programmatic means for instilling social norms, values, skills and discipline into this nation’s
youth. A minimum age requirement for civilian alcohol consumption (age twenty-one) is another
example of law as social control; law regulates social behavior by incorporating assumptions
about a minor’s maturity. Yet, law as a mechanism for social control is not always readily
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apparent. Indeed, examples just cited reflect the ways law attempts to order a society in subtle
ways.
Legal scholar Robert Cover was particularly incisive on law’s disciplining effects.
According to Cover (1985), law possesses coercive – even violent – effects. As Cover sees it,
“legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.”38 To corroborate this thesis about
law and violence, Cover analyzes the drastic implications of a judge’s decree. He discusses the
specific instance of a death penalty sentence, whereby a judicial order can end an individuals’
life. More generally, Cover underscores the subtle dimensions of violence accompanying law in
trials and sentencing procedures.
The act of sentencing a convicted defendant is among these most routing of acts
performed by judges. Yet it is immensely revealing of the way in which
interpretation is distinctively shaped by violence…[t]he defendant’s world is
threatened. If convicted, the defendant customarily walks – escorted – to
prolonged confinement, usually without significant disturbance to the civil
appearance of the event. It is, of course, grotesque to assume that the civil façade
is ‘voluntary’ except in the sense that it represents the defendant’s autonomous
recognition of the overwhelming array of violence against him, and of the
hopelessness of resistance or outcry.39
Note that this argument is not the suggestion that it takes weapons and war to transform law into
a mechanism for social control. In contrast, law and society scholars show the multiple modes of
law’s inherently disciplining, controlling, and coercive work.
In a similar vein, Jonathan Simon and Malcolm Feeley (1992)40 write about ways in
which legal institutions act as social control and management mechanisms.41 According to

Cover, Robert M. 1986. “Violence and the Word.” Yale Law Journal 95: 1601-1629.
Ibid., 1607.
40 Simon, Jonathan and Malcolm M. Feeley. 1992. “The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications.” Criminology 30(4): 449-474.
41 Simon’s Governing Through Crime (2007) is also evocative of law and society scholarship on
politics surrounding law, violence, and social control. Throughout the book, Simon provides
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Simon (1998), the criminal justice system has turned away from a focus on prisoner
rehabilitation as a means of justice and societal reintegration. Instead, Simon argues that the
orienting basis for the “new penology” in American law and order lies in the management of
high-risk individuals, a premise more reminiscent of actuarial sciences. Accounting and
managing practices supplant the more traditional priorities of law enforcement. Consequently,
law as social control transitions to a sharper iteration of law as a mechanism for publicly
identifying and managing irredeemable, socially deviant citizens – whether in the virtual,
cyberworld or the “real,” offline world.42
Simon observes three major shifts within the criminal justice system ushered in by new
penology practices. First, the deviant class is to be policed, tracked, and managed, as opposed to
responding to individuals on a case-by-case basis. Simon writes that what “distinguishes the new
priority of groups is the dominance of statistical over characterological conceptions of group
boundaries.”43 A second major shift is in the narrative, or discourse, that law enforcement
professionals, academics, and citizens apply to criminals formerly “[s]ubjects defined as aberrant
and in need of transformation,” are criminals in the new penology “now seen as high-risk
subjects in need of management.”44 Not coincidentally, the criminal justice system now has
population(s) management as its priority. Framing criminals or deviants as always and already
risk-bearing individuals drives the new penology’s dangerousness-evaluating impetus. Finally,
there is a shift from the reliance on community members for the efficacy of law and order or
evidence of the ways by which the U.S. government acquires and enhances political power
through criminal justice programs, public fears about crimes, and legislative pushes to punish.
42 Consider the public nature of sex offender registries. See Craun’s “Evaluating Awareness of
Registered Sex Offenders in the Neighborhood” or Moskowitz’ “Not in my digital backyard:
proposition 35 and California’s sex offender username registry” for detailed discussions about
sex offender registries and their effects.
43 Simon, 452.
44
Ibid., 453.
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criminal justice operations to the reliance on “internally generated and largely technocratic forms
of knowledge, such as drug tests and compliance with administrative rules.”45 In this way, the
new penology places a premium on scientific expertise and bureaucracy as the fount of
knowledge, as opposed to leaning on families, communities, schools, or places of faith for
deterrence, rehabilitation, and re-assimilation.
But what are the impacts of new penological practice? On the one hand, what are the felt
impacts on society when managerial, actuarial methods of offender management fail? On the
other hand, what are the effects on law-society dynamics when lack of clarity in the law bleeds
into enforcement practices and thereby extends to the objects of enforcement – both within and
along its periphery (i.e., offenders, non-offenders, and not-yet-offenders)? How do law and
enforcement advance conditions for the creation of the carceral-civil society? In short, I explore
how new penological practice, for my purposes epitomized in the public sex offender registry,
has been integral to the rise of the contemporary American carceral state.
I follow Loic Wacquant and Marie Gottschalk in their critical formulations of a state in
which mass penological mechanics (e.g., mass incarceration) function as means for exercising
power over various populations under its control. According to Wacquant, the rise of
punitiveness – which he locates both in sites of carceral programs (e.g., prison and offender
registries) and social programs (e.g., welfare) reveals “a shift from the social to the penal
management of urban marginality” (81).46 Workfare and prisonfare together, Wacquant argues,
indicate state responses to social insecurity as a consequence of depressed economic conditions
as well as labor uncertainty. For Gottschalk, the carceral state can be traced to the rise of
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neoliberal practices, among a myriad of other social, political, and racial trends. Meanwhile,
Jonathan Simon and David Garland see the entrenchment of carceral practices as state responses
to criminal insecurity, which they diagnose as a consequence of mixed sociopolitical and
socioeconomic conditions including the existence of cycles of violence and criminogenic
behavior. While Scheingold, Wacquant, Feeley, Simon, Gottschalk, and Garland frame the
reasons for its emergence and evolution in slightly differing registers, consensus is that the
carceral state is the current mode of post-industrializing, neoliberal Information Age governance.
To varying degrees, all the aforementioned scholars observe that it is often the socially
and economically marginalized – the poor, the racial and ethnic minorities – who are always,
already objects of the carceral state. Scheingold points out the punitive dimensions of the law
and order narrative, whose desired targets are often impoverished racial and ethnic minorities.
Simon notes that zero-tolerance, punitive policies are applied in settings ranging from the
classroom to the prison cell. Garland underscores the punitive dimensions of the welfare state –
particularly as they are felt by the lower class and minority racial populations. Over the last
decade, Wacquant has sought to clarify his theory pertaining to the carceral state by replacing the
term “mass incarceration” with “the more refined concept of hyperincarceration.” By
hyperincarceration, Wacquant means:
To stress the extreme selectivity of penalization according to class position, ethnic
membership or civic status, and place of residence – a selectivity which is a
constitutive feature (an not an incidental attribute) of the policy of punitive
management of poverty…I recount that punishment is not just a direct indicator of
solidarity and core political capacity for the state…it is also the paradigm of
public dishonor, inflicted as a sanction for individual moral, and thus civic,
‘demerit’ (1689).47
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Here, Wacquant urges a shift in the way we think about the carceral state. On this view, the state
has as its primary targets specified class, racial, and ethnic populations for its punitive,
surveillance-based, risk assessment-driven policies and programs. I sympathize with this
position. But this kind of singular view lacks explanatory power as applied to sex crimes in ways
that law and society formulations do not. No one population or groups of people are being caught
in the carceral state’s net. In addition, whereas Michelle Alexander hones a racial analysis of the
carceral state – to the exclusion of other analyses, Gottschalk pursues a wider articulation of the
panoply of logics (neoliberal, racial, sociopolitical) undergirding growth in the carceral state and
its impact across demographics.
When it comes to the policing of sex crimes, it appears that all bets are off. Those who
commit sex crimes span the gamut of class, occupation, race, ethnicity, and age. One cannot say
with certainty that the carceral state is targeting a specific class, racial, or ethnic population as
applied to the sex offender context – other than the fact that most offenders are male. As Michael
Lawlor, Under Secretary for Criminal Justice Policy and Planning Division within Connecticut’s
Office of Policy and Management, wrote in a 2012 report, “…individuals who have committed
sex offenses do not constitute a single, homogenous population.”48 More, when we speak of
offenders who utilize technology and/or cyber means in the commission of sex crimes, statistics
show that 99.3% of them are male and 88.7% are white.49 Under the carceral state logic urged by
Wacquant, then, it would seem that the white male is being targeted in this instance. Yet, such a
view is incompatible with the acknowledgment that the most serious of sex offender
classifications (“Level 3” or “Tier III”) and punishment regimes are often reserved for racial
Michael Lawlor. 2012. May 17 2017. “Recidivism among sex offenders in Connecticut.”
http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjresearch/recidivismstudy/sex_offender_recidivism_2012
_final.pdf.
49
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minorities. For example, in a 2006 letter to then-New York Governor George Pataki, the New
York City American Civil Liberties Union objected to the fact that at the time, blacks made up
15.9% of the state’s population but comprised 37.2% of Level 3 sex offenders listed for New
York’s online public registry.50 In reviewing county-by-county demographics, the ACLU’s New
York branch concluded that “the empirical evidence raises serious doubt that the overrepresentation of blacks…reflects the actual rate of offending among that population.”51
At the same time, we can sharpen the carceral state model, building on current law and
society formulations to provide an account that more fully describes ways in which the role of
unclear, imprecise, arbitrary law lends to the creation, expansion, and entrenchment of the
carceral-civil society in the Information Age. Together, potent synergies of unclear law, on the
one hand, and rapid technological advancements, on the other hand, form a combustive mix by
which the carceral seeps into the civil; punitive into the nonpunitive; the law enforcer into the
vigilante citizen; the sex offender one day into the sex offender marked for life. Or, as Gottschalk
puts it,
[r]egistered sex offenders are subject to an Alice-in-Wonderland maze of civil
commitment laws, and community notification, registration, and residency
restrictions that amount to a kind of ritual exile.52
A key feature of the American carceral state fabric is the institution of law enforcement. The
concepts and practices of policing help fortify the melding of the punitive and civil. Enforcement
of the “Alice-in-Wonderland maze” of laws is part and parcel to the carceral state project.
Indeed, it is through enforcement of hazy, arbitrary, and unclear sex offender and cyber sex
Donna Lieberman, Robert Perry, Christian Smith-Socaris. 2006. “Proposed legislation
regarding civil commitment of sex offenders.”
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/sexoffender_analysis_ltr_121106.pdf. Accessed 17 May
2017.
51 Ibid.
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offender laws that the carceral state is preserved. Moreover, in a context in which confusion
abounds within and is heightened by, Information Age technologies and social media
communicative networks, it is important to understand the circuitry between the carceral state,
policing, and the cyber world.
Just as the carceral state feeds off a lack of legal clarity and resolution, the cyber world
both cultivates and is cultivated by an unclear, imprecise social culture in its premises of blurred
identities (vis-à-vis anonymity of the internet), blurred boundaries (vis-à-vis absence of
geographical parameters online), and blurred lines between thought and action (what constitutes
an “action” online?).
Policing and Society
Law and society scholars have long been interested in the relationships between police
and the public they protect and serve. Relationships between police and civilians can be strong.
They can be weak; or they can unequivocally hostile. On the one hand, community policing
methods have achieved improved results in terms of building trust with communities –
particularly those in minority neighborhoods.53 On the other hand, recent events over the last
three years have reignited clashes between law enforcement and civilians – clashes often rooted
in racial fears and animosities.54 Clearly, public perceptions of the police directly impact
individual and community relationships with the law. In their examination of the role public
53
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perceptions about justice and governmental legitimacy play in citizen support for police,
Sunshine and Tyler (2003) find that police-citizen cooperation “is engaged when people in the
communities being policed experience the police as exercising their authority fairly.”55 When
people perceive police to be enforcing the law with justice and equity, the civilian-police
relationship can strengthen. The inverse appears to be accurate as well; community mistrust of
police can lead to public hostility and lack of cooperation.
While scholars have done a substantial amount of work documenting police-civilian
relationships, they do not explicitly address perspectives both of citizens and cops. A notable
exception to this is Peter Moskos’ Cop in the Hood (2008). Still, this is a personal account – one
written by a graduate student who became a police officer for one year in the Baltimore,
Maryland Police Department. Its scope is necessarily limited to the perspectives of a scholar. It is
not an account spotlighting the perspectives of individuals who have been on the force for years.
To an extent, therefore, I seek an understanding – if basic and preliminary in this project – of the
multiple actors involved in policing cyber sex crimes. I believe that comprehending the role,
experiences, and perspectives of law enforcement will strengthen law and society insights about
the mutually constitutive relations among cyberspace, policing, cyber crimes, and society.
Cyberspace, Technology, Law, and Society
Some scholars have explored “cyberspace itself, considered as an entity or site” (Ross
2002). Some law and society scholars pose questions about the ways internet and new
technologies impact law, regulatory frameworks, and the legal structure. In turn, they ask
whether and how law keeps pace with the unwieldy, nebulous character of the cyberworld.
Katsh, Collins and Skover (1995) posit for instance that the:
Sunshine, Jason and Tom R. Tyler. 2003. “The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in
Shaping Public Support for Policing.” Law & Society Review 37(3): 513-548.
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whole framework for thinking about law and working through problems in a
legalistic manner is challenged by media that store, process, and communicate
information in digital form (16).
Once more, we find hints of the mutually constitutive dynamic of law and society. Here,
cyberspace and technological innovations are the microcosm in which to reveal ways that law
and technology mutually shape one another. Take, for example, the issues of child pornography
production, distribution, and consumption. Online users can produce, share, and download child
pornography through the convenience and ease of their computers, laptops, and cell phones.
With the rising ubiquity of these technological media, “growing concern” has mounted
about the sexual exploitation of minors (Chisholm 2006; Hackett, Oelrich and Krapohl 2010;
Roos 2014). The United States judiciary has been especially attentive to the role of technology in
facilitating and empowering sex offenders (Harrison 2006; Wynton 2011). Technology has
deeply impacted the way society’s members communicate and act. Wynton (2011) writes:
Social networking sites have changed the way Americans communicate, share
ideas, learn information, and organize themselves. No longer confined to personal
social uses, these sites now also serve as accessible platforms for political and
social organizations (1860).56
Certain members of society build illegal attachments through online social networking.
Individuals interested in perpetrating acts of luring, stalking, and grooming minors into sexual
dialogue and activity employ cyber technologies.57 Cyberspace and technology broaden ways to
commit sexual crimes against youth (Griffin-Shelley 2003; Quayle and Taylor 2011).
Technology bears its imprints on society – both negative and positive. Technologies which
Wynton, Jasmine S. 2011. “Myspace, Yourspace, But not Theirspace: The Constitutionality of
banning sex offenders from social networking sites.” Duke Law Journal 60(8): 1859-1903.
57 McGhee et al. (2011) discuss the Luring Communication Model (LCM). This model posits a
five-phase process by which cyber sex offenders pursue minors through: gaining access,
deceptive trust development, grooming, isolation, and approach. In specific, grooming involves
“the subtle communication strategies that sexual abusers use to prepare their potential victims to
accept the sexual conduct” (4).
56
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“serve as accessible platforms for political and social organization” double as devices for crime
(Wynton 2011). Meanwhile, judicial orders barring sex offenders from accessing social media
accounts have become models for legislation throughout the states (Wynton (2011). There are
laws that also require sex offenders to register online pseudonyms or identities with the
government (Wynton 2011).
Technology, society, and law again weave together in these instances (Doring 2009).
Another example of the mutual constitutive relationship of technology, law, and society lies in
the creation and proliferation of sex offender registry databases. The 2006 Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act nationalized the requirement for sex offender registries (Federal
Sentencing Reporter 2011). Prior to that, states held discretion about the decision to create a
registry. These state registries documenting the name, age, residence, and sexual criminal acts
emerge from a context in which public fears about technology and sexual predators have steadily
increased since the 1980s (Farkas and Stichman 2002; Lynch 2002; Wright 2008; Eagn 2013).
Emergent public concerns in tandem with rapidly developing technologies to generate calls for
legal and political actions – further evidence of the connective sociopolitical tissues between
technology, law, and society.
Yet, law and society scholarship on cyberspace is relatively new and underdeveloped. I
aim to contribute to a growing field of study about intersections of law, cyberspace, crime, and
politics. Specifically, I envision this research as an initial contribution to the understudied topic
of the practices and politics surrounding policing, sex crimes, and cyberspace in law and society
scholarship.
Political science research does exist on policing, cybercrime, technology, and sex
offenders. Scholars, however, have not yet pursued questions about the ways policing cyber sex
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offenders differs from previous versions of U.S. law enforcement efforts to address sex crimes.
Likewise, research is scant on the topic of exploring ways in which policing cyber sex offenders
carries distinctive implications for law enforcement, law breaking, and the politics of criminal
justice in the United States.
Scholars hailing from psychology and society, meanwhile, have done extensive work
investigating differences (if any) between sex offenders and cyber sex offenders (Gudjonsson
and Sigurdsson 2000; Bensimon 2007; Babchishin, Hanson and Hermann 2011; Elliott, Beech
and Mandeville-Norden 2013; Babchishin et al. 2015). Legal and constitutional scholars examine
the cyber sex offender defense issues pertaining to First Amendment, Fourth Amendment,
entrapment concerns (Moore and McGrain 2010; Urbas 2010; Wynton 2011; Eagan 2013). As I
mentioned earlier, a few law and society scholars discuss how trends in criminalization and
punishment of sex offenders highlight a “new penology” as well as politics of law and order
(Scheingold 2011; Feeley and Simon 1992; Simon 1998). Nonetheless, these scholars do not
address the rising matter of cyber sex crimes and how cyberpolicing reveals a mode of policing
and criminality that supersedes the “new penology” identified in the late 1990s – a mode that is
part and parcel to neo-liberal, carceral state governance.
I see three central contributions of the dissertation. First, I highlight the understudied
topic of policing sexual cybercrimes and cyber sex offenders. Second, I add to existing research
on policing, law, and society by demonstrating how policing sex offenders reveals an iteration of
criminal justice politics and neo-liberal, carceral state governance in the Information Age. Third,
I show how this mode of law enforcement continues and expands the carceral state into the civil
society, the blending of which I call the “carceral-civil society.” Here, I contribute to the
constitutive theory of law by demonstrating how law intersects, shapes, and is shaped by virtual
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behavior in the cyber world. On this front, I synthesize insights drawn from carceral state
scholarship, sharpening concepts from new penology scholarship - with ideas drawn from the
technology and law scholarship. In so doing, I show the nebulous, hazy nexuses between law,
crime, technology, and society.
More importantly, I show how these nexuses provide fodder for the imprecision and lack
of clarity in the law. I show how law’s inability to keep pace with realities of cyberspace and
new communicative terrain adversely impacts policing on the ground. We can train, however, to
see through the carceral-civil society and how the technology-armed new penology becomes
more about “identifying and managing unruly groups.”58 We can discern law’s haze as well as
the subtle yet insistent unfolding of the carceral-civil society before us.
To these ends, I organize the manuscript as follows. In Chapter Two, I present a historical
account chronicling significant milestones in terms of patterns and shifts within United States
policing of sex crimes against minors. By doing so, I build a framework for understanding the
ways in which law’s often unclear, indeterminate, and confusing role in enforcement impacts
policing concepts and methods. I show how legal imprecision in part leads to the development of
the carceral state – particularly during a time in which criminal behaviors are exacerbated by
cyberspace and other contemporary technological platforms. In Chapter Three, I focus
specifically on the online, virtual, cyber, internet-related dimensions of sex crimes and sex
crimes policing. Here, I explore and analyze what these technological aspects of sex crimes and
policing entail for law and society dynamics within the context of the carceral state. I show how
policing online sex crimes functions as a microcosm for discerning penological patterns in the
thriving “carceral-civil” society. In doing so, I also foreshadow the instrumentality of the public
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sex offender registry within Information Age carceral state development and expansion. In
Chapter 4, I identify the public sex offender registry as a locus in which unclear law provides the
blueprint for carceral state development in the Information Age. Here, I argue that sex offender
registries mark a tech-infused, invasive legislative and law enforcement response to crime in
ways that render the criminal justice system disorderly and further riddled with imprecision,
inaccuracy, and error. In Chapter 5, the concluding chapter, I continue discussion of the sex
offender registry – this time, focusing on the move from an offense-based registration system to
a risk-based registration system (as is currently being proposed in Connecticut and implemented
elsewhere). Although touted as a return toward more individualized justice, I detect mechanisms
of ongoing social categorization, surveillance, and ostracization in this shift toward riskassessment - methods contrary to the spirit of anti-carceral state practices. On this front, caution
and acumen are required in order to evaluate whether risk-assessment systems will slow or
enhance the expansion of the carceral state. Ultimately, precise analysis ought continue vis-à-vis
an understanding of how various criminal justice procedures fit into the fabric of the carceral
state.
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Chapter Two
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Law’s Imprecision and Indecision: Sex Crimes and Law Enforcement in the United States
[Kansas’ Sexual Abuse Treatment Program] serves a vital penological purpose,
and offering inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to
compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.59
There are many things innocent in themselves, however, such as cartoons, video
games, and candy, that might be used for immoral purposes, yet we would not
expect those to be prohibited because they can be missed.60
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With oft-time swing vote Justice Anthony Kennedy writing the majority opinion in McKune v.
Lile 536 U.S. 24 (2002), the Court upheld Kansas’ SATP (sexual abuse treatment program) for
incarcerated offenders. Admiting one’s sexual crimes is a required step toward successful
completion of the program, one that convicted sex offender, Robert G. Lile, argued amounted to
compelled self-incrimination and therefore constituted a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
See https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/536/24/case.html. Accessed 25 April 2017.
60
Just two months before issuing its ruling upholding court-mandated treatment for incarcerated
sex offenders in McKune v. Lile, the Court struck down the federal 1996 Child Pornography
Prevention Act (CPPA). With Kennedy again at the helm of the majority opinion in Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition 535 U.S. 234, the Court overturned the law on First Amendment grounds,
citing the law’s invalidity on its face for being “substantially overbroad,” covering materials that
are “neither obscene…nor produced by the exploitation of real children.” See
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/535/234/case.html. Accessed 25 April 2017.
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Introduction
In the preceding chapter, I introduced my argument: policing sexual cybercrimes against
minors marks an expansion of the American carceral, surveillance, risk-based state. This
expansion is aided and abetted by the unclear, hazy role of law. Law often plays a tenuous,
unclear, indecisive role in policing sex crimes – particularly those that are committed with the
assistance of various technologies and online apparatuses. Law thus plays an integral part in the
carceral state’s expansion.
In particular, the lack of legal, constitutional, and statutory clarity, exacerbated by an
incapacity to keep pace with rapid technological advancements, does more to complicate law
enforcement work than what the law is expected to do as far as clarifying and outlining policing
parameters.61 For example, in commenting on rules for search warrants and crime scene
procedures, one former Connecticut State Police (CSP) Major Crimes unit detective put the
impact of “law” on policing this way:
You know, Meg, these rules are made by people who are not police. They have no
idea what it means, what it is to be a police officer, and collect evidence of a
murder at 3 a.m. on a Thursday. They just don’t know. They can’t know.62
Encapsulated in these remarks is a theme on which I center my dissertation. It is my claim that
policing of sexual cybercrimes against minors affords us a deep look at the ways law63, crime,
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Urbas (2010) points out the potential pitfalls in covert online police operations such as
offenders employing the entrapment defense during legal representation – or whether a sexual
crime against a minor has even been committed for example, in the case of officers “posing” as
children online in order to nab the suspect for engaging in luring or stalking activities (415).
62 Personal Correspondence, Trooper A, September 2015.
63
In the law-society tradition, I follow Ewick and Silbey (1998) specifically in terms of what I
mean to denote by “law.” According to this vein of scholarship, law is broadly construed. Laws
are more than written codes and rules. Law does not exist apart from social relations but rather is
both a producer and a product of, them (19). Likewise, the norms, codes, and rules – both
delineated and not – which govern policing, shape and are shaped by the ongoing melding of law
enforcement, law breaking, and technology I explore in this project.
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policing, technology, and society intersect, cohere, or collide.64 To that end, I examine the
uneasy relationship between technology, law, and policing along three main axes.
First, technological methods of cyber policing operations replace physical proximity with
capacity for online ubiquity.65 Officers exchange spatial closeness for virtual closeness. Second,
criminal justice measures, such as public sex offender registries, intersect online sex crimes with
offline repercussions. Third, interactions between police officers and cyber sex offenders reveal
heightened norms of self-surveillance and self-discipline precisely due to tenuous mechanisms
for compliance (e.g., problematic enforcement of sex offender registration).66
In this chapter, I trace the most significant milestones in the ways United States law
enforcement communities conceptualize and respond to sex crimes against minors throughout
history.67 In so doing, I present a historical account of the American policing of sex crimes. Such
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A key insight scholars give us is the fact that law-society relations are messy, dynamic, and
complicated. Ewick and Silbey (1998) explore how citizens comply with law, exploit the gaps
and “loopholes” in law, or resist the law. In these instances, individuals often do not stick with
one modality of legal consciousness or behavior. For example, individuals who speed on a daily
basis may not necessarily find it acceptable to rob a bank. Exploitation of gaps within the legal
order (e.g., speeding in areas in which a local resident knows cops typically do not arrange speed
checks) in one way is juxtaposed with passive compliance in another (e.g., not robbing a bank
may not exactly entail an active decision to obey laws against theft but rather a passive
acknowledgement about potential risks and penalties involved).
65 Belvins and Hott (2009) note that the “ubiquity of computers and internet in modern society
have led” to the “direct creation of new forms of crime and deviance.” What technology does for
those breaking the laws, so it does for those enforcing the laws: police are able to pursue more
efficient forms of undercover investigation vis-à-vis an online combination of anonymity and
pseudonyms.
66 Sex offender registration can be problematic, as the examples of post-Hurricane Katrina New
Orleans or computer glitch-ridden California demonstrate. Cohen and Jeglic (2007) record that
the state of California lost track of 33,296 sex offenders who had been registered. In the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, an estimated 2,000 registered sex offenders who were forced to flee their
homes.
67 To limit the scope of this dissertation, I examine policing sex crimes against minors. That said,
I fully recognize the urgent topic of peer-to-peer sex crimes perpetrated among adults. For an
important, recent work that addresses it in a very detailed fashion, see Powell, Anastasia and
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an account is vital to highlighting and understanding how societal norms and practices are not
static but rather malleable and subject to continuous shifts. Finally, I identify instances in which
law’s indeterminate role in policing sex crimes becomes evident. As I will show, law’s haze has
always been a part of policing sex crimes. Such a demonstration is crucial to the analysis I
undertake beginning in Chapters Four and Five about the impacts of law’s inadequacy,
imprecision, and lack of clarity on policing and society – as seen especially in the public sex
offender registry; what those impacts mean for the growth of the carceral state; and how those
impacts are amplified by the distinctive problems presented by cyberspace and other
contemporary technological platforms.
As scholars demonstrate over and again, law and its shapers are inexorably connected.
Laws governing sex crimes are products of a confluence between policymakers, the public, and
the police. Changes in how professional communities, the media, law enforcement, or the public
perceive sex crimes do not occur in societal vacuums hermetically sealed from other
communities and domains. Changes shape and in turn are shaped by the ways in which
professionals, politicians, pundits, the public, and police respond to sex crimes.
As Ewick and Silbey explain, a substantive body of law and society scholarship
investigates the “social construction of law.”68 In turn, its construction furthers processes for the
construction and evolution of identities, norms, values, and institutions in society. Crime, law
enforcement, and cyberspace are part of these dynamic law-society processes and relationships.
Policing, crime, cyberspace, and society are affectively, cognitively, and empirically

Nicola Henry. 2016. “Policing technology-facilitated sexual violence against adult victims:
police and service sector perspectives.” Policing and Society 1-17.
68 Ewick and Silbey, 18.
43

interwoven.69 In this dissertation, I follow scholars working from this standpoint. I, too, quest for
the connectivity between, among, and through law and society (Scheingold 1984, 2004, 2011;
Hunt 1993; McCann 1994; Ewick and Silbey 1998; Engel and Munger 2003).
Below, I discuss the impactful changes in law enforcement perceptions and practices.
This is not an exhaustive or comprehensive account. Rather, the purpose is to provide a historical
sketch that specifically assists with a more in-depth exploration of policing sex crimes,
technology, and the complicated, indeterminate role of law in Chapter Three.70
************
Police Responses to Sex Criminals and Crimes in the United States
Policing practices are not sui generis. They emerge and flow from the society – the polis
– which police are expected to protect and serve. Following in the law and society tradition of
understanding societal praxes and human agency, I submit that there is likewise always and
already a sociopolitical context for understanding law enforcement concepts and practices. Law
enforcement developments operate within a circuitry of societal influences: criminal justice
practitioners, jurists, legislators, political pundits, the media, and the public (Scheingold 2004,
2011; Simon 2007). In short, law enforcement talk (i.e., concepts) and walk (i.e., practices) stem
from a confluence of various actors, discourses, and policies.
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Epistemological debate over empirics possesses an especially spirited legacy in the subfield of
law and society scholarship. One finds a classic example in the Stuart Scheingold-Gerald
Rosenberg discussion about civil rights litigation efficacy in mobilizing systemic social changes
such as school desegregation in the 1950s and 1960s; women’s abortion rights in the 1970s; gay
and lesbian rights in the 2000s. Scholars’ positions on the character and functions of law shape
their assessments of its societal roles and powers. See Stuart Scheingold’s The Politics of Rights
and Gerald Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope.
70 Although I segment these discussions into separate sections, the demarcations by no means
express my belief that historical changes and shifts occur in isolation. Rather, it is an
organizational choice for the purposes of clarity and concision.
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On a basic level, too, it is crucial to recognize that the notion of a necessary and
constitutive congruence exists between legislation (law-making) and policing (law enforcement).
Police and legislators remain dependent on one another for perspectives and actions alike. The
former expect and hope that laws are clear; the latter expect and hope that laws are implemented.
Such a congruence, however, between law and its enforcement is not an easy one. In particular,
when lawmakers use crime legislation as bids for expanded political power, police often become
caught in a web of politics based on social (which are oftentimes racialized) fears and anxieties
(Simon 1992, 2007; Farkas and Stichman 2002; Wright 2008; Eagan 2013).
Beyond the relationship between cops and legislators lies arguably a more important
dynamic: police-citizen relations. Public views of the police directly impact individual and
community relationships with the law. For example, Sunshine and Tyler (2003) find that policecitizen cooperation “is engaged when people in the communities being policed experience the
police as exercising their authority fairly.”71 When people perceive that police are enforcing the
law with justice and equity, the civilian-police relationship can strengthen. The inverse appears
to be accurate as well: community mistrust of police leads to hostility and reduced cooperation.
All of the above notions about policing practices center on the idea of mutual
constitution: institutions, practices, and relationships shape and are shaped by each other. I
believe that when taken together, understanding law enforcement perspectives and experiences
will strengthen law and society discourses about mutually constitutive relations among policing,
crime, cyberspace, and citizens. Furthermore, the history of sex crimes policing is one in which
law’s indeterminacy, imprecision, and confusion directly shape the ways crimes are defined (or
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ill-defined) and enforced (or ill-enforced). It is to these ends that I organize the chapter which
follows.
************
Governing Through Sex Crimes: Sex regulation in America across the centuries72
At best, the relationship between law and policing in the U.S. has been murky. At worst,
it can be described as schizophrenic. Enforcing the law is not a simple one-to-one formula. That
is, law enforcement does not always comport with the meaning or intent of the law. Nor is
legislation consistent with on-the-ground realities and praxes both of police officers and
civilians. Although he objective is for there to exist a seamless connectivity between law on the
books (legislation) and law on the ground (police), Scheingold (1974; 1984; 1991) and Ewick
and Silbey (2004) have notably pointed out that discrepancies exist more often than does the
connective tissue. On this point, Scheingold observes that legal symbols and concepts Americans
have come to take for granted – the U.S. Constitution, courts, liberty, rights, or justice – are in
fact part and parcel of “a faith in the political efficacy and ethical sufficiency of law as a
principle of government.”73
While factors weighing on these uneasy relationships between law and policing are
many, I argue that some of it has to do with law’s lack of clarity – and how this lack of clarity
filters to policing. Such unease is palpable on closer inspection of sex crimes legislation. I

A nod to one of Simon’s central idea that the post-industrialized state garners its strength and
finds its governing power through social control responses to crime, delinquency, and deviancy.
See Simon, Jonathan. 2007. Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed
American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear. New York: Oxford University Press. In a
very apt variation on the theme of governing through crime, Corey Robin discusses the
connective tissues between fear, social control, and democratic governance. See Robin, Corey.
2004. Fear: The History of a Political Idea. New York: Oxford University Press.
73 Scheingold, Stuart A. 2004. The Politics of Rights 2nd edition. Michigan: University of
Michigan.
72
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discern three levels of confusion on which law operates: a) the incongruity in the law itself (i.e.,
the text of the law, the way it is worded); b) incongruity between law and its implementation
(i.e., intent versus actualization); c) generation of unintended consequences that may actually
border or be antagonistic to the purported missions of law and its enforcement (i.e., contravening
public goods such as safety and security). Numerous law and society scholars have investigated
the notion of “gaps in the law,” the idea that law implemented in practice can be vastly different
– even contrary – to law in theory and on the books (Skolnick 1967; Wald 1967; Muir 1967;
Abel 1973, 1980; Trubek and Galanter 1974; Feeley 1976; Macaulay 1984; Sarat 1985; Ewick
and Silbey 1998; Scheingold 2004; Pojanowski 2014; Verma 2015; Reisberg 2017).74
Enforcing Laws of Morality: Policing sexual deviants in 17th-19th century America
Sex laws in America date to European contact.75 According to Jenkins (1998), “the
earliest colonial codes contained lengthy lists of sexual offenses…with fornication, adultery,
bestiality, and homosexuality” earning the most stringent of physical penalties.76 Legality and
morality were intensely intertwined; religious and moral injunctions formed the basis for
regulating sexual behaviors. For example, the state of Connecticut enacted a sodomy statute in
1642 whereby one William Plaine of Guilford was sentenced to death for “masturbating a

See Pojanowski, Jeffrey A. 2014. “Private Law in the Gaps.” Fordham Law Review 82: 16911735; Verma, Anjuli. 2015. “The Law-Before: Legacies and Gaps in Penal Reform.” Law &
Society Review 49(4): 847-882; Reisberg, Liina. 2017. “Gaps in the Law Fulfilled with Meaning:
A Semiotic Approach for Decoding Gaps in Law.” International Journal for the Semiotics of
Law. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-017-9521-1.
75 Indigenous American peoples had long cultivated their own sexual mores and scripts for social
behavior that predated the introduction of European sensibilities. See Lugones, Maria. 2007.
“Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System.” Hypatia 22: 186-219. Also see
Antoinette Burton, ed. 2005. Gender, Sexuality and Colonial Modernities. NY: Routledge.
76 Philip Jenkins. 1998. Moral Panic: Changing Concepts of The Child Molester in Modern
America. New Haven: Yale University Press: 22.
74

47

number of young men in the area.”77 The age difference between Plaine and the young men is
unclear from the historical record; what is certain is that Plaine paid the price for a sex crime
with his life. Indeed, laws delineating violations of sex norms, and penalties for them, existed
from the days when colonial America was young.
These laws were tethered to understandings of a Biblical-based moral code. In fact, as
Friedman notes, the colonies were first and foremost theocratic.78 As theocracies, the colonies
cultivated a criminal justice system that “was in many ways another arm of religious
orthodoxy.”79 To that end, “[t]he colonies in general made little or no distinction between sin and
crime…[i]t was the duty of law to uphold, encourage, and enforce true religion.”80 Under such a
system, it is not surprising that sexual offenses were taken seriously. For instance, sex outside of
marriage was punished by fines, whipping, or the stocks. Bastardy was also not viewed kindly –
with women receiving lashes for bearing children out of wedlock. Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet
Letter may have been a fictional account, but its roots were anchored in truths and practices of
the Puritan vision.
But what about enforcement? Who ensured compliance with the law? Who held people
accountable when the laws of morality were broken? Religious leaders of the colonies held
laypeople to account.81 During early European contact with America, laws governing sex crimes

George Painter. 1991. “The Sensibility of our Forefathers: The History of Sodomy Laws in the
United States.” October 3 2015. http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/sensibilities/connecticut.htm.
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Friedman, 31.
79
Ibid., 32.
80
32.
81 17th-century ecclesiastical giants such as Cotton Mather and Jonathan Edwards delivered
jeremiads detailing at length the moral sicknesses afflicting their communities. For example, see
Edwards’ powerful classic “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” in Early American Writing
(1994).
77
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had their moorings in Biblical injunctions and moral conventions.82 Likewise, primary enforcers
of moral conventions pertaining to sex were men (and only men) of the cloth.83 At the same time,
laypeople – ordinary individuals – also assisted with enforcement in the preservation of moral,
theocratic order. Night watches consisting of ordinary citizens tasked with spotting persons
engaged in suspicious activities date to the 1630s. Formal police forces did not organize until
1838, when Boston installed the first American police force.84 Indeed, law enforcement resided
primarily in the hands of the people in the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries. Church leaders
dominated the arbitration of law and criminal justice during this time. Police as we know them
today – let alone an independent police force – was yet a distant concept.
In 1636, the colonial city of Boston created the first night watch.85 More than twenty
years later, New York would borrow the model – establishing a night watch in 1658.86 As for
Philadelphia, it was not until 1700 that the city installed its night watch.87 Scholars document
how watchmen often slept through or became drunk on duty during these nascent years of
“police” work.88 In 1833, Philadelphia created the first day watch; New York followed suit in
1844. Despite the dramatic break from England that was etched into the core of America’s
founding, many ideas and practices were nonetheless patterned after the mother country’s

Friedman’s classic Crime and Punishment in American History is a wide-ranging account
detailing the religiosity both of the early American law and order progenitors and how this
permeated the laws they crafted. See Lawrence M. Friedman. 1993. Crime and Punishment in
American History. New York: BasicBooks.
83 On the powerful role of Puritan church leaders in young New England, see Francis Brenner’s
1994 Shaping New Englands: Puritan clergymen in seventeenth-century England and New
England.
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http://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-policing-united-states-part-1. Accessed 8 October
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85 Ibid.
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institutions to a degree.89 For example, the London Metropolitan Police, which was established
in 1829, served to “inspire American experiments with a standing army of professional law
enforcers.”90 Boston established a day watch in 1838; but this proved insufficient to handle its
rapidly growing population. Boston also saw its official Boston Police Department take shape in
1854. New York City, New Orleans, Newark, and Baltimore took similar steps to organize police
forces in subsequent years.91 In 1903, Connecticut Governor Abiram Chamberlain signed a bill
that authorized creation of the first state police department.92
Police entities which cropped up during these years would be far more recognizable to us
than were the previous iterations of 17th century night and day watches. Beginning in the mid
1800s, the structure of police agencies more closely aligned with the independent, bureaucratic
structure we know today.93 Individuals received training and resources. Scholars such as Robert
Wadman and William Allison attribute the formalization of law enforcement to a number of
social, economic, and political factors – among them urbanization, industrialization, and
perceptions about the rise in crime and vice.94 Law enforcement expanded as a profession to
keep pace with the increased concentration of human populations in urban centers as well as the

Friedman observes the common “stimulus” of fear operative in the creation of both the formal
English and American police organizations.
90
Ibid., 68.
91 See Walker, Samuel and Charles Katz. 2013. The Police in America: An Introduction, Eighth
Edition. NY: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
92 “A Brief History of the Connecticut State Police.” January 18 2017.
http://www.cspmuseum.org/CMSLite/?CMSLite_Page=7.
93 By “independent,” I signal the shift in locus of policing from ecclesiastical hands to external,
political ones. To the extent though that police departments became tethered to political party
bosses in places like Chicago, for example, independent policing did not achieve complete
actualization at the time.
94 See Wadman, Robert C. and William Thomas Allison. 2004. To Protect and Serve: A History
of Police in America. D.C.: Pearson.
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perceived rise in social disorder and crime.95 The evolution from a band of ordinary citizens
taking watch to a professionalized group of trained individuals took time. Despite structural and
organizational shifts in law enforcement, moral and Biblical teachings continued to undergird the
premises of policing. For instance, public displays of drunkenness and prostitution were
classified as disorderly conduct.96 Displays of this kind were viewed as immoral. Consequently,
police were instructed to respond to these examples of moral disorder in society.
The moral approach to regulating, prosecuting, and policing sexual behaviors continued
through the 19th century.97 Moral teachings and sensibilities provided fundamental groundwork
for law. From the time of early colonial night watches through the 19th century, sexual offenses
were both conceptualized and policed in terms of morality. In addition, racial scripts often
underwrote sexual mores – as seen in American slave codes, for example. Acts such as
“fornication” or sodomy may or may not have been victimless “crimes,” but what was standard
among their prosecution is the perspective that these acts violated the moral as well as pure racial
bedrock of the community (Bremer and Webster 2006; D’Emilio and Freedman 1997).98 In one
way or another, sex crimes law and enforcement – whether pertaining to masturbation or sexual
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See Reppetto, Thomas A. 2010. American Police: A History, 1845-1945. Enigma Books:
Oxford, England.
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See Ferdinand, Theodore N. 1980. “Criminality, the Courts, and the Constabulary in Boston:
1702-1967.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 17: 190-208.
97 In fact, the Progressive Era renewed calls for morality-based legislation. The genre of “blue
laws” such as prohibitions on alcohol, drunkenness – along with other behavior perceived as
depraved – emerge from this historical context of policing morality.
98 See Bremer, Francis J., and Tom Webster. 2006. Puritans and Puritanism in Europe and
America: A Comprehensive Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc. and
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assault of a child – are best understood in a moral context in which social discipline, self-control,
and racial purity were placed at a premium (Stoler 1989; Bush 1993; Wallenstein 1994).99
Enforcing Laws of Science: Policing (and diagnosing) sexual offenders in 20th century
America
During the 20th century, a burgeoning scientific, technical approach began to supplant the
more traditional, moral approach to legislating, enforcing, and punishing sexual offenders. As
cities expanded and industries modernized, so, too, did law enforcement change. In the United
States, the turn of the century saw “recorded serial murders and sex killings accelerate[e].”100
Jenkins attributes the uptick to reported sex-related murders to enhanced “police detection” and
media reporting.101 This does not surprise, as the police had become more formalized, organized,
and effective as an institution by the late 1830s in the United States.
Equipped with resources, experience, and knowledge to deal with crime – particularly in
growing urban centers – law enforcement now had a more mature capacity to deal with the
increased frequency of sex crime reports.102 After all, as Friedman points out, the “invention of
the police was, in part, a response to the violence of cities.”103 Of course, more sophisticated
police methods and a growing media industry are just part of the story. At work as well were
persistent public anxieties and fears about crime – fears that have been consistently exploited,
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capitalized, and politicized throughout the chronicles of U.S. law, crime, and society history
(Scheingold 1984, 2004, 2011; Simon and Feeley 1998; Farkas and Stichman 2002; Robin 2004;
SpearIt 2011; Roos 2014). For example, Rogin’s pointed observations about racial overtones and
undertones present in everything ranging from American film culture (e.g., Birth of a Nation) to
President Wilson administration’s move to separate white and black coworkers, so that white
females were not ‘forced unnecessarily to sit at desks with colored men’ reveal the racially-fused
politics of policing sex crimes – especially in the urban setting (1985, 155).104
At the same time, the disciplines of medicine and psychiatry were also professionalizing
in the United States. It was also the advent of Freudian psychoanalysis. Developments in law
enforcement, medicine, and psychiatry are neither coincidental nor mutually exclusive. As
Foucault notes, the “intervention of psychiatry in the field of law” and the accompanying
“psychiatrization of criminal danger” had become prevalent during the 19th century. In other
words, criminal actions originated from dangerous insanity and harmful urges which the “legally
responsible agent” cannot “even control because he is frequently not even aware of it.”105
Changes in these fields precipitated a paradigm shift that recast sex crimes as a mental
abnormality, rather than an intentional choice. Based on medical and psychiatric findings, the
criminological consensus came to hinge on the notion that sexually “deviant” actions were
actually symptoms of underlying mental illness and/or biological “flaws.”106 Indeed, to this day,
sexually deviant tendencies and behavior such as paraphilia (including pedophilia) are thought to
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be manifestations of mental disorders.107 If sexual offenses were unintentional expressions of
subterranean mental, biological, and behavioral disorders, traditional criminal justice conceptions
about individualized justice and personal responsibility could no longer hold (Feeley and Simon
1992; Simon 1998; Hebenton and Seddon 2009). Instead, medical intervention and psychiatric
therapy – not imprisonment – were billed as the adequate, targeted methods to fulfill criminal
justice aims of crime prevention, societal order, and public safety. These shifts in criminology
are accompanied by changes in theories and practices of punishment as well.
Thus, the medical view of sexual deviance stood opposite the conventional law
enforcement view that sex crimes are premeditated acts motivated by malice. Sexual deviance
was a symptom of mental and biological processes gone awry. It was not necessarily a matter of
choice, argued doctors and psychiatrists. Under the banner of science and medicine, the sex
criminal was now an individual in need of therapy – not punishment. In effect, the sex criminal
had been mislabeled, erroneously subjugated to moral judgments and criminological misnomers.
The implications of modified conceptions about sex criminals were made plain to U.S. law
enforcement. Namely, police departments needed to dismantle punitive procedures and replace
them with purportedly promising mechanisms of therapeutic intervention. Yet, such
incorporation of psychiatric insights into policing methodologies made for an interesting and
oftentimes unclear, confusing combination.
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Psychiatric diagnoses began finding their way into law; likewise, legal processes became
vehicles for medical assessments. As encapsulated in Foucault’s prescient words, legal justice
within the modernizing criminal justice system
has at least as much to do with criminals as with crimes. Or, more precisely,
though for a long time the criminal had been no more than the person to whom a
crime could be attributed and who could therefore be punished, today the crime
tends to be no more than the event that signals the existence of a dangerous
element – that is, more or less dangerous – in the social body.108
Criminals were individuals who posed dangers to the body politic. More specifically, under this
medical-legal logic, just as sexual deviants exhibit to their own mental and psychological wellbeing, they equally pose risks to a society’s technological, industrial, and scientific progress. In
this way, a particular mode or technique of medical treatment and policing sex criminals came
into vogue in the early 20th century.
Consider the story of Kenneth Elton, a repeat offender of female minors, as recounted by
Jenkins. The following account aptly illustrates the constitutive, relational shifts that were
occurring in the treatment and policing of sex offenders:
Elton presented himself as merely a teenage boy with a taste for girls a little
younger than himself. While working at an army camp during World War I, he
associated with girls of thirteen or fourteen in preference to the ‘gold-digger’
women frequented by soldiers, figuring that the youngsters were probably
disease-free…[i]n 1922, after approaching a young girl on the street, he received a
one-year jail sentence; in 1925, after being caught performing cunnilingus on a
girl of nine, he was committed to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C.
Elton was puzzled by the tough official reaction, and he minimized his offenses as
‘a kind of masturbation, just to get the gun off.’109
The above passage indicates the application of a particular medical-criminal justice regime to
sexual deviants. The sexual deviant therefore was (and is) seen as posing a danger to society that
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warrants punishment and/or separation from society either in the form of imprisonment or
confinement in the hospital.
Four key aspects of this regime become evident from Kenneth Elton’s case. One, the
prison sentence for soliciting a minor (i.e., “approaching a young girl on the street) in the 1900s
is fairly light as compared to today’s sentencing structure. If committed in the state of
Connecticut now, for example, such an act against a child under thirteen years of age would
carry a penalty of 5 years minimum prison time.110 In addition, it is notable that Elton’s
performance of an oral sex act on a minor likewise did not warrant a prison sentence under the
law at the time. In fact, Elton was sent to a hospital for that act – not a jail. Today, individuals
who commit sexual assault in the first degree can expect imprisonment and “special parole”
lasting “at least” ten years.111 Second, the variation in “punishment” and “treatment” is striking
for the commission of different criminal acts.112
On the one hand, the American system metes out criminal penalty for online solicitation
of a minor – presumably an act that may not result in any kind of sexual consummation. On the
other hand, the American system does out a decidedly medical – perhaps even therapeutic –
treatment for actual performance of a sex act against a minor. The seemingly lesser offense
receives a more traditional criminal justice penalty; the seemingly more serious offense
meanwhile receives a hospitalization. Third, that Elton feels “puzzled” by the “tough official
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reaction” reveals the possibility that both the law enforcement and medical responses had been
heretofore not enacted in meaningful ways with respect to his situation. Without reading too
much into this one instance, it nonetheless suggests that these fields had yet to ramp up efforts to
identify, deter, and address sex offenders with a systematic approach – despite the increasing
professionalization of both. Finally, a constitutive dynamic among the law enforcement and
medical fields is palpable. A shift from criminalization to medicalization of sexual offender
suspects is located in Elton’s case: where he first receives a criminal sanction, then several years
later experiences a mandated hospital stay.
During this era of flourishing psychiatric research and local government-mandated
exploratory committees on sex criminals, the over-arching conclusion was that sex crimes
“usually” did not occur as the result of “obsessive recidivists.”113 In addition, political leaders
and law enforcement found that first-time sex offenders committed the majority of sexual
misdeeds in urban epicenters like 1930s New York City.114 For this reason, psychiatrists “wished
to promote therapeutic intervention as a benevolent alternative to the punitive assumptions of the
prevailing [criminal justice] system.”115 Importantly, law enforcement accepted the wisdom that
fields of medicine and psychiatry purveyed. Feeling intense political and public pressure, police
sought a solution to what appeared to be an exploding sex crime crisis across the nation. After
all, there were daily media reports of sex crimes and daily arrests of suspected sex criminals.
During the late 1940s, police departments began to accept psychiatric experts on sex
offenders into their departments. Law enforcement combined conventional policing techniques
with the resources of psychiatric profiling and understanding of who sex criminals were and how
113
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they acted. Even now, psychiatric and medical insights permeate professional discourses about
sex offenders and cyber sex offenders. Child abusers, it is said, suffer from depression and
anxiety.116 Pedophiles, a subset of child abusers (not all child abusers are diagnosed with
pedophilia), tend to be socially awkward and introverted.117 Or, according to sociologist Keith
Durkin, who has conducted in-depth interviews with sexual offenders, “a striking characteristic
of pedophiles is the ability to minimize, rationalize activities.”118 Thus, the lineage of these
insights is nearly a century old, applicable to today’s burgeoning carceral state as much as they
were to the nascent criminal justice system 100 years ago.
This rosy vision of therapy and medical intervention, however, soon faced doubts. In
realistic terms, psychiatrists and police alike recognized that certain segments of the sex
“psychopath” population ought to undergo a dual experience of just punishment and targeted
therapy. Routines for psychiatric therapy were simply not making good on the pledge to
rehabilitate and normalize sexual deviants. Highly publicized sex crime cases in the U.S. like
that of William Heirens119 in 1946 (who allegedly committed multiple murders, one of which
included the dismemberment of a six-year-old female victim) also fostered skepticism about the
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efficacy of treatment.120 On a note left at one particular murder scene, Heirens had written: “For
Heaven’s sake, catch me before I kill more. I cannot control myself.” To be sure, Heirens’ words
did not help to alleviate the accelerating train of second-guessing about pursuing the therapeutic
route for sex criminals. If the objectives of psychiatric therapy are to diagnose, treat, and
rehabilitate individuals with mental illnesses, including “disordered” sexual behavior, the failures
of therapy (i.e., sex criminals recidivating) will understandably trigger wholesale critiques.
The profession was struggling to grapple with public perceptions of a diagnosis and
treatment regime gone awry. Media coverage across the nation exacerbated the public’s concerns
about sex crimes. Prescribing therapy stood as the weakest of the tools in the law enforcement
toolbox. 1930s and 1940s newspapers in St. Louis, Missouri, for example, greeted readers with
the following headlines: “KINDERGARTEN GIRL ACCOSTED BY MAN;” “MAN
ACCUSED BY 8-YEAR-OLD BOY OF MOLESTING HIM IN THEATRE;” “6-YEAR-OLD
GIRL AT ASHLAND SCHOOL MOLESTED;” “9 CHARGES AGAINST MOLESTER OF
GIRLS.”121 In this light, the pairing of psychiatry and policing had made for a less than clear,
decisive strategy to address sex crimes across the nation.
Equally important, the issue of sex criminal recidivism posed a major hurdle to the
realization of the medical vision. Even after receiving court-mandated treatment, individuals
were re-offending. In this light, therapy (in conjunction with conventional criminal sanctions)
was not the panacea as originally conceived. As was noted in New York City, ‘[t]he repeatedly
arrested but released sex offender is a special bogey.’122 Documenting a particular case
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illustrative of the limitations law and enforcement faced – and the debuting concept of the “sex
psychopath” at the time, Jenkins writes about a man
who received a year’s imprisonment in 1942 for indecent exposure to two young
girls. Released in 1943, he soon received thirty days in prison for exhibitionism.
The year 1944 brought probation for molesting a five-year-old girl and then
another year in jail for indecent exposure to more little girls. The man was
rearrested again each year from 1946 through 1949, when he was finally
committed indefinitely as a sex psychopath.123
Between the 1930s and 1950s, reported sex crime waves ebbed and flowed in American politics,
media, and society as a whole. Public fears alternated among peaks and zeniths, coinciding with
the country’s political, social, and racial scripts of the day.
In this context, social, political, and legal conditions ripened for the construction of a new
genre of American law: sexual psychopath statutes. These laws sought to salvage the remaining
insights of psychiatry and combine them with the grit of law enforcement. Farkas and Stichman
(2002) discuss how the first “sexual psychopath” laws were passed beginning in the 1920s and
1930s in response to high-profile sex crimes.124 Media coverage documenting alleged “waves” of
sex crimes against minors ignited public fears about the vulnerability of American youth.
Forming a partial template for the sexually violent predator (SVP) legislation that would appear
in the 1990s and early 2000s, sexual psychopath laws provided for the civil commitment and
treatment of offenders.125 Yet, these psychopath statutes nonetheless retained treatment-oriented
content and objectives in language, if not in practice.
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The United States saw the generation of a mid-20th century, post-war sociopolitical
climate, in which “the ‘crime problem’” became “more intense in people’s minds, and in their
lives.”126 In this setting, then, it is not surprising that politicians, physicians, psychiatrists, police,
and the public coalesced around efforts to wage a new war – a domestic pursuit of justice against
the sexual predators and “sex fiends” who roamed the country, menacing children.127 Heated
calls for swift action materialize in the form of law and order legislation. States throughout the
nation promptly put pen to paper and crafted the genre of the sex psychopath statute, as has been
just discussed (Lave 2009).128
The politics of sexual law and order developed freely during the mid-20th century,
without much judicial interference in the beginning. For example, the Supreme Court had yet to
weigh questions of indecency and obscenity or set constitutional parameters in any systematic
way.129 In other words, law makers and law enforcers had vast powers with which to fashion
laws covering sex crimes. In effect, law-making and law-enforcing capitalized on the absence of
decision and clarity within sex law itself. Meanwhile, municipalities like New York and Chicago
pioneered “sex bureaux to catalog sex offenders against children.”130 Initiatives to catalog and
track sex offenders were part of an extensive, multi-pronged campaign to address the sex crime
126
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problem (part perceived, part actual) in the United States.131 Again, these efforts did not occur in
a vacuum, but rather were one response of many to growing anxieties about broader changes
within the social order, such as the African-American civil rights movement, emergence of youth
culture, and the growing presence of women in the workplace.132 Other pieces of the law
enforcement pie entailed states carving out sex psychopath statutes.133
Two key premises secured the foundation of sex psychopath statutes. Exploratory
committees tasked with writing the statutes touted the notion that there were sex offenders who
were not insane yet still turned to atypical methods of “satisfying sexual desires” and so thus
posed risks to the public. The first basis of sex psychopath statutes is that certain sex offenders
pursue abnormal means to satiate sexual desires. On balance, sex psychopath statutes ought to
regulate or altogether prohibit those means. Advocates for sex psychopath statutes also argued
that the population of “compulsive,” violent sex offenders must be contained in specific areas –
away from general prison populations or other conventional institutional settings. Here, the
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second basis for sex psychopath statutes is that certain sex offenders; especially sexual deviants
need to be ostracized from society.
Prior to the advent of sex psychopath laws, legislators and police did not have the
statutory resources to counter the persistent problem of sex crime recidivism. Jenkins discusses
how “[a] need for prolonged incarceration was suggested” by cases of individuals with long
histories of sexual violence against children.134 For example, in 1938, a 53-year-old man was
reported to have begun his criminal record in 1910 – serving prison time for “indecent assault
and carnal abuse of a child.”135 He was consecutively re-arrested and re-released in 1921, 1925,
and 1936 for other sex crimes against children.136 Once identified as psychopathic under these
laws, individuals went straight to indefinite civil confinement and therapy. Insanity thus voided
constitutional protection even as psychopathic sex criminals were subjected to criminal sanction.
During the 1940s and 1950s, states began to craft legislation targeting sex offenders both
for medical/psychiatric diagnoses, and for government surveillance. In 1947, California became
the first state to pass a law that authorized police tracking of the whereabouts of sex offenders
upon release from a prison – a practice that continues to this day and has extended to all fifty
states. By 1998, 49 states and D.C. had created centralized sex offender registries, which shared
information in common. And which state was the last one to join the sex offender registry
movement? Connecticut. However, beginning in May 1998, “legislation…establishing a
centralized State sex offender registry” made Connecticut’s membership in the club official
effective October 1, 1998.137
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Connecticut also retained a sexual psychopath statute on the books as late as the 1990s.138
Interestingly, in the 2003 case of Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the argument that sex offenders in the state were denied due process as a
result of language in the law that disallowed them from a hearing to determine whether they
posed dangers to the public. Both law makers and law enforcers exercised a broad scope of
power to legislate as well as police sex criminals who were identified as psychopathic,
compulsive, and dangerous.139
Yet following a “flurry of legislation” a slight, temporary reprieve from the punitive
energies crystallized in the form of the President’s Commission Report of 1968, requested by
President Lyndon B. Johnson.140 “This report emphasized improvements in rehabilitation as
central tasks for the future of corrections.”141 The narratives and framing of crime in this report
synced with the attitudes of the 1960s and Civil Rights-era during which Americans as a whole
turned less sympathetic toward law enforcement responses to sex crimes. In the midst of
increased awareness about rights and liberties, stringent punishments and confinements
enshrined in the sex psychopath legal schematic became less acceptable. In particular,
identification of all sex offenders as “psychopaths” was losing its appeal in the eyes of activists
and politicians seeking to be on par with changing sensibilities. To a significant degree, police
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departments were caught in the middle. The punitive trajectory of law enforcement appeared to
stall at precisely the gap between disciplinary and rehabilitation models. Indeed, “[w]hen fear or
crime…reduced from a boil to a slow simmer, professionals…put through programs of reform
and rehabilitation.”142 Police had to pivot and change course.
In conjunction with (perhaps more accurately, as a result of) Civil Rights-era activism,
which both responded to and re-ignited racialized anxieties at that time, shifting expert opinion
impacted the ways media portrayed, the public viewed, and law enforcement respond to sex
crimes in the 1960s and 1970s. Walking back from prior narratives about sex offenders as
fiendish persons demonizing America’s children in mass droves, medical and psychiatric experts
changed tunes – and so did the media and public. In the same vein, legislative and judicial
officials searched for immediate mechanisms to modify punitive and therapeutic mechanisms for
dealing with sex criminals. The United States law enforcement communities had to follow suit.
Beginning in the 1960s, lawmakers and judges limited drastically the “powers of forcible
civil commitment and discretionary sentencing that had earlier been the foundation of official
policies toward sexual deviants.”143 Consequently, police found the powers to identify and arrest
suspected sex offenders in the lurch. Media coverage and public opinion veered far afield from
previous conceptions of panics surrounding sex crimes. As experts in the fields of medicine and
criminal justice downplayed sex crime, people developed a skepticism about its actual gravity
and extent. Illustrative of the time, a leading criminological work from 1959 depicted the sex
crime issue in the following tone:
the most serious [of sex crimes] are associated with rape, particularly forcible
rape, or with assaults on young girls or elderly women. But…there are few
outright cases of this type. Most of the rape cases deal with statutory rape…So far
142
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as forcible rape is concerned, it has been much overrated. In many cases the
female has offered little resistance, and in other cases she has ‘framed’ the
male.144
This text marks a vast conceptual distance between treatment of sex offenders in the earlier
decades of the 1900s and that of the mid-century. The sentiments contained in the above passage
squarely place blame on the gendered (i.e., female) victim for doing one of three things:
overreacting; not doing enough to resist the offender’s attentions; or actually conniving to accuse
the male perpetrator without factual basis. On this position, then, law enforcement responses to
sex crimes are rooted in baseless accusations made by weak – even devious – females who are
acting on a malicious thirst for attention. In this context, police actions would therefore appear
illegitimate and unnecessary.
Keeping a sense of the academic, social, political, and media scripts underlying changing
attitudes toward sex crimes in mind, one realizes that these depictions are moored in relaxed
judgments about both the act itself and the agent behind it. Jenkins reports that experts on the
subject pronounced “early sexual contacts” as not having “harmful effects on many children
unless the family, legal authorities or society reacts negatively.”145 Again, these determinations
sounded a far cry from previous narratives of sexually deviant behaviors and sex crimes that
prevailed through the 19th century and early 20th century.
Certainly, the transformation from early 17th, 18th, and 19th-century perceptions of sex
crimes to views proliferating in the mid-20th century was a far-reaching, extreme one. During the
earlier decades, sexual deviants were deemed pernicious, violent, and malevolent predators of
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youth.146 The mandate for law enforcement was clear and carried out without question. Police
investigated and arrested sexual offenders of children in a highly intense, specialized way. The
sheer volume of arrests for rape, sexual assault, and battery from the 1920s-1950s speaks to this
mandate.147 Yet, during the later decades, that clarity of mission and purpose diminished; police
did not have the wide berth of official backing and public opinion behind them they previously
possessed. Attitudes toward sexual activity were loosening; age of consent was now a topic for
debate.148
To this day, variation abounds among the states when it comes to setting the legal age of
consent. As is the case with many states, the age of consent is sixteen to Connecticut. 149 Still, as
UCLA’s School of Law Eugene Volokh says, while thirty states set consent at sixteen (including
Connecticut), eight states mark it at seventeen years of age, and twelve states set it at the ripe old
age of eighteen.150 Finally, differences between age of the victim and age of the rapist provide
the basis for yet more variety in how states treat offenses like statutory rape and aggravated
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sexual assault.151 For example, many states provide that if the age difference between offender
and victim is fewer than two or three years, the felony offense can be downgraded to a
misdemeanor.152 Sex crimes law was disparate and inconsistent then; it is now as well. If, during
the sexual revolution, sexual relations between adults and youth were no longer perceived as
troubling an issue as they once were, then enforcing sex laws on the books became a logistically
cumbersome and politically unpopular move. As states revised statutes governing sex crimes,
police witnessed their arrest powers and enforcement authority revised as well.
The War on Sex Offender: The Policing Comeback in the 1970s-1980s
Just a few years later, however, the idea of rehabilitation would subside, as American
politics returned to traditional understandings of the disciplinary, yet rehabilitative role of law
enforcement. After two decades spent unraveling legislative and policing initiatives deemed too
harsh a response to sex crimes, political winds began to blow the opposite direction once again.
Legislators, activists, and the broader public, questioned whether the pendulum had swung too
far to the side of leniency toward sex criminals.
In the wake of altered laws and reduced policing targeting sex criminals, renewed calls
for strengthened law enforcement emerged. Scholars - ncluding Friedman, Scheingold, Simon,
and Garland - have noted that during the 1980s War on Drugs, in conjunction with the wake of
the not-so-coincidental welfare state expansion, twin emphases on the more punitive goals of
retribution and deterrence were back with a vengeance. Politicians set their sights on tightening
the screws on drug and sex legislation. The “war” model replicated itself in various legislative
arenas.
151

Koon-Magnin and Ruback, 1923.
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Factors fueling this reinvigorated drive for policing were many, but the chief of which
was the merger of the War on Drugs context with the feminist campaign (in the midst of the
emergent landscape of social work). Most noteworthy among them were the following two:
feminists launched a campaign to highlight the prevalence of rape in the nation; and medical and
social work professionals successfully brought attention to the prevalence of child abuse in
American families and homes.153 With activists on the one hand and child experts on the other
hand decrying child abuse as a widespread and serious threat, police resources and skills were in
high demand.
Such demand materialized, for example, in the 1974 Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (CAPTA).154 Authored by Minnesota Democratic Senator Walter Mondate (just
two years prior to serving as Vice President under Jimmy Carter), the Act mandated formal
reporting and investigation of child abuse claims. Then, as now, scholars debated questions over
the clarity, efficacy, and constitutionality of the Act’s provisions that abridged familial autonomy
and privacy in the name of child safety and protection.155 Shortly following its passage, for
example, scholars found that a host of reasons accounted for people not reporting and
investigating child abuse claims – including uncertainty over how to define abuse and neglect
and the possibility of facing lawsuits or otherwise reprisal-like actions from families.156
Moreover, Mondale expressed concern regarding how implementation of the law functionally
required “nonprofessional psychological and social judgments about children and family on the
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basis of minimal information” and how “[t]hese judgments could result in unwarranted intrusion
of the government.”157
Local, state, and federal agencies cropped up in order to meet the new federal
requirements. In the same year, the Department of Health and Human Services established the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN).158 Private organizations also
materialized to direct expertise and funding for addressing the new national crisis of child abuse
in its physical as well as sexual dimensions. Legislators detected the broad political salience of
the moment and so quickly attached themselves to the crimes against minors movement
renaissance – conservatives and liberals; feminists and evangelicals alike.
The movement brought together conventionally cacophonous voices around the singular
issues of child physical and sexual abuse. The American public needed the specialized
knowledge and skill sets of law enforcement once again – this time, to address cases of child
abuse, molestation, rape, and incest. The topic of child pornography and its intrinsic exploitation
of youth came to a head as well during this time. Activists wielded an influential hand in
pressuring municipal agencies and police departments to investigate child pornography.
In response to activism and political pressure surrounding the issue, New York City
police descended on Times Square in 1977 and initiated a major “crackdown” on purveyors of
child pornography.159 That same year, Chicago police uncovered operations and the headquarters
of what they determined to be a nationwide “homosexual” ring involving sex trafficking of male
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youths for the purposes of prostitution and pornographic modeling.160 Meanwhile, the House
Judiciary Committee prepared to hold hearings on child pornography, prostitution, and other
forms of exploitation, with New Jersey Congressman Peter Rodino, Jr. saying that it was “a
matter to be dealt with as quickly as possible.”161
The case for an inevitable linkage between child pornography and child abuse was made
nearly immediately at the outset of the 1970s tough-on-sex crimes comeback.162 According to
activists and law enforcement experts (then as well as now), consumption of child pornography
involves the emotional, physical, and sexual abuse of children. As one advocate put it, victims of
child pornography featured in film and on page “were emotionally and spiritually murdered.”163
Today, feminist scholars contend that child pornography “works to eroticize a child’s
powerlessness” and the “existence of a booming child pornography market validates viewers’
desire to sexualize children.”164 In 1977 Congress passed the Kildee-Murphy bill, which banned
the “manufacture, distribution, and possession of child pornography.165 Just as CAPTA had to
fend off constitutional challenges, so, too, the Kildee-Murphy bill faced First Amendment
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questions pertaining to whether definitions of “child” and “pornography” were overbroad,
thereby constituting invalid incursions on protected speech (Clough 2012; Roos 2014).166
Equally important, police practices mirrored growing consensus over child abuse. Law
enforcement agencies vigorously investigated allegations and prosecuted child abusers to the
fullest extent of newly stringent laws. With the debut of National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children (NCMEC) in the 1980s, police pursued sex abusers of children with a
heightened sense both of institutional and public support. Likewise, in 1986, the federal
Children’s Justice Act funded programs to improve the prosecution of child abuse and neglect
cases.
In effect, policing sex crimes against minors had returned in full force by the 1980s.
Therapeutic intervention and rehabilitative practices for sex criminals failed to staunch the
seemingly persistent increase in sex crimes perpetrated against children. The medical-criminal
justice regime of treating sex offenders in civil confinement fared no better. Worse, these
practices failed to pacify activists, who opposed the sexual psychopath legislation on the basis of
what they saw as unjust, arbitrary, and racist law.
Finally, in the 1970s and 1980s, Americans began to turn their backs on the rehabilitative
ideal for criminals across the board – but especially with respect to sex offenders. Simon notes
the “decline of the rehabilitative ideal” in the 1970s and the subsequent return to criminal justice
norms of retribution and deterrence in the 1980s.167 In sum, the 1970s and 1980s marked a shift
back to a more energized, clear-sighted, forceful mode of policing sex crimes against minors.
The 1960s approach to legislating and policing sex crimes had all but vanished by the 1980s.
See Clough, Jonathan. 2012. “Lawful acts, unlawful images: the problematic definition of
‘child’ pornography.” Monash University of Law Review 38(3): 213-245.
167 Simon, Jonathan. 1998. “Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology.”
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Sex Crimes, Meet the Internet: Policing at the dawn of the Information Age
Enter the 1990s, the last decade of a century during which the nation experienced a
debilitating Great Depression, two tumultuous World Wars, the Civil Rights revolution, and the
psychological pain of Vietnam. The 1990s saw the Generation X-ers coming of age and the
cradle of the technology boom in California’s Silicon Valley take shape. The 1990s also saw the
internet take center stage in crimes, particularly those involving sex crimes against children. Just
as the internet revolutionized communications, it transfigured both the perpetration and policing
of sex crimes.168
In Chapter Three, I sketch an account of contemporary policing of sex crimes and cyber
sex crimes. In taking up such an account, I do so with an eye toward the constitutive, dynamic,
contingent relationships between law enforcement, crime, technology, and society. What does
the role of law look like when crime goes online? What does it mean both for law enforcement
and society to function in the Information Age? How does the complex, confusing, maze-like
geography of cyberspace further complicate law making and law enforcing in the United States?
How do these constitutive series of relationships among law enforcement, criminals, and
technology function as microcosms for broader penological patterns in the emerging carceralcivil society? What is the relationship of the carceral state to sex offenders – or as Gottschalk
observes them to be, ‘the modern-day untouchables’?169 I explore these inquiries next and lay the
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conceptual groundwork for understanding the role of the public sex offender registry within the
carceral state.
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Chapter Three
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Walking the Beat on the 21st Century Cyber Block: Police and Cyber Sex Offenders170
On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.171
On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a cop.172
[T]he Internet is ubiquitous, so ever-present in our lives now, that unlike a dog here or a dog
there, it’s become like a huge, baying pack of hounds that won’t ever shut up.173

Etymological origins of the phrase “walk the beat” are somewhat unclear. Modern usage of
the phrase expresses the idea that police conduct a foot patrol in a particular neighborhood. In
other words, officers are assigned to specific sections of a city, for example. Additionally, “the
beat” is closely associated with a resurgence in community policing practices. Community
policing centers on the development of personal ties with people living in the neighborhood;
police and citizens cultivate relationships – ones built on mutual trust and respect. Through these
mutually constitutive, trusting, respectful relationships, the objective is to provide more targeted,
responsive public service on the one hand as well as to strengthen the capacity for police to do
their investigative work on the other hand. At its core, practitioners of community policing
practices seek to foster trust in the police and cooperation on the part of residents. A March 2015
Wall Street Journal piece describes the return to community policing practices in places across
the nation – including the city of New Haven. Political observers and scholars see this return as
part of a corrective program to certain perceived law enforcement abuse of power in the highly
publicized police-shootings of adolescent African-American males, such as in the cases of
Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown. See “Putting Police Officers Back on the Beat.”
http://www.wsj.com/articles/putting-police-officers-back-on-the-beat-1426201176.
171
This phrase comes from the caption to the “most reproduced” cartoon in The New Yorker
history. In 1973, cartoonist Peter Steiner created the now-iconic drawing of one dog sitting
behind a desktop computer telling a fellow canine beside him the following: “on the internet,
nobody knows you’re a dog.” In a July 13, 2013 Washington Post article, Michael Cavna
observes that neither the cartoon creator nor his readers could anticipate the prophetic portent of
the caption. Computers and cyberspace were foreign objects and concepts to a majority of
Americans in the 1970s. Even Hollywood films like the 1968 2001: Space Odyssey or the 1983
War Games did not portray computers in ways yet practicable for the average American. Instead,
computers were imaginatively configured as personified objects belonging either to space
expeditions or elite military operations, respectively. “Steiner acknowledges that the cartoon,
upon its 20th anniversary, remains just as relevant – yet in 2013, the resonance is magnified,”
Cavna writes. In Steiner’s words, “the Internet is so ubiquitous, so ever-present in our lives now,
that unlike a dog here or a dog there, it’s become a huge, baying pack of hounds that won’t ever
shut up.” Whether law enforcement investigate hacking, phishing, bullying, or child
pornography, police confront the various “baying pack of hounds” roaming cyberspace.
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Introduction
In Chapter Two, I traced the evolution in the sociopolitical construction and policing of
sex crimes within the United States. In this chapter, I document the ways by which law
enforcement grapples with sex crimes of a digital, virtual – or, non-physical, if you will –
character in a relatively new space (cyberspace, online world) which nonetheless have potential
for actualization in the far more long-standing, established spaces (physical, offline world).
After undertaking this historical account, I identify as well as analyze implications for
law and society dynamics embedded in police-criminal-cyberspace linkages. In order to
understand this constitutive series of relationships among law enforcement, criminals, and
technology – and how they function as microcosms for broader penological patterns in the
emerging “carceral-civil” society, I explore how cyberspace complicates principles and practices
of law enforcement across the United States generally and in Connecticut specifically.174
I also investigate how the law’s lack of clarity and precision inform – or better,
misinform – the ways the internet and communicative technologies are likewise reshaping and
transforming nexuses between law, crime, and technology. Two primary inquiries therefore
guide the conceptual and analytic framework for this chapter. First, how does cyberspace impact
and transform enforcement of law and policing of sex crimes against youth in the United States?
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As I noted in the introductory chapter, Connecticut is an important, valuable case study for
the purpose of understanding policing cyber sex crimes against minors. One, the state is a
founding member of the Internet Crimes Against Children task forces (ICAC) – a vital player in
U.S. law enforcement efforts on this type of crime. Two, Connecticut was a litigant in the 2003
U.S. Supreme Court case (Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe). At issue was the
constitutionality of the state’s public sex offender registry and whether the database violates an
offender’s due process rights. The High Court did not address the specific question of the
registry’s constitutionality. Instead, the Court ruled that the registry was based on the offender’s
conviction alone. For these reasons, Connecticut provides a trove of data to examine the
following: information on law enforcement approaches to cyber sex crimes; information on the
legal, social, and political debates surrounding policing crime in the Information Age.
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Second, how does policing impact the way cyberspace functions as a terrain with its potential
both for communication and crime (as will become clear later in this chapter, sexually explicit
communication between adults and minors constitute crimes).
To these ends, I explore the unique ways by which cyber policing operations diverge
from traditional policing practices. During this exploration, I have uncovered specific reasons for
the distinctive turns law enforcement takes directly related to the character, features, and
functionality of the cyber world. From their inception, cyber policing operations of sex offenders
absorb tools of anonymity, masquerade, temporal flexibility the online universe fosters – the
very aspects criminals exploit for their own purposes. The history of internet technologies, which
is ongoing, is one of rapidly-increasing availability and convenience. The internet’s ubiquity
allows for uniquely easier modes of law-breaking and law-enforcing. At the same, elements of
anonymity, masquerade, and ubiquity likewise present challenges to traditional methods of law
enforcement.
I believe that these changes contained within cyber policing herald subtle, yet important
expansions to the new penology – the logic of which nourishes the carceral state. Feeley and
Simon argue that the new penology frames the criminal justice system as managing populations
according to different risk level individuals pose to society. Groups or communities deemed
high-risk receive more intensive management and control than those deemed low-risk. For
instance, individuals (and communities) suspected of association with terror or terror-related
activities warrant exacting scrutiny from U.S. law enforcement authorities. Alternatively,
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individuals (and communities) suspected of prescription opioid drug abuse are deemed more of a
risk to themselves than to the broader society.175
In addition, policing cyber sex offenders presents a distinctive expansion to the new
penology equation of risk management. I see three over-arching factors for why this population
of offenders pushes the bounds of the new penology. First, cyber sex offenders are not easily
categorized in terms of risk level they carry to society: the “mere” consumer of child
pornography stands as a far different case than the child porn producer as well as a years-long
abuser of his niece. Second, they are not easily pegged into demographic boxes: the cyber sex
offender can be your elderly black neighbor, your local Asian-American pharmacist, or your
white, unemployed cousin. Third, the criminal justice system follows cyber sex offenders in
ways it does not with regard to other prisoner populations such as violent offenders, drug
offenders, and deadly weapons offenders. Here, I mean that the management and surveillance of
cyber sex offenders continues into their lives post-incarceration in ways distinctive from other
offenders’ post-incarceration lives.176 Specifically, all 50 states – including Connecticut – require
sex offenders to register their names, addresses, and places of work with the state police. This
registration, which can vary from ten years to life (depending on the offense) is available for
public perusal.
In my view, the sociopolitical impetuses for intensive surveillance of sex offenders and
cyber sex offenders are even more pervasive than the new penology’s managerial explanation
would allow. In other words, the new penology logic undergirding the carceral state – a state in
which the disciplinary blends into the civil, punitive into the nonpunitive, the public into the
175
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176 I am sensitive to the fact that post-prison life for all offenders is riddled with problems reintegrating, finding work, re-establishing relationships with family, friends, and community.
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private, takes on more powerful, concentrated energy in the context of Information Age law and
order. The dynamics between police, criminal, and cyberspace are not static. Rather, they are
dynamics built on fluidity and contingency – ones that simultaneously reach and are part of,
politics, social trends, and cultural mores.
************
Contextualizing Police and Crime in Cyberspace
To ground the aforementioned queries, I draw three aspects or insights from arguments
within the technology, law, and society scholarship.177 These aspects center on the ways through
which the online world becomes differentiated from the offline world – as well as the
ramifications of such differentiation on socialization, culture, and politics.
One, cyberspace is not solely anchored to a geographic location in the traditional
meaning of a stationary, physical “space.” Yes; computers have a specific IP (Internet Protocol)
address, which does constitute a geographic marker of sorts. IP is an online network that
organizes data into packets or messages. These packets or messages contain the source of the
data (the sender’s information); the destination of the data (the recipient’s address); and the
177

The field of sociology is contributing much theory-building to an understanding of the
intersections between technology and society as well as technology and law. It is my goal toward
the end of this project to gather insights from law and society research and ultimately assemble a
constitutive theory of law-society-cyberspace as a way to sharpen analysis about the
relationships between law enforcement, crime, cyberspace, and society. See Latour, Bruno. 1990.
“Technology is society made durable.” The Sociological Review 38(51): 103-131. Also, see
Latour, Bruno. 1996. Aramis, or the Love of Technology. MA: Harvard University Press. In a
separate vein of law and technology scholarship, which nevertheless highlights the fascinating
consequences of the law-technology nexus, see work being done on predictive policing (the use
of computer algorithms to forecast crime “hot spots” – geographic locations, neighborhoods – of
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actual message content.178 Practically speaking, it is the internet’s version of physical mail
correspondence conventions: sender’s address, recipient’s address, envelope, and stamp. In this
technical sense, then, internet network mechanisms exist to mark identifiable, specific computer
and phone geographies – or addresses – of technology users (senders and recipients in the case of
emails, for instance). Nonetheless, the online world breaks and exceeds territorial, physicallybased demarcations.179 Marcum, Higgins, and Freiburger (2010) explain, for instance, how
policing cybercrimes is a vastly different enterprise than policing involving “a physical crime
scene in a neighborhood or office building.”180
For example, an adult in Colorado is able to engage in illegal, sexually explicit dialogue
with a minor from Hartford, Connecticut, arrange to meet that youth, whisk her away to his
apartment, and spend days engaging in sexual acts with her.181 In 2014, Timothy Wind, of
Colorado, took a liking to a 14-year-old Hartford girl – conversing with her through the Disney
social chat room “Pixie Hallow’ and other apps or features such as “Skype” and “Tumblr.” Mr.
Wind drove to Connecticut to take the girl on what he described as their “honeymoon.” Nearly
two weeks later, police located the teen and arrested the man for kidnapping, sexual assault, and
internet exploitation, among other charges. To this point on the ways in which cyberspace
muddles physical parameters and settings, Brenner writes:
Cyberspace does not require physical proximity between the victim and the
perpetrator. Cybercrime is unbounded crime; the victim and perpetrator can be in
different cities, different states, or different countries. All a cybercriminal needs is
178

http://compnetworking.about.com/od/networkprotocolsip/g/ip_protocol.htm.
For more discussion on the uniqueness of sexual cybercrimes, see Marcum, Catherine D.,
George E. Higgins, and Tina L. Freiburger. 2010. “Policing possession of child pornography
online: investigating the training and resources dedicated to the investigation of cyber crime.”
International Journal of Police Science & Management 12(4): 516-525.
180
Ibid., 518.
181 See http://www.wfsb.com/story/265225670/missing-harford-teen-returns-home-fromcolorado.
179

81

a computer linked to the Internet. With this, he can attack a victim’s computer,
defraud someone, or commit any of a host of cybercrimes.182
Closer to home, former Hartford, Connecticut school administrator Eduardo Genao was charged
with one count of felony child-endangerment after sending sexually explicit text messages to a
thirteen-year-old female. After meeting the girl at a local race and equity conference, Genao
obtained her number (under the pretext that he wanted her to send him pictures of a particular
professor’s slide slow presentation), and began requesting that she send him “’daring’ photos of
herself” as well as inquiring about her level of sexual experience.183 In the end, though, highpowered defense attorney Hugh Keefe made the case that Hartford prosecutors lacked
jurisdiction in his client’s case. Why? Genao sent the text while he was in Atlanta, Georgia, and
the teen had returned to her home in New York. No alleged criminal activity occurred in the
geographic, physical, city space of Hartford; it occurred in the transmission of data along cellular
networks and across state lines.
Scenarios like the ones just mentioned illustrate an increasingly common reality about
questions over jurisdiction: perpetration of cyber sex crimes often crosses municipal, state, or
even country lines. Marcum, Higgins, and Freiburger (2010) thus describe the “internet as an
intercontinental information highway.”184 As host to these “intercontinental information”
highways and communication networks, the cyber world functions as a terrain in which the
meaning of space is strikingly amorphous, unstructured, and boundless. Yet, the ability to
navigate this seemingly limitless space – with its wending information “highways” and
communicative pathways – testifies to exercises of power. In his 1996 case study of the Los
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Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Herbert examines the relationship between territoriality and
police authority: in effect, the geography-power connection.185 Herbert links exercises of police
power directly to the mechanisms by which the LAPD defines, cordons, and controls geographic
zones and L.A. neighborhoods.
In a similar vein, cyberspace is budding with instances of power and geography – albeit
in ways distinct from the offline world. For the individual intent on engaging in some kind of
sexually explicit expression or activity with minors online, that person would do well to become
fluent in the “dark net” – those otherwise clandestine corridors of child pornography production
and distribution networks or child sex trafficking forums.186 From the perspective of the
computer crimes specialist intent on preventing and/or responding to illicit online expression and
activity, it might take understanding how to converse with a child offender in order to make for a
compelling “twelve-year-old girl” online. As Trooper A explained to me in an off-site interview,
“the offenders will always be there online…there’s always a new app and social media platform”
for child predation; “there’s never an end to these kinds of investigations,” Trooper A
continued.187 During another off-site interview, Trooper B described the furious pace with which
law enforcement “have to keep up” with all of the online tools, social media forums, and apps
that make illicit sexual expression (and potentially, sexual activity) so easy to pursue.188
Meanwhile, if the offender is savvy, he or she will ask questions to try to ascertain whether the
“child” is actually a child or an undercover cop. For this reason, police receive extensive training
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in how to conduct online operations.189 The cop-suspect interactions within cyberspace make
apparent just some of the space-power plays at work. Command of cyberspace – and the
subsequent exercise of control (whether legally or illegally) – is content on the ability to navigate
social media, phone apps, chat rooms, and other networking sites with technological know-how.
Cops and criminals alike need to be cyber street-smart if they are to achieve their objectives.
Two, scholars contend that cyberspace provides unprecedented opportunities for
individuals to assume different identities. In addition, cyberspace enables individuals to secure
anonymity in ways far more difficult to achieve in the physical world. I have had the opportunity
to see the ease with which law enforcement can utilize the anonymity-rich and identity-fluid
conditions of cyberspace to facilitate online investigations into suspected sex offenders.190
Detectives may log into a chat room of known value as a virtual meeting space for adults to
message children and teens. They will do so with a contrived screen name that may allude to age
and gender (for example, hdprtygurl13), await a message from another person in the chat room
or other similar social networking apparatus, and converse with a suspected offender upon
receiving a message.191 When conducting this kind of work, law enforcement agents are never to
initiate the conversation.192 As has been explained to me, the online investigation proceeds in
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Political Science Pre-Doctoral Fund. Through this initial field work, I had opportunities to
engage in a sustained (nearly year-long), trust-building series of relationships with law
enforcement professionals.
190 Trooper A, personal correspondence, November 2015.
191
This is a fictitious screen name in order to protect past, ongoing, and future investigations.
192 This has been confirmed to me by state troopers who explain that receipt of Department of
Justice (specifically through the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention) grant
monies in contingent on adhering to strict investigative and process protocols. In 1998, the
Justice Appropriations Act provided that the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency create as
well as fund ICAC – the Internet Crimes Against Commission Task Forces. The ICAC protocol
manual is closely guarded among the relevant law enforcement agencies involved in sexual
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accordance with strict rules, which supply clear “dos” and “don’ts” for law enforcement as well
as protection from the entrapment defense – a classic defense lawyers often use to contend that
the cyber sex offender was lured into a sexually explicit conversation by an undercover law
enforcement agent.193
On the one hand, in the context of these technology-assisted law enforcement methods,
police can masquerade as minors in order to nab the suspect. On the other hand, savvy offenders
can likewise shift identities in order to be more appealing to an adolescent – for example, taking
on the emoticon-driven linguistics familiar to and common among, youth online users. Mitchell,
Wolak, and Finkelhor (2005) note the duality of cyberspace anonymity – how the benefits accrue
to police on the one hand and to criminals on the other.194 They write:
Anonymity is a unique aspect of the Internet that advances these crimes. A 40year-old man who would not be appealing to a teenage girl crossing his path at the
mall can create an online persona that will make him seem to be the perfect
boyfriend for a 14-year-old he meets in a chat room. This same anonymity is an
advantage to law enforcement because it allows a 40-year-old investigator to go
online posing as a 14-year-old girl. This permits law enforcement to be proactive
in investigations in ways they previously could not, and it allows them to detect
some offenders before they victimize an actual child.195

cybercrimes investigations; I was advised by my interviewees that I was barred from reading the
manual per regulations.
193 Mitchell, Wolak, and Finkelhor (2005) point out that ICAC task forces are “governed by
explicit guidelines regarding their conduct online.” These protocols and guidelines are developed
in conjunction with the Department of Justice Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS).
In addition, CEOS created a High Technology Investigative Unit in 2002 to focus specifically on
child exploitation cases perpetrated online and with associated technologies. See
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos.
194 Mitchell, Kimberly J., Janis Wolak, and David Finkelhor. 2005. “Police Posing as Juveniles
Online to Catch Sex Offenders: Is it Working?” Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and
Treatment 17(3): 241-267.
195
Mitchell, Wolak, and Finkelhor, 242.
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Just as the online world offers a communicative terrain without conventional boundaries, it also
becomes a relational site in which users can cultivate an unparalleled level of fluidity in names,
personalities, and identities.
Three, the concept of cyberspace forces scholars to reconsider what we mean to express
by “behavior.”196 According to conventional accounts of behavior, scholars intend to signify
physical, embodied acts with subsequent effects and consequences. For example, a child who
throws tantrum is exhibiting intense emotions in a physical, embodied manner: characterized by
a combination of crying, yelling, screaming, and flailing of limbs. Yet, the idea that cyberspace
plays host to such physical, embodied acts becomes more complicated. Instead, digital
transmission of information (i.e., emails or text message); online conversation (i.e., chat rooms,
social media network chat rooms)197; expressing sadness or behaving excitedly (i.e.,  or rly?
Omg! ☺) occur without the necessity of actualization. “Virtual” has come to mark a number of
societal trends and aspects in richly-textured ways. To many communications researchers,
“virtual” denotes ways that technology (e.g., computers, the internet, cell phones) mediates
social experiences.198 Thus, “virtual” worlds or realities span technological components and
experiential dimensions. Rather than individuals physically carrying out actions in the offline
Psychology Today published a piece in 2012 entitled “What is Behavior Anyway?” Clearly,
scholars are asking this seemingly simple question. Indeed, it is not a term to be taken for
granted. In that piece, Dr. Lee Dugatkin, presents different definitions of behavior from multiple
scholars. The definitions encompass responses to “external and internal stimuli” (Starr & Taggart
1992) as well as “observable activity…anything…that involves actions and/or response to
stimulation” (Wallace et al. 1991). See https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-princeevolution/201207/what-is-behavior-anyway.
197 The popular social media network, Facebook, launched “Rooms” in 2014. “Rooms” is an
anonymous chat application, in which invite-only users can discuss common interests without
having to divulge name or town. See http://time.com/3534690/facebook-anonymous-app-rooms/.
Almost immediately, concerns have arisen as to whether this type of explicitly anonymous cyber
setting will once again trigger illegal online “behavior” or activity.
198 See Steuer, Jonathan. 1992. “Defining Virtual Reality: Dimensions determining
Telepresence.” Journal of Communications 42(4): 73-93.
196
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world, internet users can express ideas, emotions, and words online and then, if they wish, can
act on them – but they do not have to.
Policing and Crime in the “Brave New World” of Cyber
Policing in the United States has come a long way since the 1900s, as has crime. From
the formation of quintessential vigilante groups of night watchmen enforcing firebrand versions
of justice to today’s highly institutionalized, organized, and bureaucratic law enforcement
systems, police have faced major changes in ideas and practices.199 Likewise, committing crimes
against persons (e.g., inflicting injury, death) is moving from a physical pursuit of victims to the
sophisticated use of online technologies and other computer-associated devices to wreak havoc
on people’s minds, emotions, and bodies (e.g., identity theft, cyber bullying, cyber stalking,
producing and/or sharing child pornography via social networks). As Trooper C said to me,
“Meg, there’s not a sex crime that we investigate nowadays that is not somehow helped out with
a cell phone or laptop.”200 This is not to say that physical commission of crimes is vanishing,
however. Rather, the increased availability and variety of technological devices is shifting –
albeit not yet a complete migration – criminal behavior from the physical, tangible world to the
amorphous, online world.
Moreover, the kinds of sex crimes perpetrated with technology (the agents directly
involved with cyber sex crimes investigations call them “technology-assisted crimes”) span a
much broader range. For example, according to former Trooper X, the “infant” genre of child
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An important reference point for my accounts of U.S. policing in this dissertation, Friedman
provides the classic, meticulously detailed history of American law enforcement and the criminal
justice system. See Friedman, Lawrence W. 1993. Crime and Punishment in American History.
NY: BasicBooks.
200 UConn Institutional Review Board Protocol H#15-241 Policing and Sex Crimes in
Cyberspace: The Changing Talk, Walk, and Politics of U.S. Law Enforcement.” Trooper A,
personal correspondence, August 19, 2015.
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pornography is becoming increasingly popular and available through online production and
distribution channels.201 This genre covers sexually explicit materials involving actual children
of toddler age and younger. Prior to the advent of the internet and heightened technological
sophistication, production as well as distribution of child pornography would have been quite
difficult. Individuals would have had to isolate a baby or child, place the baby in sexually
explicit positions, and then photograph or video record the infant. Now, adults can troll publiclyavailable Facebook or Instagram photos online and subsequently doctor the images.202 Next, with
the click of a button, they can share these distorted images to people in Connecticut, Canada, or
Croatia.203 As another example, consider the ease with which adults can engage with children
and youth – in ways far easier online than in the offline world. Adults can pretend to be a peer
and strike up a conversation online with minors – without detection from the child’s parent or
legal guardian. Cyberspace offers a unique kind of mobility and agility to sex offenders that is
absent in offline social worlds.
It is important to note that much debate exists within internet and technology scholarship
as to whether online technologies and spaces contribute to the creation of “new” crimes (e.g.,
hacking) or simply facilitate the expansion of traditional crimes in ways that would otherwise be
difficult, or at the least, fettered by obstacles in the physical world (e.g., stalking).204 For
example, Durkin (2009) contends that technological innovations such as the internet help to
201

Trooper X, personal correspondence, October 2014.
Unless the user chooses to privatize photos, the default setting for Facebook or Instagram
images and videos is “public.” Even after having taking this precautionary step of making private
these images and videos, the user’s profile and cover photos on Facebook are searchable by and
viewable to, the online public.
203 Incidentally, according to some of my contacts, eastern European bloc countries are some of
the primary geographic offenders in terms of pornography production and distribution – as well
as child sex trafficking.
204 Marcum, Higgins, and Freiburger (2010) distill clear demarcations between traditional, cyber,
and hybrid crimes.
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constitute “new forms of deviance” like cyberstalking and cyberbullying.205 Meanwhile, Wall
(2007) crafts a test for determining whether crime is “cybercrime” as follows: “the test of a
cybercrime must focus on what is left if those same networked technologies [the internet] are
removed from the equation” (34).206 According to Brenner’s perspective, “[m]ost of the
cybercrime we see today simply represents the migration of real-world crime into cyberspace”
(2010).207
For my purposes, the debate over the constitutive components underlying traditional,
cyber, or hybrid crimes is less germane than the substantive discussion about how cybercrime is
transforming U.S. law enforcement ideas and practices. Nevertheless, I want to make clear my
position on this matter: I consider online crimes against minors to be true, authentic cyber
crimes. In the course of field work and semi-structured interviews, I learn from police on the
ground that they believe – and treat – sexual cyber crimes as a different animal from traditional
sex crimes. In other words, while traditional sex crimes and cyber sex crimes share common
ground (such as pursuit of illicit and/or violent sexual acts), cyber sex crimes take on lives of
their own- lives that are unique to the technology world. Again, consider the examples of child
pornography and chatting with minors online as instances created sui generis from the
availability of technology and the cyberworld.
Both the enforcement and violation of laws have evolved into sophisticated, complex, yet
efficient enterprises.208 Development of communication, information, and computer technologies

See Durkin, Keith. 2009. “There must be some type of misunderstanding, there must be some
kind of mistake: The Deviance Disavowal Strategies.” Sociological Spectrum 29(6): 661-676.
206 See Wall, David S. 2007. Cybercrime. MA: Polity Press.
207
See Brenner, Susan W. Cybercrime: Criminal Threats from Cyberspace. CA: Praeger, 2010.
208
Sophisticated in the ways that individuals with criminal intent are able to manipulate the
security of passwords and servers to hack into governmental databases, for example. Complex in
the ways that individuals interested in child pornography can locate a relevant site, connect with
205
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plays an integral role in the increasingly complicated societal problems law enforcement
communities confront and criminals exploit. As an example, consider the ease with which child
traffickers operate in what some scholars (Terranova 2004; Castells 2010, 2011; Lyon 2014)
have dubbed the Information Age – an era of networked communications and data on demand at
the fingertips of cell phone, laptop, and tablet users. Specifically, traffickers can arrange
shipments and meetings online, communicate with their partners online, and, by shutting down
governmental websites, exploit security gaps in the countries, states, or cities to which their
“goods” are set to arrive.209
The internet has altered the fields of law enforcement and criminal activity in significant,
irrevocable ways. Indeed, the creation of cyber crimes units within police departments at the
local, state, and federal levels in a recognition that cyber crime is here to stay. According to an
April 2014 Police Executive Research Forum publication, for example, 42% of 498 responding
law enforcement agencies in the survey reported having a specialized computer or cyber crimes
unit.210 Based on the findings of that same document, the recognition that cyber crime is

others across the globe, and produce, distribute, and share images/videos; child pornography in
particular is an international, global issue. Efficient in the ways that individuals sexually
interested in children do not have to visit their nephews or nieces to have a bit of fun. Instead,
adults can maximize efficiency satisfying their desires by surfing the net from the comfort of
home, chatting with a minor online, and requesting that youth to share suggestive or explicit
images and video.
209 Belvins and Hott (2009) observe that the “ubiquity of computers and the internet in modern
society have led to the growth of criminal subcultures centered on technology.” See their piece,
“Examining the Virtual Subcultures of Johns” in the Journal of Contemporary Ethnography
38(5): 619-648.
210
See
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series_2/the%20role%20of%20local%2
0law%20enforcement%20agencies%20in%20preventing%20and%20investigating%20cybercrim
e%202014.pdf. Accessed 28 November 2015.
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drastically transforming the enterprise of policing becomes clear.211 Broadly speaking, the
internet and ways people use it have without doubt impacted sociolegal, sociopolitical, and
cultural domains across the United States.212 Whether it involves comedy, communication,
copulation, crime or crime control, the use of online, networked technologies entails distinctive
methods for engaging in social relations with other people.213 On the flip side, users of internet
technologies can also operate as well as further encourage, distinctive mechanisms for violating
those social relations.
Application of the term “behavior” to online activities does not possess the exactness or
clarity it has as applied to the offline world. One cannot be said to “behave” in the physical sense
within cyberspace. To the extent that online expression is nonetheless intentional and purposive,
internet users do participate, however, in a richly-textured circuitry of online activities and
conversations. Furthermore, the fact that online expression and activity may or can lead to
subsequent behavior in the physical world demonstrates potential linkages between online
expression and offline behavior.

See “The Role of Local Law Enforcement Agencies in Preventing and Investigating
Cybercrime.”http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series_2/the%20role%20o
f%20local%20law%20agencies%20in%20preventing%20and%20investigating%20cyberrime%2
02014.pdf. Accessed 28 November 2015.
212
Despite its unprecedented impact, the internet is not immune to armchair forecasters or to
survey questions posed to digital experts. For example, the Pew Research Center issued a 2014
summary of survey questions entitled the “15 Theses about the Digital Future.” Respondents
shared a vision in which they “foresee an ambient information environment where accessing the
Internet will be effortless…” Certainly, this conception of an “ambient information environment”
also attaches to potentiality for greater ease in committing crimes. See
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/03/11/digital-life-in2025/.
213
A recent Hartford Courant article explored some recent inventions – like the OhMiBod
company’s latest product, TASL (The Art of Science and Love) toy and app designed to augment
sexual experiences. See http://www.courant.com/consumer/hc-ls-sexbots-0124-20160122story.html.
211
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For example, an adult may initiate conversation with a minor online but consummate the
relationship with a physical meeting at a mall or motel. Scholars and practitioners alike wrestle
with the question of whether online offending of children necessarily leads to offline abuse. Law
enforcement practitioners in the Connecticut State Police community with whom I am in contact
are unequivocal in their position that consumption of child pornography increases the potential
for offline offending.214 Equally important, these law enforcement agents also underscore the fact
that production of child pornography materials (e.g., images, videos) inherently involves child
abuse.215 Even on this point, however, scholars raise the issue of virtual pornography as an
instance in which physical harm is not committed against an actual child.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has struck down provisions in the 1996 Child
Pornography Prevention Act that barred “any visual depiction…including computer or computergenerated image or picture” of a minor “engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” 216 The Court
agreed with an adult-entertainment trade association (the Free Speech Coalition) that the
provisions were overly broad. Again, note that behavior in cyberspace traverses lines: production
and consumption of virtual child pornography (production of material in the expressive sense)
may or may not lead to sexually offending an actual child (behavior). The “Wall of Shame” in a
law enforcement unit puts this connection into blunt terms: it displays arrested and convicted sex

See Bourke, Michael L. and Andres E. Hernandez. 2008. “The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: A
Report on the Incidence of Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders.”
Journal of Family Violence 24(3): 183-191.
215 Fissures, however, exist amongst scholars on this front. See Hackett, Simon, Marty Oelrich,
and Donald Krapohl. 2010. “Cybersex offender risk assessment. An explorative study.” Journal
of Sexual Aggression 16(2): 197-209.
216 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 535 US 234 (2002).
214
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offenders who began as online purveyors of sexually explicit materials involving minors or
participants in conversations and video-sharing with minors – or a combination.217
Furthermore, I mean to underscore the ways that expression and behavior in cyberspace
carry different implications for law’s preservation – as well as its violation.218 Humorously
mundane videos “go viral”219 on YouTube – spreading like a virus across the cyberscape.220
School districts announce weather-related cancellations on their websites or in mass text
messages. Individuals need not gather over dinner at a local pub to catch up. They can begin a
group message on Facebook from the comfort of their own home or apartment.221 While they are
at it, this same group of friends can share food photos on Instagram – the next best thing to
breaking bread in physical space and time.222 Instead of holding up a bank, an individual can
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Unit A field/site work, October 2015.
I delineate these differences more specifically as this chapter progresses and especially in
Chapter Four’s focus on the criminal justice sanction of the sex offender registry.
219 For an engaging introduction to the phrase, “going viral,” and what it means for cyberspace,
society, and culture, see Nahon, Karine and Jeff Hemsley’s Going Viral (2013).
220 The term “cyberscape” is intended to evoke the analogy of a landscape. See Rosenbaum,
Mark S. 2005. “Meet the cyberscape.” Marketing Intelligence & Planning 23(7): 636-647.
221 Crucial work is being conducted to assess the impacts of online interactions on socialization
processes and the development of social bonds. Professors Jodi Dean and Hubertus Buchstein,
among others, have advanced critical theories of technology, society, and democracy in the
political theory journal, Constellations. See Dean’s 1997 “Virtually Citizens” in Constellations
4(2): 264-282 or her 2003 “Why the Net is not a Public Sphere” in Constellations 10(1): 95-112.
There is considerable debate resolving around the social benefits to technology-mediated
communications may obscure the expression of genuine emotion and thought, leaving both
senders and receivers confused about intent, purpose, and truths.
222
Again, plenty of discussion rages – from scholarly pieces to news items – exploring
technology’s effects on relationships. In some cases, authors contend that technology is not the
next best thing. Laura Klein, writing for a University of California Berkeley website, opines that
technology – among them social networks and smart phones – “burn through the precious social
capital” found in person-to-person interactions. See Klein’s “Does Technology Cut Us Off from
Other People.”
http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/does_technology_cut_us_off_from_other_people.
Accessed 29 November 2015.
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hack into personal accounts, access credit or debit card numbers, and siphon monies.223
Conversely, police need not solely walk the beat in New Haven to respond to calls for help and
identify suspects.”224 They can use computers and the method of “pinging” an individual’s phone
to triangulate accurately the person’s physical location.225 In fact, as we have seen, police can
engage suspects online, interact with them in a chat room or social network dialogue – aided by
the inherent undercover of anonymity the internet provides – and thereby build a standard law
enforcement investigation with evidentiary support.226

223

Interestingly, the history of hacking is rooted in fairly benign origins. The early days of
hacking largely consisted in young males fascinated by and knowledgeable, in computer use.
Curiosity – as opposed to ill intent – primarily drove these individuals to hack governmental or
corporate databases. In both the literature and layperson parlance, these individuals were “white
hat hackers.” As hacking developed and became more sophisticated, some became more bent on
malicious objectives; these were called “black hat hackers.” These phraseologies are evocative of
the “good” versus “bad” cowboys in the American Wild West, who distinguished themselves by
wearing white or black hats. See Brenner, Susan W. 2010. Cybercrime: Criminal Threats from
Cyberspace. CA: Praeger, for a concise, informative review of this history.
224
An emergent literature focuses on the concept of predictive policing, whereby law
enforcement communities utilize computer algorithms to predict where specific crime “hot
spots” (i.e., geographic areas, neighborhoods in a city or town) will occur. Typically, these
algorithms rely in part on historical data in terms of 911 calls and police reports gathered from
areas in which the department serves. Predictive policing is just one example of a practice unique
to the developing panoply of law enforcement practices in the Information Age. It also raises
questions about constitutional rights in theory and in practice. See Ferguson, Andrew. 2012.
“Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion.” Emory Law Journal 62(2): 261-327. Joh,
Elizabeth E. 2014. “Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment.” Washington
Law Review 89(1): 35-68. See Garrett, Brandon L. 2014. “Big Data and Due Process.” Cornell
Law Review 99: 207-216.
225 Pinging involves using the GPS (Global Positioning System) of a suspect’s cell phone, in
conjunction with cell phone towers in the area, to triangulate the person’s geographic location. In
2013, the United States Supreme Court ruled that pinging is exempt from Fourth Amendment
protections, because it does not reach the threshold of a “search.” See a detailed summary and
exploration of the ruling in Harvard Law Review 126(3): 802-809.
226
For example, see again Mitchell, Kimberly J., Janis Wolak, and David Finkelhor. 2005.
“Police Posing as Juveniles Online to Catch Sex Offenders: Is it Working?” Sexual Abuse: A
Journal of Research and Treatment 17(3): 241-267. Also, see Urbas, Gregor. 2012. “Protecting
Children from Online Predators: The Use of Covert Investigation Techniques by Law
Enforcement.” Internet Law Journal 16(1): 410-425. For an important discussion of ways the
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************
The Dinosaur Age of Computers to the Information Age of Cyberspace227
The internet did not suddenly catapult to rock star status as an accessible, ubiquitous
communication tool in society for all Americans to use.228 After all, it took Gutenberg nearly two
decades from initial development of the prototypic printing press and the printing of the Bible.229
While cyberspace may appear to have taken on a life world of its own, the fact is that computer
engineers, scientists, and academics were, and continue to be, crucial to its expansion and
refinement. A 2015 Pew Research Center survey found that 84% of American adults use the
internet, compared to 52% of American adults in 2000. For comparison, while 5,000 computers
were reported to have been in use within the U.S. by 1960, that number would jump to 80,000
merely a decade later.230 America’s love affair with the computer had begun. And that love affair
would effectuate real, important, and impactful trends to American politics, law, and society.
Americans’ engagement with computers and later on, the internet, would bring dramatic
changes to the politics of social relations, policing, and criminality. French political theorist

internet fosters anonymity, see Rashid, Awais et al. 2013. “Who am I? Analyzing Digital
Personas in Cybercrime Investigations.” Computer 46(4): 54-61.
227 The term cyberspace does not originate from the halls of academe or military intelligence.
Instead, the term comes from literature. Author William Gibson coined the term “cyberspace” in
his 1984 novel, Neuromancer.
228 While technological development in general does seem to abide by Thomas Kuhn’s notion of
revolution as quick upheaval and turning, expansion of the internet was neither instantaneous nor
universal. Of course, the tech world as we know and experience it today does feel to be an everchanging arena: consider as just one example how often Apple debuts yet another version of the
iPhone.
229 http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/omeka/exhibits/show/mcdonald/incunabula/gutenberg/
Accessed 3 February 2016.
230 Brenner, 10. Indeed, the exponential growth in computer use during a relatively brief time
frame is worth noting. Internet access, however, appears more elusive – particularly with respect
to elderly and most minority populations (with the notable exception of Asian-Americans). See
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/18/english-speaking-asian-americans-stand-outfor-their-technology-use/.
95

Jean-Jacques Lyotard speaks helpfully to this point, Outlining the various ways that
computerized societies transform the status, production, and value of knowledge, Lyotard wrote:
These technological transformations [e.g., cybernetics, computer language,
informatics] can be expected to have a considerable impact on knowledge. Its two
principal functions – research and the transmission of acquired learning – are
already feeling the effect, or will in the future.231
Lyotard did not end with analysis of technology’s impact on knowledge. Rather, he argued that
the fundamental changes in knowledge will in turn impact the ways citizens relate to the state,
the economy, and each other. In a similar vein, Horkheimer and Adorno issued siren calls about
the potentially deleterious consequences flowing from intersections between technology and
society.232 Today, these analyses and warnings reverberate through societal discourses and
practices in the Information Age – including those pertaining to policing, crime, and sex.
************
Cyberspace: The New “Wild West” for Police and Criminal233
“Meg, it’s all computers now…not a sex crime that happens nowadays without some kind
of texting, sexting, or stalking by phone and laptop.”234 Commenting on the role of technology,
this state police detective observers that it has become a regular – if not yet integral – feature to
the commission of sex crimes. Cyberspace, along with the vehicles that traverse this
communicative, interactive terrain (e.g., cell phones, laptops, tablets) are fast becoming the
231

Lyotard, Jean-Francois. 1979. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. UK:
Manchester University Press: 4.
232 “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” in Horkheimer and Adorno’s 1944
Dialectic of the Enlightenment.
233 Yen explores the different metaphors used to describe cyberspace – such as the “Wild West”
moniker. Yen concludes that cyberspace is more similar to a feudal society, rather than the
romanticized notion of the “Wild West.” See Yen, Alfred C. 2002. “Western Frontier or Feudal
Society? Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace.” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 17(4):
1207-1263. Yen argues that by shifting to the trope of feudal society, law can play a more
important role in “shaping the future of the Internet.”
234 Trooper C, personal correspondence, August 19, 2015.
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common tools of criminal sexuality and illegal sexual deviance.235 It’s tough for us just to keep
up with these guys and all their video and messenger apps and networks they use,” Trooper A
tells me.236 Trooper B agrees with the assessment that cyber sex offenders are constantly shifting
to new mechanisms for child luring and predation, saying that “there seems to be a new app
every day.”237 From the law enforcement standpoint, the rapidly, consistently expanding variety
of technologies proceeds in tandem with the ever-widening availability of technologies –
creating a terrain that is conducive for increased, and more efficient, criminal access to minors.
As it has more or less always been, policing offenders is a classic cat and mouse game.
At its core, policing is a pursuit of someone (law breaker) who has broken or violated something
or someone (rule, objective, or victim).238 It is a quest to identify and arrest in order to enforce
laws. Law enforcement makes those identifications in part on the basis of the particular
cyberspace geographies individuals occupy. “This guy is a regular of this forum, up to no good,
he’s on this thing all day, just waiting to get off [sexually].”239 Trooper A describes a man who
frequents a specific online networking venue in order to fill sexual appetites for dialogue with
little girls. The man has not yet physically offended a minor, but Trooper A has cyber police eyes
on him in order to prevent that from ever occurring. Trooper A will likely agree to an arranged
in-person meeting – in the event the man extends the invitation – and arrest the man for a number
of sex crimes-related charges such as endangerment of a minor. To be sure, the man’s presence
within the online social network by itself does not constitute criminal activity. Once he initiates a
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There are vast psychiatry and psychological literatures debating pedophilia as sexual deviance
symptomatic of abnormal sexual desires – rather than an outcome of criminal intent.
236 Trooper A, personal correspondence, Spring 2015.
237 Trooper B, personal correspondence, October 2014.
238 Friedman discusses the persistent or “recurrent” issue in criminal justice is defining just who
is bad/illegal – let alone what is bad/illegal. See Friedman, 140-1.
239 Trooper A, personal correspondence, Spring 2015.
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sexually explicit dialogue with someone whom he presumes to be an under-aged female,
however, the boundary between online expression and online illicit activity dissolves.
Online expression thus becomes initial evidence of illegal activity. Accordingly,
expression can quickly become stark evidence for criminal behavior in the online world. While
online sexual expression with a minor may remain confined to the online space and not
materialize in a physical assault of a child, enforcement of law necessitates treatment of this
expression as a criminal action in process. In the offline world, the standard for criminalizing
expression is much more rigid and clear-cut. Such bright lines are not readily available in the
online realm.
In this cyber policing sting game, the mouse is found. And the cat’s true identity as a
police officer remains intact. An officer’s cover is easier to maintain during online policing
operations – as long as the officer does not “screw up” the cyber lexicon, according to Trooper
A. The police agent has to become familiar with how female or male users (some lingo can differ
depending on gender) actually “talk” online.240 If they can adhere to the expectations and tropes
of online youth discourse, police can avail themselves the anonymity and temporal flexibility
cyberspace affords: officers can take the time to think before they type. In an offline sting, police
often need to make quick decisions based on evolving conditions on the ground. In an online
sting, police can build a strong case for arrest in practical and temporal ways offline operations
complicate.
Simply put, cyberspace uniquely impacts the temporal dimensions of policing practices.
On the one hand, troopers can gather evidence during the course of an hour-long conversation.
On the other hand, they can extend that time by “leaving” the chat room or other communicative
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Trooper A, personal correspondence, October 2015.
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venue for a time, then return to the conversation with a suspect later that day, the next day, or
that week – depending on the urgency of the operation. For example, troopers can pursue and
monitor multiple online operations simultaneously – sometimes three or four conversations in
different chat sites at a time. In this context, cyber policing improves the efficiency of law
enforcement practices by permitting officers to multi-task in ways and to a degree they could not
in offline sting operations. Moreover, online investigations do not compromise the officer’s
physical safety in the same way offline investigations potentially can.
From the law enforcement position, however, cyber policing does not usher changes all
for the better. The cat-mouse game becomes more difficult along two significant dimensions to
policing: criminal profiling and enforcing law on thought versus behavior. Conventional
premises and practices of law enforcement are less portable to cyberspace policing in these two
facets. I take each in turn.
Constructing a profile for cyber sex offenders is a complex enterprise – one that defies
conventional wisdom with the law enforcement community (and for that matter, assumptions
undergirding opinions of the American public writ large). Use of profiles for identifying
potential suspects has been a traditionally accepted component of law enforcement efforts. Police
devise profiles to assemble a detailed, descriptive picture of a suspect’s physical features.
Investigators connect bits of information they have on hand (e.g., images from surveillance
video, eyewitness accounts) or information they receive from the public (e.g., when citizens call
a tips hotline). By doing so, police are able to piece together a descriptive picture of the suspect.
In addition to describing physical features of the suspect’s appearance, profiles can
extend to relevant behavioral aspects – such as “acting suspiciously,” “pacing the floor,” “issuing
verbal threats to strangers passerby.” Consider the Department of Homeland Security injunction:
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“If You See Something, Say Something.”241 This urgent command can be construed to cover
both physical and behavioral components of a “suspicious” individual – one who looks and acts
suspiciously.242 Police profiles of suspects are more than an object, however.
When police construct profiles of suspects, the process often proceeds in five stages: 1)
“assimilation (collecting the evidence); 2) classification (integrating the information and
classifying the offender); 3) reconstruction of the behavioral sequence involved in the crime; 4)
looking for any signature (or idiosyncrasies of the perpetrator; 5) and constructing a profile.”243
Put another way, law enforcement agents gather data. Next, they categorize the suspect on the
basis of the assembled data. Then, they attempt to retrace the steps by which the suspect
allegedly committed the crime(s). After taking these measures, law enforcement is prepared to
craft an in-depth profile of the suspect. Here, the objective of profiling is to strengthen accuracy
in a criminal investigation. In cyber policing operations, however, traditional profiling
mechanisms are not available.
Cyber sexual offenders are not a discriminatory lot. They span the racial, ethnic, class,
age, and education gamut.244 Some are teachers, engineers, or high school drop-outs. Some are
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http://search.dhs.gov/search?query=see+something%2C+say+something&op=Search&affiliate=
dhs. Accessed 2 October 2015.
242 Leitzel argues that the focus of law enforcement should center on identifying suspicious
behavior – as opposed to the race of the individual. He contends that “[p]olice should, in general,
not use race as a basis for deciding whom to watch, or, after a crime has been committed, whom
to question or arrest on grounds of suspicion” (39). See Leitzel, Jim. 2001. “Race and policing.”
Society 38(3): 38-42.
243 White et al. 2011. “The utilization of forensic science and criminal profiling for capturing
serial killers.” Forensic Science International 200(1-3): 160-165.
244
The one exception to this demographic variety is gender. Most (certainly, not all) cyber sex
offenders are male. Broadly speaking, most sex offenders are male.
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priests, druggies, war veterans, sailors, or police officers.245 According to the 2011 Federal
Sentencing Reporter, 99.3% of child pornography offenders are male. 88.7% are white. 17.5%
are college graduates. 27.2% are 50 years of age and older.246 Indeed, NCMEC surveys have
confirmed that among the approximately 740,000 registered sex offenders in the United States,
most are male, a majority (53%) are white. These statistics are consistent in Connecticut as
well.247 Nevertheless, there is little predictability especially on the cyber sex offender front, other
than the fact that sexual offenders are likely to be male and also possess the strong likelihood to
have been sexual abuse victims in the past.248 It is not the case that police can build a profile on
the basis of a priori assumptions or descriptions of previous cyber sex offenders: the next suspect
can present a litany of entirely new, unique circumstances and characteristics.
Identifying perpetrators of cyber sex abuse becomes a more exhaustive enterprise
because the range – or rather, pool of possible suspects is so expansive. Interestingly, in terms of
child pornography offenders taken in isolation (as opposed to offline sex offenders), most are
likely to be employed, in a relationship, and possess no prior criminal history. For example, one
cyber sex case the Connecticut State Police (CSP) investigated involved not just one individual –
who was the primary purveyor of child pornography – but a familial network was ultimately
questioned. Police pursued leads pointing to involvement by an uncle, niece, and cousin in illegal
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Home to the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (New London) and the Naval Base (Groton),
Connecticut news stories from time to time feature coverage of sailors getting arrested for
possession of child pornography and other illegal sexual cyber activities. For instance, see
http://wfsb.com/story/24449099/groton-man-charged-with-possession-of-child-pornography.
246 SpearIt. 2011. “Child Pornography Sentencing and Demographic Data: Reforming Through
Research.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 24(2): 107-107.
247 Janicki, Mary M. Renee LaMark Muir, Meghan B. Peterson, Gustaf Marks-Hamilton, and
Richard A. Bensics. 2017. “A Study of the Sex Offender Sentencing Registration, and
Management System.” Connecticut Sentencing Commission.
248 Glasser, M. et al. 2011. “Cycle of child sexual abuse: links between being a victim and
becoming a perpetrator.” British Journal of Psychiatry 179: 482-494.
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online activities.249 In another case, a husband wife had joined forces to engage in child
pornography sharing.250
In cyberspace this cat-mouse game becomes simultaneously easier and more difficult. On
the one hand, the cyberspace cat and mouse game becomes easier in the sense that both police
officer and criminal can adopt – even shift identities. The officer can take on the identity of an
interested buyer of child pornography. Police can accomplish this behind a computer screen.
Conversely, the offender can assume the identity of a youthful peer – again behind a computer
screen. Whereas traditional sting operations require the physical presence of police – in the alley,
street corner, or safe house – cyber ops furnish officers the benefits of safety and convenience. In
a similar vein, individuals with criminal intent can take advantage of the anonymity cyberspace
is built on. On the other hand, the cyberspace cat and mouse game becomes far more difficult
because the mouse is able to switch plays at a moment’s notice. If the suspect becomes wise to
the possibility that he may be chatting with an undercover police officer masquerading as a
minor, the individual will shut down conversation – perhaps even migrate to a different online
forum altogether – in search of the most redoubtable “dark net” subterfuge.251 The online world,
therefore, both aids and challenges mechanisms for law-enforcing as well as law-breaking.
The second dimension along which I see significant albeit incremental upheaval in law
enforcement practices is the unique problem of legislating and policing child pornography
possession, sexting, and engagement of sexually explicit materials and/or conversations with
249

Trooper A, personal correspondence, April 2015.
Trooper A, personal correspondence, April 2015.
251 The “dark net” refers to the “underbelly” of the digital world – or the cyber “underworld.”
See Bartlett, Jaime. The Dark Net: Inside the Digital Underworld. U.K.: Random House, 2015.
The “dark net” or “dark web” are corners of cyberspace that enable users to “hide [their] location
and activity” by utilizing Tor, a program originally developed by the Naval Research Lab. See
the fascinating Rolling Stone article on the topic of all things dark web:
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-battle-for-the-dark-net-20151022.
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minors via technological devices and space. In my view, these technology-specific problems of
law and order are germane loci for identifying the confused and confusing role of law.
In Connecticut, possession of child pornography in the first degree is a Class B felony
punishable up to 5 years.252 First degree requires one of the two factors: a) possession of 50
images or more; b) possession of one or more images in which serious physical injury is depicted
or the threat of serious physical injury is depicted.253 In 1990, Congress passed the Crime
Control Act, which served as the first child pornography possession law on the books.254 Still,
prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual in question knowingly
possessed these images.
An individual who purchases a used computer from Craigslist and then finds child
pornography stores on it upon returning home with it will not be prosecuted; however, the
previous owner who downloaded the illegal media will be, for example. Although possession
offenses can occur in tandem with production and distribution crimes, they do not have to. The
offense of possession is separate from production or distribution of child pornography. An
individual can possess child pornography without participating in the production of it. Similarly,
an individual can possess child pornography without acting as the initiator of distribution. The
person can elect to receive the media, without proceeding to share them with other users.255 The
distribution question becomes a bit murkier, as the receiver must actively show interest in the
receipt of such materials within the online distribution network. This idea that possession of
252

https://www.cga.ct.gov/2014/act/pa/2014PA-00192-R00HB-05525-PA.htm.
Ibid.
254 “Child Pornography Sentencing and Demographic Data: Reforming Through Research.”
2011. Federal Sentencing Reporter 24(2): 102-107.
255 At the federal level, receipt of child pornography is a different offense than possession of
child pornography. Prosecutors, however, have the discretion to pursue either charge. See “Child
Pornography Sentencing and Demographic Data: Reforming Through Research.” 2011. Federal
Sentencing Reporter 24(2): 102-107.
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child pornography may not necessarily occur in connection with its production or distribution
raises legal questions of harm and constitutional First Amendment questions.
On the legal front, one may ask about the harms of child pornography: does possession of
this pornographic genre on its ow perpetuate sexual abuse and physical violence to children? 256
That is, does consumption of child pornography lead to actual offending of children on the part
of the viewer; additionally, does consumption of child pornography help support demand for this
illegal market?257 The federal courts are somewhat divided on these questions. In 2013, a split 9th
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an individual’s possession of child pornography is probable
cause for a police investigation into suspected sexual abuse.258 Another matter complicating
these queries is the fact that age of consent may not necessarily match the ages of the youth
depicted in the images or videos. The “child” in child pornography may actually be 18, not 15. 259
On the constitutional front, one may ask about the First Amendment ramifications of
criminalizing child pornography possession: does criminalizing possession constitute an
incursion on protected speech? That is possession – without actions consequent to it (in other
words, the possessor does not act upon those images, neither distributing the proscribed materials
nor sexually abusing children) may be a category of protected speech. Does criminalizing

See Harrison, Christine. 2006. “Cyberspace and Child Abuse Images: A Feminist
Perspective.” Affilia 21(4): 365-379. The author describes how cyberspace has “been
expropriated to escalate child sexual abuse” – among other sexual crimes.
257 This harm approach which, Congress as well as many feminist scholars have taken, is built on
the premise that consumption of child pornography will ultimately lead to individuals seeking
out children for the purpose of inflicting sexual abuse. For a particularly powerful argument
explaining the harm approach, see Roos, Hanna. 2014. “Trading the sexual child: child
pornography and the commodification of children in society. “Texas Journal of Women and the
Law 23(2): 132-156.
258 http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/06/14/12-50097.pdf. Accessed 18 May
2016.
259 Clough, Jonathan. 2012. “Lawful acts, unlawful images: the problematic definition of ‘child’
pornography.” Monash University of Law Review 38(3): 213-220.
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possession represent an unconstitutional encroachment onto speech – when speech remains just
that and does not lead to action (which would necessitate enforcement)? Or does possession of
child pornography function as incitement to sexual abuse? Roos (2014) suggests that individuals
who engage solely in fantasizing of sex with minors should not be punished. Whereas, those who
act on those fantasies ought receive full weight of the criminal sanction. More broadly, how does
legislation governing cyber sex crimes foster the growth of the carceral state? What are the
linkages between criminalizing thought or expression and the premises of the carceral state,
which find their roots in the identification of citizens as always, already actual or potential
offenders?
On the constitutional questions, the United States Supreme Court has intervened to say
that creating virtual child pornography (computer-generated images) is a protected speech act, as
no direct harm is done to real children (Clough 2012). Of course, the question about whether
virtual child pornography leads to actual offending against minors lingers in the backdrop of the
Court’s ruling.260 As Congress maintains the harm approach and the courts debate the
constitutional ramifications thereof, police are left with a legal structure that metes out harsher
punishment to child pornography possessors than child sex abusers (although, these populations
may overlap). For example, under Connecticut law and in compliance with federal sentencing
guidelines, an individual who commits first degree sexual assault receives a two year mandatory
minimum sentence.261 In contrast, a person convicted of child pornography possession in the first
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For a solid argument demonstrating that the Supreme Court erred in its ruling that virtual
child pornography is constitutional and that by doing so, it upended its earlier harm doctrine, see
Mains, Benjamin A. 2010. “Virtual Child Pornography, Pandering, and the First Amendment:
How Developments in Technology and Shifting First Amendment Jurisprudence Have Affected
the Criminalization of Child Pornography.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 37: 809-827.
261 Norman-Eady, Sandra. 2005. “Office of Legislative Research Report: Sexual Abuse,
Harassment, and Assault.” https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0857.htm.
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degree is sentenced to a mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment.262 Or consider that the
average federal sentence length for child pornography in 2010 surpassed lengths for all federal
crimes except kidnapping and murder.263 Police conducting cyber operations face the curious
situation of enforcing the criminalization of fantasies – however disturbing – to the same degree
as the criminalization of actions. In sum, law enforcement of cyber sex crimes is further
augmented and problematized by the unclear legal and constitutional terrain.
************
Patrolling the Cyber Beat, Monitoring the Cyber Sex Offender
In this chapter, I have explored the unique ways by which cyber policing operations
diverge from traditional policing practices. During this exploration, I have uncovered specific
reasons for the distinctive turns law enforcement takes directly related to the character, features,
and functionality of the cyber world. From their inception, cyber policing operations of sex
offenders absorb tools of anonymity, masquerade, and temporal flexibility the online universe
fosters – the very aspects criminals exploit for their own purposes. The history of internet
technologies, which is ongoing, is one of rapidly-increasing availability and convenience. The
internet’s ubiquity allows for more facile modes of law-breaking and law-enforcing. At the same
time, elements of anonymity, masquerade, and ubiquity likewise present challenges to traditional
methods of law enforcement. The opaqueness of the online world, in conjunction with the
absence of clear legal mandates in regulating cyber sex crimes, make for a muddled context in
which law enforcement takes places and the carceral state continues to take shape.
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Connecticut General Statutes 53a-196d-Possessing child pornography in the first degree:
Class B felony. https://www.lawserver.com/law/state/connecticut/ctlaws/connecticut_statutes_53a-196d.
263
Gottschalk, 200.
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Thus far, I have been making the case that the carceral state thrives on exactly a lack of
legal clarity, indeterminate boundaries, and imprecise mandates. For what drives the carceral
state is the blurring of lines between the punitive and nonpunitive, and the melding of the penal
and civil. Unclear law and murky enforcement therefore make up the fuel that feeds the carceral
state’s fire. In this context, key lessons from this chapter’s account of cyber sex crimes policing
as they relate to carceral state development and expansion are two-fold.
First, the online world (cyberspace) is inherently riddled with an unboundedness. It is an
arena of communicative behavior that is for all intents and purposes built on an absence of
parameters or borders. Individuals and groups can socialize online without ever disclosing their
offline identity, residence, or occupation. They can interact in a universe wholly of their doing or
undoing. Elements of anonymity (whereby a criminal can potentially go undetected for months
in a chatroom or social media networking site) or high-tech masquerade (whereby the individual
with the Twitter handle #hotgurl1980 may in fact be an elderly male in his 70’s) pervade
cyberspace. By the same token, police can conduct online investigative operations with the
equally instrumental dimensions of anonymity and masquerade. Agents can infiltrate child
pornographer social networks or trafficking rings online and gather intelligence necessary for a
solid legal case – all from the comfortable distance of a police unit or office (unlike traditional
undercover efforts that require physical proximity). As identities of both offender and agent are
fluid, their interactions amorphous, and the carceral state can develop, expand, and thrive in the
online interstices of law-breaking and law-enforcing, between the dynamics of law-breakers and
law-enforcers. Here, the carceral state and its impact migrates online, eventually subsuming
cyber sex offenders in its catch-basins of online public registries.
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Yet, it is these very borderless, boundless, features characteristic of cyberspace which can
also complicate law enforcement work. Such complications form the second half of the cyber
policing-carceral state connection. State legislatures, the courts, and federal government struggle
to craft laws and criminal justice sentencing schemas that keep pace with evolving technologies
(along with the kinds of communications and behaviors that they enable). As these bodies of
law-making and adjudicating stumble their way through, police are nonetheless expected and
required to act decisively. As long as laws pertaining to cyber crimes are still in their infancy
stages, it is difficult for enforcement to “keep up” with the criminals – let alone be coherent.
When law is unclear, enforcement has the potential to take on exaggerated features of police and
judicial discretion. The carceral state derives its energy from precisely these issues of
inexactness, indeterminacy, and lack of clearly-defined boundaries.
In Chapter Four, I specifically examine the criminal justice mechanism of the sex
offender registry as an instance of the convoluted law-crime-technology-society force field
within the broader arc of the carceral state. I examine the registry as a means by which the
carceral state derives its power and persistence from law’s imprecision and confused
implementation – as well as from the evolving, ambiguous character and functionality of
cyberspace.
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Behind Bars, On Screens: The Sex Offender Registry as a Microcosm for Understanding LawCrime-Policing-Technology Connections
‘Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation…[w]hen convicted sex offenders re-enter
society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for a new
rape or sex assault.’ Connecticut, like every other State, has responded to these facts by enacting
a statute designed to protect its communities from sex offenders and to help apprehend repeat sex
offenders.264
Although the public availability of the information may have a lasting and painful impact on the
convicted sex offender, these consequences flow not from the…registration and dissemination
provisions, but from the fact of convictions, already a matter of public record.265

Then-Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquist, upholding Connecticut’s public sex offender
registry, reversing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, in Connecticut Department of
Public Safety v. Doe (2003), 538 U.S. 1. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/011231.ZO.html. Accessed 20 March 2017.
265 Writing for Smith v. Doe 538 U.S. 84, 101 (2003), Supreme Court Justice Kennedy deliver
the majority opinion upholding Alaska’s public sex offender registry.
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/538/84/case.html. Accessed 20 March 2017.
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Introduction
In Chapter Three, I explored the often-tenuous relationships between law and policing
within the murky, nebulous context of cyber (internet and technological-based) sex crimes.266 I
documented ways in which imprecision in the law – both on the statutory and constitutional
levels – leads to confusion at best, disorder at worst in policing practices on the ground. To this
point, I have shown how the unique social terrain of cyberspace only exacerbates complexities of
law enforcement work. Equally so, this emergent arena of communication and crime also renders
legislative intent more difficult and unclear – which is designed to clarify and guide police
practices in the first place.
In this chapter, I inspect what I argue constitutes and epitomizes a logical outcome of the
murky, fraught relationships between law and policing – particularly as those relationships
converge at the law-technology-society nexuses: the public sex offender registry. As repositories
for offenders’ identifiable information (name, age, residence and workplace addresses, sexual
offenses), sex offender registries on a basic level function as a tool for documenting individuals
convicted of sex offenses.267 According to the U.S. Department of Justice office overseeing sex
offender policy implementation:
[n]early all registration requirements in the United States are initially triggered by
a conviction for a criminal offense. More jurisdictions limit their registration and
notification systems to persons convicted of sex offenses and non-parental
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Whether perpetrated via phone, laptop, and sundry technological devices or apps.
Not all sex offenses trigger public registration with law enforcement, but nearly most do; such
an approach is consistent across the 50 states. For example, even non-violent offenders in
Connecticut need to register for ten years with the state police; repeat and/or violent sex
offenders must register for life. See https://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0030.htm for more
specific details on the registry. In many states, there are public registries and private law
enforcement-use only registries. Connecticut is one of them. I explore Connecticut’s sex offender
registry in-depth later in this chapter.
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kidnapping of a minor. Some states also include other violent or dangerous
offenders in their registration and notification system.268
Sex offender registries contain information on those offenders who have been convicted; they do
not contain information on arrestees.269
On a deeper level, I submit that sex offender registries mark a tech-infused legislative and
law enforcement response to crime. Yet, these registries simultaneously refract law, technology,
and policing in ways rendering the criminal justice system disorderly and further riddled with
imprecision, inaccuracy, and error. Borrowing from Ewick and Silbey’s interpretation of legal
consciousness as a “cultural practice” by which “individual action and understanding are
implicated in the production of legality,” I call two ways of understanding the sex offender
registry “the rights of the accused viewpoint” and the “law enforcement viewpoint.”270 In other
words, different individuals in different stations of life construe and experience the registry in
different – even divergent ways. By describing the criminal justice system (as it pertains to sex
offenders specifically, and criminal offenders across the spectrum more broadly) as riddled with
imprecision, I mean the registering of offenders whom I believe ought not to be registered in the
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U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Sex Offender Sentencing,
Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (SMART). “Sex Offender Registration
and Notification in the United States: Current Case Law and Issues.” December 2015. See
https://www.smart.gov/caselaw/handbook_sept2014.pdf. Accessed 21 March 2017.
269 So-called DNA “databanks,” law enforcement collection and storage sites for DNA profiles
taken from individuals – do contain information on those convicted as well as arrestees. Joh
(2014) writes that as of 2013, these databases contain profiles for “10.7 million offenders and 1.7
million arrestees.” See Joh, Elizabeth E. 2014. “Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth
Amendment.” Washington Law Review 89(1): 35-68. Interestingly, then, at this point, sex
offender registries differ in terms both of the nature (sex offender registries are public, with
some that are private in addition; DNA databases are private) and the kinds of offenders’ data
they contain (sex offender registries publish information on convicted persons; DNA databases
hold information on convicted persons and persons who were arrested but never convicted).
270 Ewick, Patricia and Susan S. Silbey. 1998. The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday
Life. IL: The University of Chicago Press: 38-9.
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first instance – or at the least, that registering them does not make the public safer in any tangible
sense.271
This point marks a classical constitutional position that sex offender registries are
overbroad and not narrowly-tailored to the target population of offenders who are dangerous to
society (as opposed to an 18-year-old sex offender who finds himself needing to register after
sleeping with his 15-year-old girlfriend).272 According to this critique, that in order for registries
to pass constitutional muster, they must survive judicial “strict scrutiny” because they abridge
fundamental rights (for example, First Amendment rights of association and movement) by
design.273 By inaccuracy, I mean the registering of offenders whom I believe ought be registering
for services from a mental health practitioner, rather than publicly registering with police
authorities; I speak here about the inaccurate application of law’s force in cases of mentally ill
individuals – when medical assistance, as opposed to public identification of one’s sexual
deviance under law’s rubric, is more appropriate. Imprecision and inaccuracy in the law can
generate systemic errors within its enforcement. Systemic errors range from the seemingly
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Scholars examining the efficacy of public registries have produced informative work, among
them: Levenson, Jill S., Melissa D. Grady, and George Leibowitz. 2016. “Grand challenges:
social justice and the need for evidence-based registry reform.” Journal of Sociology & Social
Welfare 43(2): 3-38; Prescott, J.J. 2012. “Do Sex Offender Registries Make Us Less Safe?”
Regulation 35(2): 48-55; Terry, Karen J. 2007. “Sex offender and victimization legislation: use,
misuse, and efficacy.” Criminology and Public Policy 6(3): 503-505; Durling, Caleb. 2006.
“Never going home: does it make us safer? Does it make sense – sex offenders, residency
restrictions, and reforming risk management law.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
97(1): 317-364.
272 An exacting account exploring the constitutionality of Iowa’s sex offender laws is particularly
germane for understanding such constitutional claims of vagueness and overbroadness: Merrick,
Jacquelyn M. 2011. “Through the Tiers: Are Iowa’s New Sex-Offender Laws Unconstitutional?”
Iowa Law Review 96(3): 1013-1032.
273 One of the most pointed articles examining the constitutionality of restrictions on sex
offenders usage of social media is: Wynton, Jasmine S. 2011. “Myspace, yourspace, but not
theirspace: the constitutionality of banning sex offenders from social networking sites.” Duke
Law Journal 60(8): 1859-1903.
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mundane, technical issue of offenders’ registration and compliance letters getting lost through
the U.S. Postal Service to more complicated, substantive matters of sex offenders not registering
due to plea bargaining and judicial decision-making outcomes by which sex crimes charges are
dropped to a lesser charge that would not trigger registration274 or sex offenders getting
reclassified into higher-risk categories in compliance with the federal 2006 Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act (AWA).275
From the American law enforcement perspective, imprecision and inaccuracy within the
law complicates the century-old dual missions of public protection and service.276 For police to
carry out these missions effectively, they must have the correct tools and resources at their
disposal. If the sex offender registry fails at the point of a technical error in the mail, the work of
enforcement becomes more challenging in an already difficult setting. On the one hand, law
enforcement may become hamstrung by the very legal mechanisms that are designed to facilitate
it. If, on the other hand, the sex offender registry captures only those who did not have the
financial resources and wherewithal to retain a clever attorney, the work of enforcement becomes
a pursuit of justice in which the scales are already tipped. Whether it is the case that the tools and
resources are flimsy or that the system has succumbed to the weight of bureaucracy, I argue that
the challenges of policing become more amplified.

Letourneau, Elizabeth et al. 2010. “The Effects of Sex Offender Registration and Notification
on Judicial Decisions.” Criminal Justice Review 35(3): 295-317.
275 See Harris, Andrew J., Christopher Lobanov-Rostovsky, and Jill S. Levenson. 2010.
“Widening the Net: The Effects of Transitioning to the Adam Walsh Act’s Federally Mandated
Sex Offender Classification System.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 37(5): 503-519.
276 As Bayley observes, American law enforcement is distinct in its relative openness and
responsiveness to citizen demands; that is, police work is often in response to citizen needs – this
is in contradistinction to police in other regimes of which the sole purpose is to defend the
regime, rather than the citizenry. See Bayley, David H. 1998. “Policing in America.” Society
36(1): 16-19.
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To these ends, I explore the sex offender registry as a microcosm of broader law,
policing, crime, technology, and society linkages. In this area of study, scholars look at the sex
offender registry from a number of angles. I highlight three major themes. One way is to analyze
the sex offender registry in terms of efficacy (Levenson, Grady, and Leibowitz 2016; Ackerman,
Sacks and Osier 2013; Prescott 2012; Letourneau et al. 2010; Wright 2008; Velasquez 2008;
Terry 2007; Cohen and Jeglic 2007). Does it help law enforcement protect the public? Does it
help reduce recidivism among offenders (i.e., do offenders return to criminal behaviors postincarceration)? Another way is to analyze the sex offender registry in terms of constitutionality
(Eagan 2013; Wynton 2011; Yung 2008; Carpenter 2006; Lewis 1996). Does it remove due
process rights for the accused? A third topic of analysis I note here focuses on whether the sex
offender registry fosters vigilantism and reprisal (Wright 2008; Cohen and Jeglic 2007; Jenkins
1998). I address these inquiries in turn and in doing so trace a brief history of the sex offender
registry in the United States.
Next, I move to my central interest in the sex offender registry as a site for political
interrogation. Namely, I examine how the registry functions as an extension of the “carceral
state” (Garland 2016; Gottschalk 2014; Alexander 2010; Simon 2004, 2014; Feeley and Simon
1998). Gottschalk (2014) frames the idea in the following terms:
[t]he carceral state includes not only the country’s vast archipelago of jails and
prisons but also the far-reaching and growing range of penal punishments and
controls that lie in the never-never land between the gate of the prison and full
citizenship…[i]t encompasses more than 7 million people – or 1 in 31 adults –
who are under some form of state control, including jail, prison, probation, parole,
or community sanctions.277

Gottschalk, Marie. 2014. “Democracy and the Carceral State in America.” The ANNALS of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 651(1): 288-295.
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In this context, the sex offender registry is part and parcel of the carceral state; it is a resource in
the “governing-through-crime” mode of governance.278 I look at the idea that the registry is a
continuation of penal practices in civil society. The registry blurs lines between the penal arena
and civil society – one among many tools within our criminal justice system that does so.
Substantively speaking, the registry both symbolizes and concretizes the leakage of criminal
disciplinary mechanisms into civil society. The registry continues and extends chronological,
geographic reach of punitive measures begun upon arrest, conviction, and sentencing.
I submit that these points map onto and coincide with, my over-arching argument about
the lack of precision and clarity within the law adversely impacting law enforcement – especially
within the evolving arena of technology-based crimes. When the law and its borders are unclear,
enforcement and its borders become unclear as a consequence. I contend that we are witnessing
an expansion of the carceral state in the cyber crime world; that this expansion thrives on the
lack of clarity and bright lines drawn between penal institutions and civil society. Finally, in
Chapter Five, based on work I am doing with the Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy
(IMRP) on the General Assembly task force re-evaluating Connecticut’s sex offender registry, I
examine whether the shift from the current offense-based sex offender registry to a risk-based
registry will address the lack of clarity in law or in fact exacerbate it.279
Brief history of the sex offender registry
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Despite increasing debate – within legal, political, and academic circles – over sex
offender registries in the United States, the notion of archiving and recording criminals names,
whereabouts, and occupations in this country is not new. The first statewide criminal registry
dates to 1937, in the state of Florida.280 While the Florida registry did not specifically target sex
offenders, it constituted the beginning of a now-universal (across the 50 states) criminal justice
mainstay: the offender registry – both for law enforcement consumption as well as public
consumption. In describing the origins of the criminal registry, Velazquez (2008) explains:
[t]he practice of requiring offenders to register began in the 1930s in response to
the increased mobility of criminals. At the time, offender registries were viewed
primarily as tools for law enforcement, which needed a way of keeping track of
high-risk offenders281.
The emergence of registries in response to individuals’ increased capacity for movement – with
assistance from the automobile (truly, automating one’s ability to be mobile, to move), makes
sense. Historically, the emergence of registries in response to law enforcement’s needs to keep
tabs on high-risk offenders also makes sense, especially as policing was still coming into its own
as a modernizing, professionalizing arm of the state in the 20th century. Interestingly, though,
these initial registries were much more localized than they are now, “primarily” targeting highstakes felons of the day like mobsters and gangsters rather than sex offenders.282 Ten years later,
in 1947, the first sex offender registry in the United States was created in 1947.283 California’s
inaugural sex offender registration law required “offenders convicted of specified offenses to
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register with their local law enforcement agency.”284 Until the 1990s, however, sex offender
registration systems were neither widespread nor uniform in structure throughout the country. In
1994, congressional passage of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children Act changed all of
that.
This legislation was the first foray into the sex offender registration policy-making arena
at the federal level.285 As is the case with all law-making, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children Act did not emerge in a vacuum bereft of political or social factors animating it. We
knows, as Werhan (2001) has put it, that “law and culture are intertwined and mutually
reinforcing.”286 Kepping this social fact in mind, that “[a] society’s laws…do not exist in
isolation but instead are a constituent part of a larger, more complex “normative universe.”287
The social, political, and cultural forces driving the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
Act are many.
I want to underscore three that I believe are particularly relevant to understanding
subsequent sex offender legislation: the factual force, the moral panic force, and the tough-oncrime force. More broadly, understanding these forces will assist in an analysis of the
relationship between law and policing on the ground.
The first factor that precipitated the Wetterling law is a factual force: the actual
abduction, sexual assault, and murder of Jacob Wetterling, a boy from St. Joseph, Minnesota.
While biking with a friend as well as a sibling, eleven-year-old Jacob was kidnapped on October
284
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22, 1989.288 Although police questioned Daniel Heinrich as an initial suspect, he was ultimately
let go, with Heinrich declaring his innocence.289 Twenty-seven years later, after a new lead
opened with the assistance of new DNA technology, Heinrich was arrested, charged with one
count of child pornography, and sentenced to twenty years in prison.290 Following the
disappearance of their son, Patty and Jerry Wettering turned grief into action and “became
national advocates for missing children.”291 In particular, Patty was instrumental in helping to
create Minnesota’s sex offender registry. An organization called Team HOPE (Help Offering
Parents Empowerment) and The Jacob Wetterling Resource Center have also formed to provide
educational and support resources for families.292 On the factual level, therefore, the law’s
premise was anchored in an abduction, sexual assault, and murder of a minor.
The second factor I identify is a moral panic factor. Scholars have coined this term to
describe societal responses to a perceived or real problem in the form of a physical, social,
religious, or political threat and enemy. The “panic” component comes into play when society or
community reacts to an imagined or actual problem in disproportionate ways. Goode and BenYehuda (2009) explain the concept this way:
From time to time in every society, charges of terrible and dastardly deeds
committed by evildoers erupt; sides are chosen, speeches are delivered, enemies
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are named, and atrocities are alleged…when the moral concern felt by segments
of the society or the community is disproportionate to the threat or harm,
sociologists refer to them as ‘moral panics.’293
Initially, many moral panics may begin as a response, albeit an “exaggerated” one, to an actual
threat.294 Indeed, moral panics have at their core a factual logic – whether it is political, religious,
social, cultural, or a combination in construct and content, that subsequently succumbs to
inflated, uncontrollable reactions across a community or society at large.
Moral panics are familiar tropes throughout U.S. history: among them, the religioninspired witch hunts in Salem, Massachusetts and elsewhere throughout 17th century New
England; the politically, diversionary, and racially-motivated fears of black men raping white
women (the effects of which continued on legal and constitutional bases until 1967, when the
Supreme Court upheld biracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia); the 1950s political witch hunt
that the U.S. government, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the helm, undertook to
ferret out the “commies;” and the more recent crusade against homosexual relationships.295
Notably, a common thread tying these moral panics together is the theme of sex. Goode and BenYehuda (2009) write:
many moral panics are about sex…sex is a special and unique sphere in which
rules are abundant, and strict, and within which the human drama plays out and
the status of wrongdoing and even abnormality is applied.296
In the case of witch hunts, much of the court trial revolved around women’s sexuality.
Interestingly, most of the men who claimed to have experiences or visions cast by the “witches”
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spoke of titillating physical encounters. Thus, the witch hunt served to castigate the wily woman.
In the case of anxieties about biracial mixing, the sexuality of black bodies was condemned. In
the case of hesitations about homosexual relationships, sexual deviance takes center stage. Moral
panics also include the 19th century temperance movement that gave way to the Prohibition Era,
which was successfully enacted into law but not in enforcement as well as more recent moral
panics of the War on Drugs in the 1970s and 1980s. In all of these instances, factual concerns
generated and animated the panics but were capitalized on, amplified, misrepresented, and
exploited for public consumption.
In this light, the Wetterling incident is best legible as “a sudden eruption of hostility
towards a specific group out of proportion to…harm they cause” and occurring within the new
penology-based, risk-obsessed, carceral-civil state in which “increased state involvement and
government surveillance” are modus operandi.”297 The abduction and sexual assault of Jacob and
other boys in the area ushered in the moral panic that morphed into an amplified, intensified
national call for action.
The third factor I identify is a sociopolitical factor: what I notate as a tough-on-crime
factor, or following Scheingold (1984, 33), the “politicization of crime” phenomenon whereby
“[p]ublic anxiety about crime” generates a “climate of fear” in which “politicians promise to
‘crack down on crime.’”298 By tough-on-crime, I specifically mean legislative (laws) and
executive responses (executive orders) that are punitive – more for symbolic effect and public
consumption than for practical outcome. In interesting ways, the moral panic and tough-on-crime
factors are congruent in that both present heightened, intensified responses to an imagined or
Walker, Bela August. 2010. “Deciphering Risk: Sex Offender Statutes and Moral Panic in a
Risk Society.” University of Baltimore Law Review 40(2): 184-214.
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tangible problem facing society. In this sense, moral panic and tough-on-crime factors are
complementary, each reinforcing the other. The tough-on-crime factor is evident in provisions of
the Wetterling law. It is therefore worth inspecting portions of its text.
The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act was part of a congressional omnibus bill, a broader spending package focusing
on criminal justice policies, programs, and funding.299 For the purposes of this chapter, I focus
on Section 170101 of the Act, which establishes the federal sex offender registry program. Title
XVII directs the U.S. Attorney General to establish guidelines for that program, requiring states
to mandate that individuals who are convicted of an offense against a minor victim, convicted of
a sexually violent offense (against victim regardless of age), or are sexually violent predators
must register “a current address with a designated” state law enforcement agency. The Act also
provides that unless and until a sentencing court receives a report produced by “experts in the
field of the behavior and treatment of sexual offenders” indicating that the individual is no longer
a “sexually violent predator,” the designation stands.300 Consequently, an offender’s criminal
status is subject to a technician’s evaluation.
Based on language in the law, most offenders are placed on the registry for ten years –
and that clock begins once they are “released from prison, placed on parole, supervised release,
or probation.”301 For those offenders classified as sexually violent predators, registration may be
longer than ten years and only after it is determined that they no longer suffer from mental
disorders that would make them “likely to engage in a predatory sexually violent offense.”302 In
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these cases, registration may be for life. In all cases, though, offenders are looking at a decade of
registration as the minimum. If an offender knowingly fails to register or keep registration status
“current,” the person “shall be subject to criminal penalties” of the state in which one resides.
State and local police are also empowered to make “relevant” information on registrants
available to the public; the exception to publicly available information is victim identity. One can
search for offenders’ names, addresses, and sex convictions online and for free.303 Finally, the
federal government promises to withhold ten percent of monies for state funding under the 1968
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act. In all, the Wetterling Act encapsulates tough-oncrime mores. It specifies the mechanisms for punishing, monitoring, and keeping track of sex
offenders both in conventional penal institutions and civil settings.
The next major federal legislation on sex offender policy was Megan’s Law in 1996, just
two years after the Wetterling Act. Similar to the circumstances surrounding the Wetterling Act,
Megan’s Law was likewise a product of sociopolitical forces. The most immediate factor is the
factual force – the spark that ignites the political, lawmaking, and law enforcement processes. On
the surface, the law is a legislative response to an actual incident. A seven-year-old girl from
New Jersey, Megan Nicole Kanka, was “lured into her neighbor’s home with the promise of a
puppy.”304 After Megan entered the home, a two-time convicted sex offender (convicted in 1981
of an attack on a five-year-old and an attempted sex assault of a seven-year-old), sexually
assaulted and murdered her.
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Megan’s parents, Richard and Maureen Kanka, took swift action, obtaining nearly half a
million signatures to petition for the first state law on the books mandating community
notification of sex offenders. This the law required that the offender register with the authorities
and that the information be made public to the community in which offenders reside. Two years
later, the Kankas, along with other parents whose children had been sexually assaulted and
murdered (including Patty Wetterling and John Walsh), successfully lobbied at the federal level
to pass a national version of the public sex offender registry.
Unlike the New Jersey version, the federal iteration required all fifty states to release
information to the public of known convicted sex offenders when necessary to protect the
public’s safety, but it did not mandate active notification. According to Parents for Megan’s Law
and The Crime Victim’s Center:
If a state failed to comply with minimal release of information standards
established by the federal government, then that state risk losing federal crimefighting funding. The federal mandate to release information to the public is often
mistakenly referred to as community notification when, in actuality, the federal
mandate required just the release of information to the public – not active
notification. There is a significant difference between simply releasing
information (making it available for the public to access on its own) and active
community notification, where law enforcement officers or designated
government agents actively go door to door or send out mailings to inform
neighbors and schools. The federal Megan’s Law did not require all 50 states to
enact active notification laws, whereas New Jersey’s state Megan’s Law had
specific requirements for active community notification.”305
Notably, the state law – New Jersey’s Megan’s Law – was more reaching and punitive than the
federal law. I suspect that the discrepancy in intensity may be due in part to the location of the
incident. The driving politics may be more intense in relationship to the geography and
proximity of the sex crime. Nonetheless, the federal law iteration delivers a one-two punch. First,
the law permits the release of registrant information to be “disclosed for any purpose permitted
305
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under the laws of the State.”306 Second, the law allows for a state’s law enforcement agency (or
agencies) to “release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concerning” sex
offenders required to register.307
On the one level, Megan’s Law gives wide berth to states when it comes to the
dissemination of information on registered sex offenders. On the second level, the federal law
frames this dissemination within a paradigm evocative of a tough-on-crime impetus; in such a
context, the release of “relevant information” is “necessary to protect the public” from riskbearing, dangerous individuals. On closer inspection, too, the tough-on-crime content of this law
is predicated on what is arguably a moral panic: sex crimes against minors. The fact of the actual
sexual assault and murder of Megan Kanka, in conjunction with the moral panic that ensues from
it and other instances like it, provides conditions ripe for tough-on-crime maneuvers that are as
much socially palliative as they are politically profitable. As with the Wetterling Act, Megan’s
Law both symbolizes and makes legible the sociopolitical underpinnings of sex crimes
legislation.
The final, most recent federal legislation targeting sex offenders I want to highlight is the
Adam Walsh Act, signed by President George W. Bush in 2006. The Walsh Act marked a
significant expansion of the “scope, scale, and requirements of sex offender registration
programs” initiated via the registries mandated in the Wetterling Act and the public/community
notification components authorized in Megan’s Law.308 The law, in honor of John Walsh’s sixyear-old son Adam, who had been abducted, murdered and decapitated, created three categories
or classifications of sexual offenses to indicate the severity of the crime(s) for which the offender
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is convicted (i.e, Tier III, Tier II, and Tier I). Tier III indicates the most severe of sex crime
felonies (for example, actual or attempted aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual
contact against youth under 13 years of age). Tier II indicates sex crimes deemed “medium”
severity (for example, soliciting a minor for prostitution, producing child pornography,
distributing child pornography). Tier I indicates the least severe of sex crimes that do not fall
within the other two categories (for example, indecent exposure which can be charged as a
misdemeanor or felony in some states; it is a Class B misdemeanor in Connecticut).309
There are three titles within the Act, the first of which establishes the sex offender
registration and notification act (SORNA). SORNA updates and essentially replaces Wetterling
Act.310 It requires states to
register all sex offenders (retroactively) who remain under criminal justice
supervision; requires all states to register certain juvenile sex offenders over the
age of 14; requires that states make “failure to register” a felony offense; creates
three ‘tiers’ of offenders with corresponding registration requirements; requires
the creation and regular maintenance of a searchable internet database.311
Brief history of the Connecticut sex offender registry
In 1998, Connecticut passed a law authorizing then-Department of Public Safety (DPS),
now known as the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP), to
“establish and maintain a central registry of sex offenders.”312 The Connecticut law also required
that “registry information be made available to the public through the Internet and at each local
police department or State Police troop.”313 With the stipulation to make sex offender registrant
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information publicly available, Connecticut joined the “national bandwagon.”314 According to
data IMRP colleagues and I have compiled in 2017, there are 5,389 registered sex offenders in
the state.315 Over the lifetime of the state’s registry (since its implementation in October of 1998
to present), a total of 9,070 convicted sex offenders have registered with the Connecticut State
Police.316 During the registry’s first two years in 1998 and 1999, CSP registered 1,302 new
registrants - including re-registration of persons convicted of sexual offences prior to 1998. Thus,
the registry was retroactively applied to individuals with prior applicable sexual offenses. In
2000, the number of new registrants decreased 29%. From 2000 to 2010, the trend in new
registrants remained relatively stable. Beginning in 2011 through 2016, however, there was a
small decrease in new registrants.317
Under the federally-mandated registry system, penalties apply to sex offender registrants
in the state who fail to update their information – such as a change in residence or workplace
address – within a timely fashion. The Connecticut law specifies that registrants notify the
DESPP of address change(s) within five days of the change(s) as well as verify their home
address every 90 days. If they fail to comply, registrants can be arrested for a class D felony – in
the same company with offenses as retail theft under $10,000 or issuing a bad check.318 Federal
law provides for up to ten years of jail time, but leaves discretion to the states.319
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Since its inception, the Connecticut sex offender registry has had a stormy history – both
legally and politically speaking. Over the last twenty years, power plays have emerged over the
role of the law, its clarity, and precision. In 1997, prior to official creation of the Connecticut
registry, then-state Attorney General, Richard Blumenthal (now a U.S. Senator) supported police
chiefs across the state in seeking immunity from “any lawsuits that might result” from the new
law requiring disclosure of information about sex offenders living in communities to the
public.320 Specifically, the police chiefs wanted clarity from the General Assembly in terms of
community notification procedures (protocols by which to inform communities where sex
offenders reside). If guidelines were in place, then localities and police in their official capacities
would be immune to lawsuits by offenders as well as victims (in the event release of information
led to identification of a victim, for instance). “I want to protect my citizens,” said Anthony J.
Salvatore, the Police Chief of Cromwell, Conn.321 But ought protection come at the cost of
uncertainty in the law and potential for adverse effects?
At the same time, Michael P. Lawlor, then-state representative from East Haven (now
undersecretary of criminal justice policy under Governor Dannel P. Malloy), who helped draft
the Connecticut version of Megan’s law, explained the catch-22 in this way:
[t]hats the real controversy about Megan’s laws…If we tell people, ‘Don’t worry,
we’ll let you know if there’s a sexual offender in your neighborhood,’ and we
can’t deliver, what do we do? Do we create a false sense of security for people?322
Thus, anxieties on all sides took shape – whether they emanate from law enforcement fearing
lawsuits if they either infringed on rights of the accused or failed to prevent sex crimes; or from
politicians who did not want to be seen as soft on crime while maintain a veneer of reasonable
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compassion; or from attorneys and activists who questioned the constitutionality of legislation
like Megan’s Law.
The law, which took effect October 1998, required local police departments to make
registries of sex offenders publically available and accessible. But not all departments followed
the new rules at first. According to a sample of six police departments in the state, just a third
reported that the registries had become publically available. Three others responded that they
were uncertain; and the sixth, Fairfield Police Department, refused to make the list of sex
offenders available to the public, pending guidance from the town attorney. In an attempt to
reassure the public that clarity and consistency would come soon, Blumenthal said he was
sending letters to every police departments in the state to inform them of the public registry
requirements, stating that “[t]here is some confusion among police departments about the
provisions of the new law,” but emphasizing that “the law is quite clear that these registries are
open to the public, no questions asked.”323
One year after Connecticut mandated that the sex offender registry be publicly available
online, an initial failure of the registry would come to pass: an eleven-year-old girl from
Willimantic, Conn. was murdered by a neighbor, a convicted sex offender.324 In the wake of this
homicide, then-state Democratic senator Kevin B. Sullivan commented:
A law on the books is a beginning, not an end, People have to be aware of it,
police departments have to be aggressive, and we in the legislature learn the
strengths and weaknesses in the application. This is a terrible way to learn that
you need to do something more.325
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From this rather detached comment, we detect the fragments of confusion the role of law can
leave behind in its wake. Sullivan says that “[a] law on the books is a beginning, not an end.” In
basic terms, the text of law does not have finality to the degree actualization of law does. “People
have to be aware of it, police departments have to be aggressive…” Here, it takes the duality of
public awareness and persistent law enforcement to concretize the law’s words into action.
Finally, a frank reading of Sullivan’s suggestion that “we in the legislature learn the strengths
and weaknesses in the application” discloses the idea that legislators experiment with law in the
anticipation that it will undergo numerous rough drafts – even if those iterations come at the
expense of livelihoods or lives.
It would seem that law is given permission to meander, to make itself clearer, more
decisive, more comprehensible. Yet, the realities of law enforcement in society do not have that
luxury of pause for re-doing or undoing. As a consequence, law recedes into obscurity and
irrelevance if it cannot assist in securing the precision and determinacy required by law
enforcement. The actual victims of law’s carelessness (for example, a murdered girl from
Williamtnic) are simply a signpost for lawmakers that “you need to do something more.” If the
registry already exists, however, what is that “something more”? Is it more surveillance of
offenders on the registry? More monitoring and tracking of offenders? Expanding the registry to
encompass more people – not only individuals who have committed sexual offenses, but to cover
those who may commit sex crimes in the future?326 By bizarre turns, the failures of law enable it
to clamor for more.
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In 2002, the Connecticut sex offender registry faced yet another controversy – this time,
involving a constitutional challenge. Critics, including the Connecticut American Civil Liberties
Union (which had challenged the law in 1999) of the registry contended that it violated due
process rights.327 Specifically, the ACLU and others identified the registry’s lack of means to
identify an offender’s level of dangerousness or risk level to the community as a site for concern.
To that end, they urged Connecticut to put in place a hearing process for a board of mental health
experts or a judge to make such a determination – as had been done in several states, including
New Jersey, home of the original Megan’s Law. Otherwise, as University of Connecticut School
of Law Professor Timothy Everett, explained, ‘[y]ou couldn’t tell whether to be worried or not if
you lived near one of the people of the Net.’328 State officials, meanwhile, argued that it was not
the state’s responsibility or “obligation” to determine a person’s level of risk, threat, or
“dangerousness” posed to the greater community.329 Indeed, the website of the Connecticut sex
offender registry posts the following disclaimer:
The Department of Emergency Services & Public Protection has not considered
or assessed the specific risk of re-offense with regard to any individual prior to his
or her inclusion within this Registry, and has made no determination that any
individual included in the Registry is currently dangerous. Individuals included
within the Registry are included solely by virtue of their conviction record and
state law. The main purpose of providing this data on the Internet is to make the
information more easily available and accessible, not to warn about any specific
individual.330
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In this case, the state’s registry is purportedly for public information not identification of
individual risk.
Further separating the state’s obligation to public safety from the very task of assessing
each offender’s risk to it, then-state Attorney General Richard Blumenthal declared that
moreover, ‘…we have no clearly reliable predictors about dangerousness so the hearing would
be elaborate, costly and in the end, perhaps, unreliable.’331 Blumenthal acknowledges the limits
of law while denying the possibility that those limits are rooted in lack of knowledge are best,
omission of facts at worst. In this context, the expanding carceral state cannot be expected to
bother with minutia of individual sex offenders; rather, it is the dangerous classes or groups of
offenders that fall within the state’s purview: it is easier to regulate the population wholesale
than it is to take on an exacting taxonomy of dangerous, risk-bearing persons. In the following
section, I discuss a Connecticut case that ultimately reached the Supreme Court and was decided
in 2003, Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe.
In view of the state’s turbulent experiences with the creation and maintenance of its sex
offender registry, it is fitting that the state’s General Assembly authorized creation of a taskforce
to evaluate it. By doing so, the legislature has to an extent admitted the existence of conceptual
and practical murkiness permeating the registry law’s stated objectives and operations.
Interestingly, it will take the work of a law-created taskforce (the Connecticut General
Assembly-authorized Special Committee on Sex Offenders) to remedy the law-generated
problems plaguing enforcement and undermining law-society relations that have clung to the
registry from its inception.
************
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Is it registering? Exploring the registry’s effectiveness, constitutionality, and unintended
consequences
Effectiveness
Before moving into the constitutional questions surrounding sex offender registries, I
address perhaps what is perhaps a more obvious, practical inquiry: Do sex offender registries
enhance public protection and help to secure public safety? Scholars (Cohen and Jeglic 2002;
Durling 2006; Tewksbury and Lees 2007; Terry 2007; Socia 2012; J.J. Prescott 2012; Benedet
2012; Levenson, Grady, and Leibowitz 2016) ranging from the fields of sociology to law to
criminology have been pursuing this line of questioning since the burgeoning of sex offender
registries in the 1990s. Some of their key inquiries and findings warrant substantive attention.
One question scholars ask begins at what is a more fundamental level: do sex offender
registries make the American public safer? In other words, do sex offender registries accomplish
their purported objective(s)? Namely, do they enhance law enforcement responsiveness to, and
supervision of, sex offenders deemed serious risk for recidivating; and, if they are public, do the
registries enhance community ability to know where offenders reside in the vicinity so that
potential victims take measures to protect themselves by “facilitating the public monitoring and
physical avoidance of those individuals”?332 If these are the aims, do sex offender registries get
the job done? According to Prescott (2012), “sex offender registration laws appear to reduce the
frequency of reported sex offenses,” especially in numerically large populations of registrants.
Specifically, Prescott found that:
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average-size registry decreases the incidence of crime by approximately 1.21 sex
offenses per year by 10,000 people, a 13 percent reduction from the sample
mean.333
Requiring registration does appear to be effective, particularly as that requirement is a
component of active law enforcing procedures such as increased surveillance and tracking –
mechanisms that have a deterrent effect as well. Is the picture of efficacy as sanguine as it
sounds? Prescott cautions that:
even if registration and notification laws succeed at reducing the relative
incidence of crimes against particular classes of victims believed to be especially
vulnerable, one cannot assume that the overall recidivism rate – much less the sex
offense rate across the board – has also fallen.334
One can imagine that offenders may simply retreat to a different geographic area to avoid
applicability of movement prohibitions. For example, if an offender is required to maintain a
distance of 1,000 feet or more from schools, he may simply decide to contain his movement in
another part of town – or a different town altogether. On the one hand then, registries do appear
to reduce recidivism to a degree, at least in the immediate area to which an offender is confined.
On the other hand, registries do not appear to have a deterrent effect on their own and do not in
general “positively affect sex offense frequency.”335 Registries may be effective when it comes
to reducing recidivism among individuals who have already offended, but less effective when it
comes to deterring those who have yet to offend.
Levenson, Grady, and Leibowitz find that the reassuring effects of registries may end at
the level of sentiment:336 while the concept and existence of sex offender registries make the
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public “feel safer,” data “indicate that their actual effectiveness in preventing sexual recidivism
is quite weak.”337 In their review of previous studies assessing the impact of sex offender
registration and notification laws (SORN), Levenson, Grady, and Leibowitz observe that “[m]ost
single-state studies have not detected significant reductions in sex crime rates that can be
credited to SORN policies.”338 In addition, the note that studies examining multiple states’
registries also yield “mixed results,” with most showing “small or no effects on recidivism
attributable to SORN” laws.339
Interestingly, in ten states, there was an increase in rape rates in California after passage
of SORN laws, whereas a handful of states (including Connecticut), showed “non-significant
trends.”340 In addition, where registration does appear to “decrease the rate of recidivistic sex
offenses,” public notification does not have the same effect.341 Thus, an offender’s awareness of
public knowledge regarding his sex crime(s) does not have the deterrent effect envisioned with a
publicly-accessible registry system. Further compounding obstacles to assessing the system’s
efficacy is the enormous variety among the states in terms of implementation such that:
[i]t is difficult to keep track of whether the offenders are actually registering. The
rules for which offenders are required to register, how they need to register, the
type of information they need to provide, and who has access to this information
varies from state to state.342
Likewise, scholars, policymakers, and practitioners are questioning just how effective an
offense-based registry system is – as opposed to a risk-based system. Although it may sound
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counterintuitive to ask, the inquiry can become: are one’s crimes the appropriate basis for longterm registration as an offender? Do one or two illegal sex acts render an individual a pedophile
or sexual predator for life? Without diminishing the horror of sex crimes against individuals of
all ages, it is important to ask whether an offense-based system is a valuable tool for law
enforcement; or, would a system anchored in the premise that one’s mental state is tethered to
criminogenic behaviors be more targeted, more accurate, more precise, and better serve law
enforcement? For all intents and purposes, the Connecticut sex offender registry does not appear
to be working as originally envisioned. I explore these questions through my IMRP work in
Chapter Five.
Constitutionality
Just as the utility of SORN legislation has proven to be a mixed bag, so, too, disputes
over its constitutionality have yielded mixed and confusing outcomes. The jury is out when it
comes to the question of sex offender registries’ overall efficacy in terms of reducing sex
offender recidivism and as a deterrent. In a similar vein, the jury is out when it comes to the
constitutionality of sex offender legislation – particularly as it concerns the sex offender registry
and community notification provisions. At all levels of the judiciary, sex offender registries and
community notification mechanisms have been deemed at times constitutional and at other times
unconstitutional – in whole or in part.
The U.S. Supreme Court is no stranger to the legal fray over determining the
constitutional status of sex offender laws. As I have shown in Chapter Three, the Court has taken
a schizophrenic approach to constitutional questions bearing on sex-based acts such as child
pornography and predation. For starters, in Miller v. California (1973), the Court ruled that
obscenity was outside First Amendment protection – but that determining whether material was
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beyond the pale required a rigorous three-part test. Yet, the Court decided in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition (2002) that certain provisions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act were
overbroad and therefore constitutional. As a result, virtual (computer-generated) child
pornography was not deemed as outside free speech protection. Six years later, however, the
Court upheld a federal law that criminalized the ownership and distribution of virtual child
pornography.343 Likewise, mixed signals over the constitutionality of SORN have percolated
throughout the judiciary. Lower courts often strike down laws within the sex offender genre on
due process bases, with the higher courts overturning or affirming, and the Supreme Court
preserving the laws.
Beginning with Kansas v. Hendricks (1997), the Court upheld the state’s Sexually
Violent Predator Act.344 In so doing, the High Court reversed the state supreme court’s decision
striking down the Act for violations of substantive due process. The Act provided for civil
procedures to place individuals diagnosed with mental abnormalities or personality disorders
associated with risks to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence into civil commitment. Leroy
Henricks, the defendant, possessed a long history of sexually molesting children and had been
scheduled for release from prison shortly after the Act become law. Was Hendricks’
“grandfathered in?” No. Writing the opinion, Justice Thomas held that:
The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act comports with due process
requirements and neither runs afoul of double jeopardy principles nor constitutes
an exercise in impermissible ex post-facto lawmaking.345
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Five years later, in a case again involving the state of Kansas, McKune v. Lile (2002),346 the
Court determined that its sexual abuse treatment program (SATP) did not constitute a violation
of Fifth Amendment due process rights.347 Both the District Court of Kansas and the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals had found in favor of Lile, ruling that the SATP amounted to coercion
and violated his Fifth Amendment rights.
Robert Lile was a convicted sex offender, one whom a jury had found guilty of rape,
aggravated sodomy (committed at the threat of gunpoint), and aggravated kidnapping. The
Kansas Department of Corrections recommended that Lile enter into a prison treatment program
to prevent him from recidivating upon release. The program requires the participant “to confront
his past crimes so that he can begin to understand his own motivations and weaknesses.”348
Respondent was informed by prison officials that if he did not participate in SATP, his visitation
rights, earnings, work opportunities, ability to send money to family, canteen expenditures,
access to a personal television, and other privileges automatically would be reduced and/or
eliminated.349
Lile contended that such a requirement and incentives to induce fulfillment thereof
amounted to “compelled self-incrimination,” which the Fifth Amendment proscribes. The Court
ruled that the program:
serves a vital penological purpose, and offering inmates minimal incentives to
participate to compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.350
In authoring the opinion, Justice Kennedy acknowledges that “[s]ex offenders are a serious threat
in this Nation.”351 Referencing 1995 statistics showing “an estimated 355,000 rapes and sexual
346
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assaults occurred nationwide” and that “[b]etween 1980 and 1994, the population of imprisoned
sex offenders increased at a faster rate than for any other category of violent crime,” Kennedy
paints a picture of urgency. In addition, Kennedy notes that for 1995, “a majority of reported
forcible sexual offenses were committed against persons under 18 years of age. Nearly 4 in 10
imprisoned violent sex offenders said their victims were 12 or younger.”352 Finally, Kennedy
remarks that “when convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any
other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault” – incidentally, a finding
the veracity of which criminologists and others now question.353 Through the use of criminal
justice data, Justice Kennedy attempted to bring statistical, technical clarity to constitutional
questions pertaining to sex offender rights.
In Kennedy’s assessment, Kansas has a “vital interest in rehabilitating convicted sex
offenders” in order to prevent recidivism and ensure public safety.354 What is more, Kennedy
found that SATP’s impositions fall on prisoners, rather than “ordinary citizens” – a distinction
that figures importantly into “weighing respondent’s constitutional claim.”355 An offender has
less a claim to rights than an individual who has not yet violated the legal and/or constitutional
bases for those rights. Kennedy reinforces the idea that rights can become abridged once a citizen
violates the basis for those rights – for, “[a] broad range of choices that might infringe
constitutional rights in a free society fall within the expected conditions of confinement of those
lawfully convicted.”356 More, he states unequivocally that the SATP is certainly not a “mere
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subterfuge” for a continued criminal proceeding (which otherwise would constitute a double
jeopardy).357 In sum, Kennedy determines that the Kansas SATP:
represents a sensible approach to reducing the serious danger that repeat sex
offenders pose to many innocent persons, most often children. The State’s interest
in rehabilitation is undeniable.358
In one fell swoop, Kennedy deftly joins together strands of the more traditional rehabilitation
impetus with threads of the post-modern carceral state logics of risk and danger assessment. On
the one hand, the state’s program is necessary for reducing future threats posed by risky persons.
On the other hand, the state’s program is necessary for rehabilitating persons into functioning,
non-risky citizens. Which is it? Does Kennedy imply that risky persons can in fact be
rehabilitated and transformed into unthreatening individuals? Or is rehabilitation a practical
objective for certain offenders but not others? Again, the role of law and its intent remain
unclear. Offenders seem forever consigned to the risk-bearing archetype – but under the canopy
of rehabilitation. As a consequence of fuzzy law, it would appear that offenders can be
rehabilitated but not fully removed from their risk profiles.
In Smith v. Doe (2003), the majority opinion of which was also authored by Justice
Kennedy, the Court held that Alaska’s sex offender retroactive application does not violate the
ex post facto clause.359 The District Court had upheld the law, but the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals found the law was punitive; thus, conflict existed at different levels of the judiciary, and
the Supreme Court intervened.
The Alaska law mandated placement of sex offenders on the public registry; registration
status could extend beyond one’s incarceration status. This is the case with many states in the
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United States, including Connecticut, in which one can serve for one or two years, but remain on
the registry for at least ten years. The Court concluded that the Alaska law was a civil (rather
than a penal, punitive), nonpunitive means of identifying previous sex offenders for public safety
purposes. In no uncertain terms, Kennedy makes clear that “a conviction for a sex offense
provides evidence for one’s risk of returning to crime.”360 In the dissent, however, authored by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and joined by Justice Breyer, the act was deemed “ambiguous in
intent and punitive in effect” and therefore requirements incompatible with the ex post facto
clause.361 Moreover, Kennedy casts the Alaska law as imposing but a “minor” condition of
registration. In addition, the Court finds that registration requirements are not “excessive” but
rather, are consistent with “empirical research on child molesters” which at the time showed that
re-offenses among the “dangerous class of sex offenders” can occur many years after one’s
release from prison.”362 In these ways, the Court’s majority speaks the languages of technicality
in order to ground the sex offender registry in actuarial sciences and data. The Court’s majority
rationalizes the role of law within a context of surveillance, risk-assessment, and dangermonitoring that must be ongoing – a context that necessarily continues beyond the jail house.
In Connecticut Public Safety v. Doe (2002), Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
unanimous 9-0 opinion upholding the state’s public, online sex offender registry. This ruling
reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision barring public disclosure of the state’s sex
offender registry.363 Primarily, the lower court had found that public disclosure deprived
registered sex offenders of due process, as the state did not provide offenders a hearing to
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determine their risk or “dangerousness.”364 For the Highest Court, a key factor in determining
that the registry did not violate an offender’s right to due process was that Connecticut:
Decided that the registry requirement shall be based on the fact of previous
conviction, not the fact of current dangerousness. Indeed, the public registry
explicitly states that officials have not yet determined that any registrant is
currently dangerous.365
Under the challenged law, conviction triggers registration – not the convicted individual’s level
of dangerousness or risk to society. To this point, Rehnquist notes that “due process does not
require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State’s statutory scheme.”366 In
other words, the Court finds that a due process claim is irrelevant with respect to one’s level of
risk or danger, because it is allegedly not the foundation for registration status. Rehnquist
explains that:
[i]ndividuals included within the registry are included solely by virtue of their
conviction record and state law. The main purpose of providing this data on the
Internet is to make the information more easily available and accessible, not to
warn about any specific individual.367
An actual conviction – one that has already gone through legal, due process – triggers
registration. Evaluation of an offender’s threat to the broader public in Connecticut via a risk of
recidivating, is outside this factual basis for registration. Finally, the Court did not reach an
inquiry of whether a substantive due process violation occurred, pointing to the fact that the
respondent made only a procedural claim.
As I have discussed, the Supreme Court upheld sex offender registry laws in the Kansas,
Alaska, and Connecticut cases. Yet, there is one glaring site of imprecision I detect in the Court’s
decision-making: the issue of registries based on offender’s conviction or risk. Specifically, how
364
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do we pair Justice Kennedy’s contention in Smith v. Doe that a sex offense conviction is
evidence of recidivism risk (within the same Court term, no less) with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
pronouncement that the Connecticut registry is designed to give the public information – not to
warn it of “any specific individual” regarding his or her risk level. Does Rehnquist obfuscate
Kennedy’s meaning of conviction equals risk? Is Kennedy incorrect to say that a conviction
equals risk in the first place? What about offenders against whom prosecutors decide to drop
charges or those who plea down to one count of child pornography possession when they could
have been convicted on multiple counts of sexual assault? How does the role of sex offender
registry serve to organize or alternatively, disorganize enforcement?
Confusion over sex offender registries persists – along both constitutional and practical
fronts. In fact, 2016 brought significant challenges to the registry. It was the year in which a
divided Pennsylvania Supreme Court (4-2 decision) ruled that offenders who commit certain sex
offenses (like possession of child pornography) should not be required to undergo lifetime
registration, unless they commit one or more sex crimes after the initial conviction. As one local
journalist reported, “they have to become recidivists to quality for the lifetime registration.”368
Until this ruling, Pennsylvania state police had been requiring first-time sex offenders to register
for life if they have multiple sex crime convictions originating from a single criminal incident.369
One journalist wrote of what the majority decision means practically speaking:
[t]he majority decision means sex offenders convicted of “Tier 1” crimes
including kidnapping of minors, child luring, institutional sexual assault, indecent
assault, prostitution involving minors, possessing child porn and unlawful contact
with a minor won’t be required to register for life on their first offense, no matter
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how many charges their first convictions entail. They will still have to register
with police for 15 years.370
Life registration may be out for some offenders, but the fifteen year-minimum registration period
would still apply for first-time Tier 1 offenders. Commenting on the ruling, local defense
attorney Brian Perry said that it “allows individuals to rehabilitate themselves and not have to
deal with (registration) for the rest of their lives.371
It was the year that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a North Carolina sex
offender law barring sex offenders from “visiting any place where minors gather for regularly
scheduled activities.” As the court explained, “neither an ordinary citizen nor a law enforcement
officer could reasonably determine what activity [is] criminalized” by the law. “As a
consequence,” the court concluded, it “does not meet the standards of due process because it is
unconstitutionally vague.”372
It was the year that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down Michigan sex
offender statute amendments that among other things required offenders to maintain a distance of
at least 1,000 feet from a school and ranked them according to levels of perceived dangerousness
or risk to the public. Writing for a three-judge panel, Judge Alice Batchelder ruled that these
stipulations were punitive and decried them as resembling ancient rituals of banishment and
shaming. She noted how these statutes prevented offenders from being able to find housing or
work. Finding that there was no “credible evidence that such laws prevent recidivism,”
Batchelder writes that the statute:

370

Ibid.
Ibid.
372
Stern, Mark Joseph. 2016. May 16 2017. ‘Federal appeals court strikes down North Carolina
sex offender law.’ http://www.slate.com/blogx/xxfactor/2016/12/02/federal_appeals_court_strikes_down_north_carolina_sex_offender_law.html.
371

144

brands registrants as moral lepers solely on the basis of prior
conviction…consigning them to years, if not a lifetime, of existence on the
margins, not only of society, but often…from their families, with whom, due to
school zone restrictions, they may not even live.373
Batchelder locates her impassioned critique in the fact that the statute effectively banishes
offenders from sections of communities based on prior convictions. The irony of this is palpable.
After all, many criticisms of sex offender registry and notification laws are directed at the idea
that they are rooted in ambiguous, intangible evaluations of risk – rather than concrete
realizations of a formal conviction.
In 2017, with Justice Neil Gorsuch now on it, the Supreme Court will be evaluating
whether a North Carolina law that bars convicted sex offenders and minors from communicating
on social media platforms (for example, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) infringes on First
Amendment rights with its overbroad language.374 The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
law in a divided ruling. Opponents of the law argue that the statute is not narrowly tailored and
covers too much speech – that the ban on sex offenders from online usage reaches access to
online job postings or prevents them from “reading the daily musings of President Donald
Trump.” In response, North Carolina Attorney General Josh Stein has stated that the law:
keeps registered sex offenders…social networking websites that kids use without
denying the offenders access to the Internet. It just keeps them off…certain web
sites.375
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As of 2016, a “vast majority”376 of the 859,500 registered sex offenders in the United States are
required to register personal information – ranging from their names and addresses to their social
media user names.377 Will the Court uphold the North Carolina statute, as it has upheld
associated sex offender legislation in other states in years past? Will the Court permit law to
extend carceral bans (or, at the least, restrictions) on physical movement within an offender’s
offline community to his mobility within the online world? At this point, the role of law and its
parameters remain unclear.
Unintended consequences
The sex offender registry’s efficacy and constitutionality have faced numerous
challenges. Finally, there is the issue of unintended consequences. When the registry is
implemented successfully, what do the unanticipated results look like? A brief sampling reveals
that unanticipated outcomes fall into three categories: vigilante responses; aiding and abetting
offenders; and community fall-out. Wright discusses a 2006 incident that spanned national
borders:
In April 2006, Stephen Marshall, a resident of Nova Scotia, Canada, identified the
home addresses of two random sex offenders registered on the Main sex offender
registry Web site. Marshall drove to the home of the two men, with whom he had
no personal relationship, and shot and killed both.378
In what constitutes a clear-cut case of vigilantism, a Canadian man crossed the border with the
objective of killing two sex offenders, with whom he had no personal tie or connection – other
than reading their names from a publicly accessible website. Under these circumstances, the
registry did not deter crime, it bred it. The criminal registry gave information, and an individual
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utilized that information to execute yet another criminal act. Seepage of the carceral state into the
civil society is rendered most explicit in a vigilante act: the citizen becomes judge, juror, and
executioner of the publicly-identified criminal. The citizen continues the carceral state’s project
of criminal sanction albeit in a graphically violent manner. After all, if the carceral state thrives
on the continual expansion of the criminal, the punitive, the illicit into the realm of civil society,
it is fitting that some citizens would likewise willingly take up the mantle of this carceral state
extension. Just as this expansion feeds the carceral state’s power, so too, it can feed one’s sense
of power and purpose within this carceral-civil polis.
In addition to providing the informational basis for vigilante attacks, sex offender
sentencing and registration laws have also incidentally promoted instances of what I call “aiding
and abetting.” Until recently, there was an Arizona radio music station (mainly oldie tunes) that
for two years aired a public service announcement encouraging people to hide potential evidence
in child pornography cases, such as photos or images on one’s computer.379 When interviewed,
the radio station’s owner, Paul Lotsof, said that while he does not agree with the idea of child
pornography, he believes that the state’s ten-year minimum sentence for possession of each
image “is too harsh and costly for taxpayers.”380 Lotsof added that “people don’t deserve life in
prison, just because they have pictures of naked juveniles.”381 In his capacity as a private citizen
and local media (i.e., radio) business owner, Lotsof acted on behalf of the sex offender who
traffics in child pornography. In a word, Lotsof was the public defender. In a more cynical
formulation, however, Lotsof can be seen as an aider and abetter to sex offenders. He sought to
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provide cover for a class he believed had become the object of an exaggerated criminal justice
schema.
Finally, the issue of public fall-out is quite possible when it comes to sex offender
registration and community notification law applications. In 2014, for example, residents in
Manchester, Connecticut erupted into anger over news that sex offenders were living in a halfway house there.382 Residents discovered that the state Department of Corrections had overseen a
group of convicted sex offenders move into a house “across from a school bus stop.”383 At a
public gathering, Scott Semple, the Department of Corrections Commissioner, said that
“virtually all the offenders” residing in the house “are on special parole.”384 Tellingly, Semple
further explained that his agency is obligated from a “statutory perspective” to “manage the
population.”385 Families expressed fury and shock that the state would permit such proximity
between offenders and youth in the community. In this instance, the managerial drive of the state
had hit a wall with public opinion. When inserted into the fabric of everyday lives of citizens, the
carceral state’s actuarial management rationale and distended surveillance mechanisms unravel
into disarray.
************
Dazed and confused: registry a symptom of law’s un-clarity
As I have discussed, the sex offender registry, whether it is analyzed on practical or
constitutional levels, cuts a striking example of just how tangled a web law, policing, technology,
and crime weave. Imbued with stated objectives of enhancing public safety, reducing offender
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recidivism, and amplifying deterrence, the registry does not readily appear successful – or, at the
least, not consistently and significantly so – on these fronts.
As currently understood and implemented, the registry appears to validate continued
carceral state applications. Lack of clarity in the law on the legislation side feeds into lack of
clarity on the enforcement side. Imprecision within the law leads to imprecision without.
Inaccuracies built into the law construct inaccuracies that touch real lives – of both enforcer and
on whom the law is enforced.
In the final chapter, Chapter Five, I discuss findings from my work on behalf of the
Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy for Connecticut’s sex offender task force.
Specifically, I explore these findings in the context of how murky law creates perfect conditions
for emboldened construction of a technology-infused new penology as well as the intensive
unfolding of the carceral-civil society. Finally, I explain how proper discernment of these
patterns within law making and law enforcing can lead to a sharper framework of analysis and
response.
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Law’s Haze, Tech’s Maze
Seeing through law’s haze and tech’s maze
I recount that punishment is not just a direct indicator of solidarity and core political capacity for
the state…it is also the paradigm of public dishono[u]r, inflicted as a sanction for individual
moral, and thus civic, ‘demerit.’386
It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity.387
If we continue to develop our technology without wisdom or prudence, our servant may prove to
be our executioner.388
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Introduction
The title of this dissertation, along with the title of this chapter, suggests a central goal in
this work, which is to move toward a better understanding about ways that law’s imprecision and
lack of clarity can lead to impracticality and confusion in enforcement. Specifically, I have
argued that policing cyber sex offenders marks a vital component in ongoing Information Age
expansions of the surveillance, risk-based, carceral-civil society.
Here, I contend that imprecision and lack of clarity within the law generate hazy,
arbitrary applications in enforcement thereof. More, I have shown that given the dizzyingly rapid
evolution of communicative technologies, policing becomes particularly challenging when the
rules of the game within social media websites or cell phone applications change day to day. For
this reason, I submit that policing technology-assisted sex offenders provides a useful example of
shifts in law enforcement concepts and practices.
************
Law’s Murky Effects on Enforcement’s Purveyors and Objects
Throughout this dissertation, I have documented various – even competing – ways sex
crimes have been legislated, policed, and tracked across the centuries in the United States. Using
the state of Connecticut as the primary case study, I have identified, examined, and analyzed
(with an eye toward the consequences of unclear, imprecise, confusing law as it is carried out in
daily enforcement practices and mechanisms) the role of law in sex crimes policing as a
microcosm for understanding more broadly the continued expansion of what I call the carceralcivil society. Carceral power – and by extension, its growth – thrives in the confusing spaces,
gaps, and interstices of the law. Confusion in the law forms the breeding grounds for the melee

152

that ensues either viscerally or more subtly. Furthermore, troubled law fosters the expansion of
the carceral state and ultimately, the seepage of penal dimensions and functions into civil society.
I have chronicled the ways in which confusion lurks within legislation, permeates
policing practices, and spreads among the law’s objects (i.e., offenders). Throughout American
history, legislating sex crimes has never been an enterprise of consistency or continuity.
Likewise, enforcement practices have necessarily mirrored the patchwork state of affairs within
the law across the decades. This lack of clarity and precision gets further exacerbated by all that
the new geographic communicative terrain of cyberspace entails: including but not limited to, the
seemingly boundless, parameter-deficient topography characteristic – in fact, constitutive – of
the online world. In tandem with hazy law (and its troubled enforcement), rapidly-shifting
technologies providing breeding grounds for the continued progression and escalation of what I
have identified as the merger between the carceral and the civil. The carceral-civil society is one
that encompasses the practices and institutions by which the punitive and the nonpunitive; the
penal and the civil; and the law’s doing and undoing are melded. What is more, Information Age
technologies and behaviors precipitate the fusion of the carceral-civil society by making
criminality on the one hand and surveillance on the other hand easier to do as well as more
accessible to pursue.
In the state of Connecticut, my case study, there are myriad instances of sexual crimes
that have been conducted with the aid of technology. Recent examples from 2017 alone are
many. In May 2017, Southington police referred over a dozen students to a Juvenile Review
Board of “inappropriate texting,” including the sharing of nude images via social media.389 In the
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same month, an Avon middle school teacher was placed on administrative leave for posting
pornographic materials on websites and social media viewable to students – an action that had
been occurring over some time.390 Meanwhile, the math director at Hamden Public Schools and
adjunct professor at Gateway Community College in New Haven was arrested on May 4, 2017
for sending an 18-year-old female student “inappropriate text messages and Instagram
communications.”391 According to the victim’s account, she “didn’t know who was sending
them” and initially thought the text “were from a classmate.”392 On the national level, former
New York congressman Anthony Weiner has been the focus of an investigation for sending
sexually explicit messages and engaging in sexually-based Skype interactions with a fifteenyear-old female minor. As of January 2017, prosecutors were “mulling” whether to press child
pornography charges.393 Weiner had resigned from his congressional post in the wake of
previous sexting scandals with adult women. In May 2017, Weiner pled guilty to one federal
obscenity count (transferring obscene material to a minor) in a plea deal; he will have to register
as a sex offender.394
A common thread that unites these recent accounts highlighting crime-technology
linkages in the facility with which the latter can be deployed in a constitutive maze of illegal
behavior: whether it is peer-to-peer dissemination of nude images or persons in positions of
power who exploit them for sexual purposes. I believe that these are pivotal moments in the
Information Age. These are moments in which the distinctive ecosystems of technological and
390
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online modes of being are effectuating dramatic breaks between how individuals interact, how
individuals socialize (and break boundaries of socialization), how legislators make law, how
police enforce the law, and how crimes are committed.
At the same time we observe the complicated relationships between law and technology
in the policing of cyber sex crimes, we see the resilient development of the carceral state
alongside – and indeed, as a result of – these intersections. In fact, the carceral state is resilient
despite reform efforts to the contrary, as I will explain is occurring in the state of Connecticut.
In Connecticut, the General Assembly-authorized special committee on sex offenders
(under the direction of the Connecticut Sentencing Commission) is undertaking a comprehensive
review of the state’s sex offender registry. Under the auspices of Central Connecticut State
University’s Institute of Municipal and Regional Policy (IMRP), I have been fortunate to
participate in the data-gathering side of this review, which ultimately results in recommendations
that will become state law. A major recommendation in the report is that Connecticut move from
an offense-based sex offender registration system to a risk-based one. According to the report,
recommendations are “aimed at increasing public safety and enhancing reintegration
opportunities for released and supervised sex offenders.”395
Currently, a sexual offense is cause for placement on the public registry. Under the
proposed formulation, offenders would be placed either on a private, law-enforcement-only
registry, if they are deemed low-risk or medium-risk; or, they would be placed on a public
registry, if they are deemed high-risk.396
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To be clear, reasons for such a shift are numerous and evidence-based. First, the offensebased model does not take into account the offender’s specific potentiality to recidivate sexually.
The offense is taken at face value, mostly foreclosing additional inquiry into mitigating factors.
Second, the offense-based model does not consistently yield just, equitable sentencing outcomes.
For example, an individual who sexually assaulted another person before committing arson on
the victim’s home may be able to plea “down” to the non-sexual crime. Thus, there are offenders
on the registry who may not be there for just reasons; on the other hand, there are offenders who
are not on the registry who ought be. In this context, the appeal of a risk-based system, therefore,
is clear. A risk-based system offers the potential for an individualized approach to each sex
offender, by assessing his or her specific risk to re-offend. With a more individualized approach,
there is the hope that low-risk as well as many medium-risk offenders will not be subject to
public scrutiny and stigma. There is also the equally important objective of targeting precious
law enforcement resources to that segment of offenders which poses the greatest threat to public
safety. Thus, individualized punishment and more finely-tuning law enforcement efforts to
protect the community are over-arching goals from Connecticut’s review.
But do risk-assessment based criminal justice structures yield more just outcomes? Of
course, such is the express objective of a risk-assessment framework. Does praxis coincide with
theory, however? To answer this question, it is helpful to return to the basics of what riskassessment actually means.
Risk assessment entails the estimation or prediction of an offender’s potential to

presents more challenges in terms of their risk scoring. For example, according to state police on
the taskforce, there are medium-risk offenders whose criminal actions and risk score point
toward a higher-risk classification.
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recidivate (for example, re-offending sexually and/or violently). This assessment considers a
number of factors alongside an offender’s risk, such as criminal history. Risk assessment is
formally defined as the “use of various tools or instruments typically based on scientific
evidence, to estimate an offenders’ potential for reoffending or causing harm to others and
potential causes or sources of that risk.”397 Research has shown that the best supported,
scientifically validated instruments for assessing risk – in our specific case, the likelihood of
sexual recidivism – are the Static-99, Static-2002, MnSOST-R, and the Risk-Matrix-2000 Sex.
For assessing the risk of violent recidivism (which include sexual components), the best
supported instruments are the VRAG, SORA, Risk-Matrix Combined, SIR, LSI-R and its various
iterations.398
In general, there are five methods to evaluating an offender’s risk to re-offend sexually
that I have identified in the sex offender taskforce report.399 First, there is the unguided or
unstructured clinical judgment. This method entails an evaluator reviewing case material and
applying personal experience to arrive at a risk estimate – without consideration of a specific list
of risk factors or any other underlying information and theory. Second, there is the guided or
structured clinical judgment. This method calls for the usage of a specific list of factors theorized
to be associated with risk – a list that is drawn from personal experience and/or theory – but
empirical evidence is not utilized. Third, there is research-guided clinical judgment. The
evaluator begins with a specified list of risk factors identified in the broader research or body of
professional literature. In conjunction with other factors, considerations, and the use of the
clinician’s judgment, this list is used to make a determination of risk. Fourth, there is the pure
“Sex Offender Risk Assessment Brief with Bibliography.”
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398
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actuarial approach. In this instance, an evaluator uses an instrument comprising a set of
specified, weighted risk factors (factors that have been identified in the literature). This
instrument is then used to identify either the presence or absence of each risk factor. An estimate
of risk is reached via standard, prescribed means of combining the factors. Finally, there is the
adjusted actuarial approach whereby the evaluator begins by administering an actuarial
instrument to the offender. Next, the evaluator utilizes a set list of considerations that can be
utilized either to raise or lower the assessed level of risk.
Methods for risk-assessment vary in terms of how structured or unstructured their
parameters are. For example, the first method discussed above involves the clinician’s discretion
to a great – possibly concerning – degree. Whereas, the latter methods tend to combine theory,
empirical data, and the offender’s unique case factors, leaving less room for discretion or worse,
arbitrary diagnoses.
Many states have sought to bring what the perceive to be more equity and justness to the
sex offender criminal justice regime vis-à-vis a shift to risk-assessment registry systems. At the
time of this writing, fifteen states - Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming have risk-assessment registration systems for sex offenders.400
Meanwhile, five additional states are contemplating the shift from an offense to a risk-based
system: Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, and Ohio.401 What are the results of these moves?
Thus far, it has been a mixed bag.
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From the scant research that has been conducted comparing risk-assessment with offensebased systems, the benefits of shifting to a risk-assessment structure are far from decisive. On the
one hand, a 2013 found that Nebraska saw fewer sex offenders recidivating upon prison release
under the risk-based system, as opposed to an offense-based system.402 Interestingly, Nebraska
originally had an offense-based system, choosing to move to the three-tiered offense-based
system mandated by the Adam Walsh Act. According to the study, this move resulted in higher
recidivism overall – sexually and non-sexually.403 On the other hand, a separate 2013 study
analyzing offender data of formerly incarcerated sex offenders sampled from Florida, Minnesota,
New Jersey, and South Carolina, found that the sample’s sexual recidivism rate was 5.1% during
a five-year period and 10.3% during a 10-year period.404 Researchers found that sexual
recidivism rates differed among the four states selected, but that it did not reach statistical
significance. The trend did reach statistical significance after the 10-year period – with Florida
having the highest recidivism rate and South Carolina having the lowest recidivism rate amongst
the sampled states. Another finding was that corresponding risk indicators (high, medium, lowrisk) and the AWA-based tier designations (Tier III – most serious offenders; Tier II – mediumserious offenders; Tier I – least serious offenders) did not consistently pair. For example, the
study found that Tier II designations actually had higher average risk scores, than any other Tier.
An “unexpectedly high” sexual recidivism rate was found for the AWA Tier II and lower risk
indicator category. Similarly, the study found that a higher AWA tier (for example, Tier III) was

Spohn, Ryan E. 2013. “Nebraska Sex Offender Registry Study.” Criminology and Criminal
Justice Faculty Publications. Paper 17.
http://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=criminaljusticef
acpub.
403 Ibid.
404
See Zgoba et al. 2013. “A Multi-State Evaluation of Sex Offender Risk and Recidivism Using
the Adam Walsh Act Tiers.” Corrections Today Research Notes.
402

159

“significantly associated” with sexual recidivism in the negative direction. That is, offenders in
the AWA Tier III actually had lower recidivism rates than AWA Tier II or Tier I offenders –
again, an unexpected finding. In fact, in three of the four states examined within the study, the
“higher AWA tier was unrelated to reoffending” and in one state, was actually “negatively
associated with reoffending.”405
Apart from the mixed results in a move to a risk-based system – admittedly, only a few of
which have been studied to this point, there are also the benefits and costs to keep in mind
associated with such a move. As is the case with any criminal justice structure, costs and benefits
accompany the risk-based system. Benefits include aid in setting appropriate sentence, custody
level, or conditions for community supervision – in a word, tailoring the punishment to the
crime. In addition, as I have pointed out earlier, law enforcement and broader public safety
resources can be better allocated to protect the public.406 Meanwhile, costs include financial
barriers. For example, the price tag involved with undertaking a detailed risk assessment of each
sex offender may prove an insurmountable obstacle to already cash-strapped towns and
municipalities. On another front, what about the availability of qualified personnel to conduct the
risk assessments? If there is a shortage, to whom or what does the state or locality turn? Finally,
how would law enforcement agencies (or what would be more likely the case, a board of mental
health experts) address the difficulties of scenarios in which an offender disagrees with his or her
risk assessment score and categorized level?407
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Clearly, work needs to be done in terms of understanding more fully the mechanics,
costs, and benefits of a risk-based sex offender registration system. Overall, what will the
consequences of a risk-based criminal justice landscape look like? Feeley and Simon note the
shifts associated with the new penology, which have proven to be instrumental in the
construction of the carceral state and carceral-civil society. First, they highlight that the
“language of probability and risk increasingly replaces earlier discourses of clinical diagnosis
and retributive judgment.”408 In a bizarre way, sex offender risk-evaluation would meld clinical
diagnosis with the language of risk. Second, they discuss the “new objectives” of the criminal
justice system, one of which includes reducing “recidivism” in a systematized manner.409 Indeed,
lowering recidivism is an explicit goal in the shift from an offense-based system to a risk-based
system. Third, they identify the “deployment of new techniques” which involve targeting
offenders “as an aggregate in place of…individualizing or creating equity.”410 Interestingly,
while the risk assessment provides for an individual determination, the offender is nonetheless
placed within a low-risk, medium-risk, or high-risk aggregate grouping – a basis on which
varying levels of imprisonment, registration, and supervision are grounded. Thus, the assessment
may be tailored to the individual, but the ultimate outcome is that the individual is placed into
broader categories of dangerous, risk-bearing offenders.
Once they are identified in these various categories, sex offenders are subject to a host of
criminal sanctions or not – such as registration requirements (for example, public registration and
community notification of one’s offense(s) and residence), prohibitions on specified interactions
with other individuals (for example, child relatives or friends), and surveillance procedures (for
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example, checking-in with authorities each time one plans to leave the state on business or
travel). As Gottschalk correctly states,
[e]ven if they are not subject to civil commitment after serving their time, many
former sex offenders remain deeply enmeshed in the carceral state. This is thanks
to the proliferation of registration, community notification, and residency
restrictions.411
Whether it is via the sex offender registry or risk-assessment schema, sex offenders face the
carceral state head-on. The vastness of the carceral state becomes cemented through the
pervasive mechanisms of risk-identification and different aspects of intensive surveillance
applied wholesale to the sex offender population in the United States. Here, new penology logics
of risk and neoliberal rationales of efficient managerial practices furnish the carceral state with
its conceptual foundation and practical power. Consequently, a risk-based registration system
may enlarge the carceral state’s verve, rather than contract it.412
***********
Law’s Cataracts and the Carceral-Civil Society
In addition to analyzing policing cyber sex offenders as a microcosm of the carceral state
in the Information Age, I also see this dissertation countering – both theoretically and
substantively – Wacquant’s criticism of “criminologists and assorted specialists in criminal
justice issues.”413 According to Wacquant, we:
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burrow away with zeal in the closed perimeter of the ‘crime and punishment’ duet
[and] pay hardly any attention…shifts in class structure and formation, the
deepening of inequalities and the broad revamping of urban poverty…414
The work of Scheingold, Garland, Simon, Feeley, and Gottschalk, however, suggest otherwise –
in the careful attention given to underlying socioeconomic conditions of crime and criminality.
As just one example, Simon and Feeley (1998) have explicitly situated the new penology as a
response “to the emergence of a new understanding of poverty in America.”415 Likewise,
Gottschalk has also demonstrated a precise treatment of the neoliberal policies animating the
carceral state. From the beginning, I have been clear that law-making and law-breaking are part
of constitutive, sociopolitical concepts, praxes, and institutions.
In the final analysis, while this dissertation has focused on cyber sex crimes, this arena of
crime is one text in a genre of instances in which to inspect the broader variegated, complex
intersections between law, policing, crime, technology, and society. Identifying and
understanding the intersections and their resultant outcomes in terms of impacting enforcement
and society is just the beginning, however. Moving forward, additional inquiries should pertain
to the exploration of law’s cataracts with respect to other nexuses of technology, law, and
policing – whether criminal in intent and outcome or not.416
Setting aside questions for future work, I attend to the silver-lining in this – the potential
for “corrective surgery” to law’s blindness in Information Age crime and policing. In a real
sense, people are actively working to reform the law from within. To be sure, it remains unclear
whether that well-intentioned reform will yield beneficial outcomes. Connecticut, however, as
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with other states, is pursuing reform albeit incrementally in how the criminal justice system –
and for that matter, society – addresses sex crimes. The key is to see through the haze of law and
the maze of technology. Particularly if thought and care are given to understanding how the
carceral state operates – especially if the premises of the carceral state are uncovered, then
corrective action may not be far afield. If that is done, then a move away from the carceral-civil
society and toward civil society may still be a viable pursuit.
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